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Fabrication: Corporate and Governmental Crime in the Apparel Industry 
 
Danielle McGurrin 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine both the gendered and racialized 
nature of workplace risk and compensation in the manufacturing industry of apparel.  The 
author selects this industry because of its low-wage, labor intensive, and “deskilled” 
work, performed in often unsafe employment environments with minimal governmental 
regulations and limited unionization. The apparel industry is also characterized by its 
large percentage of racial and ethnic minorities, especially immigrant employees, that 
further disadvantage them in terms of communication barriers, threat of deportation, and 
the multiple and intersecting marginalizations associated with occupying a low-wage, 
minority and/or immigrant status. The gendered effects of workplace risk are addressed 
in the garment industry, as women and girls largely comprise these workers.  
 Using governmental data, including Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the author measures 
the incidences, rates, and demographic characteristics associated with workplace injuries 
and illnesses for the years 1993-2002. In addition to occupational injuries and illnesses in 
these industries, the author examines Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division data 
to examine the incidences and types of compensation violations from the years 1993-
2002. Finally, the author examines the limitations of government safety and 
 v
compensation regulations and enforcement, and the corrective measures that are needed 
to uphold and safeguard the occupational health, safety, and compensation rights of these 
workers. 
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Introduction 
Serious contradictions exist between our human needs and our economic system, a 
system whose primary goal is to maximize profits regardless of the waste, cost, and 
hazards. We see that government is an insufficient bulwark against the baneful effects of 
giant corporate capitalism and often a willing handmaiden. 
From Michael Parenti’s Democracy for the Few (1995:119) 
 
 The purpose of the present study is to examine governmental and corporate 
malfeasance in the apparel industry within the context of an historical, economic, and 
socio-political theoretical framework. Utilizing these lenses, I seek to uncover the 
rationales and processes through which the government and the apparel industry have 
helped facilitate and perpetuate the American and global sweatshop. More specifically, I 
attempt to explain how the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and immigration status 
have impacted worker remuneration, occupational injuries and illnesses, and other 
working conditions in the apparel industry. 
 In Chapter One, I begin with the El Monte, CA case study that highlights the 
abuses associated with modern-day sweatshops. I provide State as well as scholarly 
definitions of what constitutes a sweatshop, as well as operationalize the apparel industry 
under study. Next, I trace the evolution of garment production in the U.S. from the late 
18th century, highlighting its early gender division of labor, multiple ethnic 
transformations, and many work hazards. Then, I introduce the role of unions in 
combating the conditions of the early American sweatshop. It is here where I introduce 
the first qualitative research question that asks: Did size of and participation in union 
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activity influence better working conditions for apparel workers? 
 In the second half of Chapter One, I examine New Deal worker reforms, and the 
subsequent Cold War freeze on the labor gains of the 1930’s and 1940’s. From here, I 
discuss the origins of global capitalism in the Pacific Rim in the textile and apparel 
industries, and its relationship to post-World War II U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
Chronicling each post-War presidency through the Johnson Administration, this section 
demonstrates how key decision-making on issues surrounding protectionism, economic 
trade liberalization, and industrial restructuring, hastened capital flight and low wage 
imports in the apparel industry. 
Shifting the focus from global capitalism in the East, this section emphasizes the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations’ efforts to privatize the global South outside the U.S., 
while promoting deregulation and deindustrialization at home throughout the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s. Specific policies significant to apparel are addressed including export 
processing zones and its impact on the safety, health, economic and other employment 
conditions of domestic and global apparel workers. To this end, I pose my second 
qualitative research question that asks: Did corporate globalization have a negative 
impact on working conditions for domestic and global apparel workers? (Given the 
ongoing and expanding nature of corporate globalization, this research question also 
addresses the present-day impact of corporate globalization). 
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In the final section of Chapter One, I introduce the reader to present-day “free 
trade” organizations and agreements that with few exceptions have nailed the coffin on 
domestic apparel employment and wage sustainability. The effects of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) are discussed in detail. 
In Chapter Two, I take the reader inside the apparel commodity chain. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the structure and organization of the apparel 
industry, its culture, and its practices, all help facilitate and sustain the American and 
global sweatshop. In the first half of this chapter, I provide an overview of the apparel 
industry including a detailed examination of retailers, manufacturers/jobbers, 
contractors/subcontractors, and workers.  
 In the second half of this chapter, I provide a theoretical rationale for the 
gendered nature of corporate and governmental crime in the apparel industry. Given the 
significance of gender in understanding employment opportunities and working 
conditions, I place my third qualitative research questions here: Does the apparel industry 
and the State engage in the hyper-exploitation of gender to further each of their 
respective interests?    
 In Chapter Three, I examine the political economy of worker health and safety 
legislation in America. Given the relationship between safety and health legislation and 
occupational injuries and illnesses, I pose my fourth and final qualitative research 
question here: Did State regulation impact occupational injuries and illnesses in the 
apparel industry? 
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 The chapter begins with the meager beginnings of worker health and safety 
legislation from 1850 to 1950. Next, I discuss the groundwork of the 1960’s leading up to 
the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970. The chapter then 
explores the uneven early years of the OSH Act during the Nixon, Ford and Carter 
Administrations, as well as the deregulation years of the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. During the 1990’s, OSHA is discussed within the paradoxical political 
environment of unprecedented corporate globalization and a reformist Presidential 
Administration. Last in this section, is the stamp of President George W. Bush on worker 
health and safety legislation. 
 The last section of chapter three explores OSHA’s inspection, enforcement, and 
penalty assessments for civil and criminal workplace violations. Limitations with each 
are addressed, as are the limitations associated with Department of Justice (DOJ) 
referrals, and their limited response to the prosecution of willful violations. 
 Chapter Four describes the chronic problem of regulatory sabotage in negating 
safe and healthy workplaces, with specific examples addressing the apparel industry. The 
chapter also calls attention to the linguistic tools and regulatory practices that disguise 
corporate law breaking, as well as disguise the government’s failure to uphold its legal 
obligations in protecting worker safety and health. Specific issues related to the WHD 
and OSHA are addressed. 
 Chapter Five provides first the qualitative research method employed in the first 
half of the dissertation. Using an historical-comparative approach, I define the 
methodology and provide a rationale for why I selected this type of research. Key 
variable concepts from the four qualitative research questions are operationalized, and the 
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strengths and limitations of this research are addressed.  
 The second portion of the methods section in chapter five discusses the 
quantitative methodology employed in the present study. The quantitative data are 
employed to provide a contemporary context to the historical comparative analysis. 
Using secondary data from government sources, I explain the appropriateness of such a 
selection in studying occupational injuries, illnesses, and compensation in the apparel 
industry. Next, I discuss the sources used to obtain data for the secondary data analysis, 
and the strengths and limitations of each. 
 Seven quantitative research questions are posed in this section, with key variable 
definitions provided for each of the hypotheses. The quantitative research questions ask:  
(1) Is there a correlation between the Employment Standards Administration (ESA) 
annual budget and the number of Wage and Hour Division (WHD) cases that are 
conducted each year in the apparel industry? (2) Is there a correlation between the WHD 
budget and the number of annual WHD investigators? (3) Is there a correlation between 
the number of WHD investigators and the number of WHD cases that are conducted each 
year? (4) Is there a correlation between the number of Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) apparel industry inspections and the annual occupational injury 
and illness rate? (5) Is there a correlation between OSHA’s annual budget and the 
number of annual OSHA apparel industry inspections? (6) Did the number of domestic 
apparel workers decline during the period under study? (7)  Did Apparel and Textile 
Industry profits increase during the period under study? (8) Is there a correlation between 
Apparel and Textile Industry profits and the Apparel Production Capacity Index? and (9) 
Has the rate of exploitation of apparel workers increased during the period under study?  
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 In Chapter Six, I provide the results and discussion for the quantitative research 
component of this dissertation.  This chapter provides apparel industry summary data on 
occupational injuries and illnesses, employee and job characteristics, and regulatory 
statistics on OSHA and WHD, the two primary state agencies responsible for enforcing 
labor laws in the apparel industry. Examining the years 1993-2002, I contextualize the 
seemingly surprising reported decline of occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel 
industry with the more predictable findings of fewer OSHA inspections in the apparel 
industry, and an increase in apparel worker exploitation.  
 In the Conclusion section, I tie together the findings of the qualitative and 
quantitative research questions, and summarize the substantive issues plaguing apparel 
industry labor conditions. Finally, future research and policy recommendations for 
improving the health, safety, and compensation of apparel workers are discussed. 
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Chapter One 
The Birth, Decline, and Resurrection of the American Sweatshop 
in Historical Context 
 
In August 1995, in El Monte California, federal and state police agents raided an 
apartment complex believed to be involved in running an illegal sweatshop operation.  
What the agents found would become one of the most publicized and horrifying cases of 
indentured servitude in modern American history. Inside the El Monte compound were 
seventy-two Thai garment workers, mostly women, many of whom had been held in 
near-slavery for up to seven years sewing clothes for some of the nation’s top retailers 
and manufacturers including Macy’s, Nordstrom, Neiman Marcus, and Target/Dayton 
Hudson, to name a few (Su 1997).  
Recruited from their impoverished communities in Thailand with promises of a 
better life, a decent job and pay, the homeworkers <s>1 quickly learned upon arrival at 
the complex east of downtown LA, that their lives were about to take a drastic turn for 
the worse. Forced by their contractors to sew between sixteen and eighteen hours a day, 
for between sixty-nine cents and less than $2 an hour, the El Monte workers were trapped 
quite literally in a vicious cycle that would not permit their freedom until they paid off 
the supposed debt of their transportation to the United States (Boncich and Appelbaum 
2000; Liebhold and Rubenstein 2003 in Bender and Greenwald). 
Although many workers had already paid their recruiters approximately $5,000 
(USD) prior to beginning their work in the United States, (Louie 2001), the workers were 
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acutely vulnerable to further exploitation largely because of their status as primarily 
young, newly arrived, undocumented, immigrant women (and men). In addition to paying 
off their so-called transportation debt, the workers were forced to purchase all of their 
food, toiletry, and other daily necessities from their captors who charged four to five 
times the market price.  
Unable to escape, contractors hawkishly supervised garment production, and 
enforced clothing manufacturer specifications and deadlines, through constant physical 
and verbal intimidation, including threats of rape and murder (Su 1997; and Lieurance 
2003). Exhausted and afraid for their lives, the workers could hardly be expected to 
slumber in their few hours of rest, as they crowded eight to ten into bedrooms built for 
two, and lived nightly with rats crawling over their bodies. Confined by doors that locked 
from the outside to keep workers in (Louie 2001), closely monitored by abusive 
contractors, and surrounded by armed guards in a compound girded by razor wire and 
iron guardrails (Su 1997), the labor conditions endured by the workers were more 
characteristic of a Soviet gulag than a description of a late, twentieth-century American 
workplace. 
While the workers momentarily gained their freedom that day on August 2, 1995, 
they would be imprisoned a second time by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) for nine more days while the federal government decided whether or not to deport 
the enslaved workers back to Thailand. While in custody, the Thai workers were forced 
to wear yellow prison uniforms, and were shackled whenever they were transported 
(Volpp 2002). Pressured by tireless Sweatshop Watch activist members, including the 
Asian Pacific American League Center (APALC), the Thai Community Development 
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Center (TCDC), the Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates (KIWA), local attorneys, and 
an uncomfortable media spotlight, the federal government finally granted the Thai 
workers legal residency with the right to work in the U.S., in 1996 (Louie 2001; and 
Liebhold and Rubenstein 2003, p. 59-60) 
In February, 1996, eight of the ten contractors of the El Monte “slaveshop” 
pleaded guilty in Federal court to conspiracy, smuggling and harboring illegal 
immigrants, and involuntary servitude (Liebhold and Rubenstein 2003). As with most 
occupational crime sentences, the penalties were light compared to the severity of the 
crimes, and the harm imposed to the victims. All of the sentences ranged between two to 
seven years, and a fine totaling $250,000 (ibid 2003). 
The workers filed a class action lawsuit with other local sweatshop victims 
harmed by the same owners <s>2. In 1999, the 150 workers won over $4 million from 11 
of the major companies that were contracting with the operators who had flagrantly and 
viciously flouted multiple U.S. criminal, health, safety, and labor laws. 
What is perhaps most disturbing about the El Monte case is that it is only one 
example of the widespread sweatshop abuse cases that occur in the U.S. (and all over the 
globe). Despite significant improvements in the overall health, safety, and labor 
conditions in most American workplaces throughout the twentieth century, workers in the 
front-line of garment assembly still face many of the same deplorable labor conditions 
that their predecessors did well over one hundred years ago.  The extent of this problem 
is discussed more completely in chapter two. 
 
Defining Sweatshops 
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Its small shops, with little capital investment, including weak infrastructure and 
low technology, characterize garment production. Because the industry lacks the 
technological hardware, production is compensated by the sweated labor of its workers. 
Fueled by the sporadic and irregular demand of the fashion industry, workers in a 
sweatshop often toil as long as eighteen hours each day without a day off for weeks 
during the peak season, only to be fired or laid off, during the off-season.      
The General Accounting Office (1994:1) defines a sweatshop as “a business that 
violates more than one federal or state law governing wages and hours, child labor, health 
or safety, workers’ compensation, or industry registration.” Unknown to most, federal 
laws and regulations do not define a sweatshop. Instead, state and federal governments 
rely upon a patchwork of criminal, labor, health, safety, and compensation laws and 
regulations to manage crimes and civil violations in the workplace. 
In contrast to the GAO definition, some sweatshop scholars define a sweatshop as 
a “specific organization of work” characterized by “very low fixed costs” (Piore 
1997:136). These fixed costs including rent, electricity, heat, health and safety 
precautions, etc., that are normally held to a minimum by operating substandard, 
overcrowded, and unhealthy factories, overseen by a contractor or subcontractor. In 
apparel sweatshops, lowering labor costs is the primary way that contractors compete for 
razor thin profit margins.  
In order to reduce labor costs to the lowest possible level, garment workers are 
normally paid by the number of sewing operations performed, otherwise known as the 
“piece rate” (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). Although U.S. federal law requires 
contractors to pay minimum wage and overtime to employees even when the worker’s 
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output falls below the minimum, contractors routinely manipulate the price of the piece 
rate, so that workers are paid far less than minimum wage (ibid. 2000). 
Perhaps the broadest definition of a sweatshop includes factories or shops that fail 
to pay their employees a living wage.  As Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000:4) contend, 
“even if a factory follows the letter of the law in every detail, workers may [still] suffer 
abuse, job insecurity and poverty. At a minimum then, a living wage would include a 
wage that allows a family to support itself at an adequate standard of living (defined by 
the prevailing cost of living in a given area), including decent housing, in accordance 
with the local housing market and health insurance coverage for the entire family.” (ibid  
2000). As we will see in the following chapter, most apparel industry employees are in 
the bottom 10 percent of all U.S. wage earners, making them among the most poorly paid 
of American workers.  
Before going to the next section, for the purposes of this dissertation, given the 
reliance on governmental data in measuring the key variables for this study, a sweatshop 
will be defined using the GAO’s definition (1994:1) categorizing a sweatshop as “a 
business that violates more than one federal or state law governing wages and hours, 
child labor, health or safety, workers’ compensation, or industry registration. 
 
From the Home to the Sweatshop: A Brief History of the Garment Industry in the U.S. 
The emergence of garment production in the U.S. has essentially two distinct but 
interrelated histories. The first garment history is that of the textile industry which began 
in New England in the early 1790s with the invention of the first water-powered spinning 
mill (Dublin 1994) <s>3.  The second history is that of the apparel industry which 
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emerged in New York City with the men’s clothing industry in the 1830s, and then 
exploded in the 1850s following the first great wave of European immigration, and the 
invention of the industrial sewing machine (Green 1996; Petras 1992). For industry 
definitions, see endnote 3. 
In the U.S., the textile and apparel industries evolved separately. Today, however, 
these industries are vertically integrated and arranged under a single management system. 
Because textile and apparel production require different technologies and production 
processes, however, they remain separate industries (Rosen 2002).  
The focus of this paper is on the industry of workers who cut and sew fabrics into 
clothing: the apparel industry. Until about the 18th century, women made most of the 
clothing worn by their families inside of the home. The exception was upper-class 
tailored-ware, which was specially ordered by customers and usually made by men who 
worked as tailors. With the rise of the middle class, tailors found a market for “ready-
made” men’s clothing in the 1830s and 1840s.  They, along with merchant 
manufacturers, started farming out or outsourcing the sewing of the cheaper quality of 
fabric to women (Green 1996). Here, for the first time (native born) women could receive 
wages for their “homework,” though as Green (1996:415) states, “this did not necessarily 
mean they saw the coins of their labor.”  At a time when women could not own property, 
vote, or work in most industries, economic independence was a rarity. 
By the 1850s in America, gender-based labor segmentation was firmly a part of 
apparel commodity production (Stansell 1983), though these changeable gender divisions 
were rarely linked to any objective measure of performance <s>4. Accelerated by an 
increase in mechanization, a greater demand for ready-to-wear clothing, and most 
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importantly, by a massive supply of young immigrant workers (Petras 1992), the industry 
was able to expand its reach far beyond its upper-income, custom order consumers.  
Then, like now, the composition of incoming immigrants helped determine the 
ethnic base of the industry. The birth of the apparel industry and the sweatshop in the 
U.S. began in New York City where first, American born, and then Irish and Germans 
immigrants dominated the trade. Following the second wave of immigration, Eastern 
Europeans, most notably Jews, and Southern Europeans, primarily Italians, maintained 
the largest presence in the industry from around the 1880s to the first few decades of the 
1900s (Bender 2003). 
It was during this time of unprecedented immigration and a burgeoning ready-
wear clothing market that the piece rate system (also known as the task system) 
developed in tandem with the contract system. The piece-rate system was often used to 
the advantage of the shop owner who contracted or subcontracted out the cutting and 
sewing to homeworkers. If the worker maintained a high output, the owner would 
frequently attempt to save money by paying the worker by the hour. If the worker’s 
output was lower, the owner often would pay the piece-rate, which was almost always 
lower than the minimum wage.  
By the turn of the 20th century, sweatshop workers toiled on average 84 hours per 
week, laboring up to sixteen hours per day during the peak season, and earning on 
average between $6-7 per week (Levine 1924). Then, as today, women garment workers 
were paid considerably less than their male counterparts, with children earning the lowest 
wages of all. Because of the low wages and high rents in many of the nation’s 
increasingly overcrowded cities, garment shops were often set up in cramped apartments 
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where dozens of workers sewed alongside one another, and slept in shifts (Lieurance 
2003).  
Particularly in small shops, though in many factories as well, the working 
environment of the sweatshop was usually unsanitary, unhealthy and dangerous. Because 
contractors and subcontractors relied upon low rent shops with minimal infrastructure 
and capital investment for cost cutting purposes, health and safety protections in most 
shops were minimal or non-existent. The occupational hazards included lead poisoning, 
poor ventilation, insulation, and lighting, blocked fire exits, and even doors that locked 
from the inside out. Sweatshops were also frigid and damp in the winter and sweltering in 
the summer. The air inside the shops was characteristically foul with the smells of nearby 
sewers, alongside the pungent fumes of gas stoves and charcoal heaters (ibid. 2003). 
As significant as the unhealthy surrounding work environments were, the work 
hazards common to the process of garment production itself were equally harmful. In the 
early 1900s, there were no laws mandating that owners safeguard machinery. This fact, 
coupled with the extraordinary pace with which workers had to produce large numbers of 
garments, led to an untold number of industrial injuries and fatalities. According to 
Lieurance (2003:39), “lost fingers, scalpings, and spine malformations, caused from 
sitting stooped over for hours on end, were not unusual.” In addition to dangers from the 
machinery were the hazards from the textiles themselves. Toxic dyes from lesser grade 
cloth sometimes poisoned the workers’ skin. And dust particles from clothing, poisonous 
gases from irons, and pressing machine steam often caused diseases like catarrh 
(inflammation of the mucous membrane) and tuberculosis (Green 2003; Lieurance 2003). 
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The Role of Unions in Combating the Conditions of the Early American Sweatshop 
In this section, I pose my first qualitative research question: Did size of and 
participation in union activity influence better working conditions for apparel workers? 
Faced with exploitive work and payment systems, below poverty wages, 
exceptionally long hours, worker mistreatment, and unsafe and unhealthy labor 
conditions, key garment trade unions began to emerge during the 1890s and early 1900s. 
One of the first major unions, the United Garment Workers (UGW), emerged in 1891 as 
an amalgamation of existing independent local unions, some of which had been in 
existence since the early 1870s (Vural 1994).  
The UGW distinguished itself as a key player in the men’s clothing industry. 
UGW’s leadership promoted the interests of skilled, American-born, male workers via 
the sale of the union label (ibid. 1994). Although the UGW would later start a women’s 
local in 1907, according to Asher (1984), the UGW membership generally was not 
inclusive of immigrant and socialist workers, and its leadership was largely disinterested 
in women workers. Women’s clothing worker unions developed separately from the early 
men’s clothing unions, as most male unions during this time did not think women were 
capable of being organized.  
In 1900, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) formed 
with the express mandate of representing all women’s clothing workers in their efforts to 
abolish extremely long work days, sub-poverty wages without benefits, and unsafe and 
unhealthy working conditions. In terms of organizational philosophy, the ILGWU was 
much more progressive than the UGW. From its inception, a socialist vision that 
critiqued not only the labor conditions in their immediate industry, but the larger 
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relationship between workers and the owners of capital was present in its ILGWU’s 
mandate (Vural 1994). As stated in the preamble of the ILGWU constitution: 
The only way to secure our rights as producers and to bring about a 
system of society wherein the workers shall receive the full value of their 
production, is to organize industrially into a class conscious labor union 
politically represented [in] the various legislative bodies by 
representatives of a political party whose aim is the abolition of the 
capitalist system so that we may be able to defend our common interests 
(Levine 1924:104). 
 
Despite its purported socialist leanings, contradiction between its emphasis on 
class consciousness and its desire for workers to gain greater control of the means of 
production, and its leadership’s proclivity toward sanctioning workplace only or “pure 
and simple” trade unionism were evident for the ILGWU’s beginning (Vural 1994). 
Alongside this struggle for increased class consciousness was also a strong effort to 
infuse gender consciousness among the majority female workforce. This effort was 
realized at the American Federation of Labor (AFL) convention in 1903 when the 
Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) formed with the purpose of organizing women 
workers into existing trade unions (ibid. 1994). The WTUL leadership, as well as many 
of its members, were comprised of feminist and middle class reformers.  
Throughout the early 1900s, the WTUL was instrumental in providing relief, 
publicity, and general assistance for women’s unions (Lieurance 2002). One of their 
largest efforts included aiding workers in the famous Shirtwaist Makers strike, called 
“the uprising of 20,000" in 1909.  The women and men shirtwaist makers, known as 
“Local 25" in the ILGWU, engaged in one of the largest general strikes (and largest 
women’s strikes) in the industry’s history.  
The major demands of the strikers included a fifty-two hour workweek, a closed 
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shop (union labor only), advanced notice of part-time work/layoffs, and importantly, an 
elimination of the brutally exploitive subcontracting system. Additionally, the workers 
wanted safer working conditions, including adequate fire escapes and unlocked doors 
from inside of the factories to the streets. Out of the forty-three thousand shirtwaist 
workers in New York City in 1909, more than 20,000 supported these demands, and went 
on strike (ibid. 2002). The WTUL choreographed the strike by renting meeting halls, 
persuading middle class women to march on the picket lines, registering new union 
members, fundraising, distributing relief benefits, issuing bail for arrested strikers, 
employing the mainstream press to report on the police brutality and hostile treatment of 
workers in the courts, and ultimately, garnering the attention and sympathy of the public 
and key reformers (Vural 1994).   
Within two months, the strike had ended with 354 small shops settling (Vural 
1994), though more than 150 large firms, including the infamous Triangle Shirtwaist 
Company, refused to bargain with the Local 25 of the ILGWU (Lieurance 2002). The 
gains in the small shops included a fifty-two hour work week, wage increases of up to 
15%, limits on required over-time, legal holidays, and spreading the work to all 
employees (to avoid layoffs) during the slow season. As Vural (1994:89) reports, “though 
the contracts quickly proved difficult to enforce and impossible to renegotiate, the 
Uprising of the 20,000 transformed a skeletal union into a living institution.” 
The following year (1910), the ILGWU organized a general strike among New 
York City’s male cloakmaker’s. Unlike the women’s Shirtwaist Makers’ strike the 
previous year, the cloakmakers’ strike was fully pre-planned, directed, and funded by the 
ILGWU’s male leadership. The cloakmakers’ “revolt” as termed by Levine (1924), 
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accomplished what would be called the Protocol of Peace. The Protocol established the 
first wage standard in the industry, created limitation on maximum work hours, initiated 
an arbitration system (to limit strikes), and founded the first Joint [management-labor] 
Board of Sanitary Control, to oversee work conditions.  
Although these were important gains for cloakmakers, and others in the men’s 
clothing industry, the Protocol did little to improve the working condition of women and 
immigrant workers. Importantly, the wage standard won by the Protocol applied 
differentially according to gender, and women saw little or no improvement in their wage 
conditions. Further, the arbitration system, as reported by Vural (1994) began the first 
move away from the ILGWU’s expressed broad social mandate, toward a narrower (and 
more self-serving) agenda of “managing the industry” to the joint benefit of owner and 
union leader interests. Equally as important, was the absence of worker safety 
improvements, and the difficulty in ensuring these significant, but limited industry gains 
without the backing of the State. As evidenced in 1911 following the catastrophic 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire <s> 5, abysmal garment working conditions would only 
be superficially remedied without the vigorous commitment and support of local, state, 
and federal legislation and enforcement. 
In the years immediately following the Triangle fire, New York played an 
important leadership role in labor legislation by creating several new worker safety and 
building code laws. In 1913, New York State also passed the fifty-four hour work-week, 
and by 1914 thirty-six new laws passed, including a women’s minimum wage (Lieurance 
2002).  
That same year, the last of the major garment unions was formed: the 
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Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). The ACWA (later the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers of America), often cited as an example of 
the “new unionism,” came together to organize all workers in the men’s clothing 
industry, regardless of their skill, gender, or nationality. The initial objective of the union 
was to support industrial unionism (as opposed to craft unionism) <s> 6, in an effort to 
create a “universal working class organization.” Similar to the ILGWU however, over 
time the ACWA leadership would also narrow its focus from worker control over the 
means of production to worker participation in the management of production. Coined by 
ACWA founder Sidney Hillman, this new vision was called “industrial democracy” 
(Vural 1994). 
Throughout the remainder of the nineteen teens, the ILGWU and ACWA 
continued to expand their membership, and by 1920, both unions were organized in 
nearly 50 cities (Petras 1992). Adjusting to the new federal quota system, which limited 
the number of immigrants entering the U.S. in the 1920s, the new “immigrants” became 
African Americans and Puerto Rican migrants who moved northward to join their more 
established sisters and brothers in the garment trade (Green 1996).  Not coincidentally, 
apparel manufacturers during this time, began to shift some of their production to the 
non-unionized South. 
Like the decades that followed, the 1920s would prove tumultuous for the unions, 
with gains and losses that mirrored the economic currents of the nation and the vagaries 
of the industry. Not unlike its earliest days, contests over the direction of union 
leadership, specifically in the ILGWU, led to increased power struggles between the 
goals of workplace reform vs. worker revolution. From the perspective of the Communist 
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Party (CP) members who were vying for the latter, reforms limited to health, safety, and 
wages “betrayed workers by forcing them to adopt to a system of class collaboration” 
(Stein 1977:202).  
In terms of action, the Communist leadership in the ILGWU encouraged larger 
numbers of strikes and walkouts, including the massive 35,000 ladies’ garment worker 
strike of 1926. Described as an “earnest and determined” effort by the strikers, their 
leadership would not be able to replicate the same skill level as its workers (Levinson 
1927: 207). Indeed, the bargaining agreements that followed the protracted strikes were 
generally less than what would have been gained through less lengthy strikes or 
arbitration, a strategy which was greatly opposed by the CP. Continued financial 
mismanagement and inept CP leadership eventually led to a depleted and fractured 
membership, an empty treasury, and massive debt. Thus, by the end of the 1920s, the 
major garment union had little control over industrial conditions  (Herberg 1952). 
 
Two Steps Forward, Three Steps Back: New Deal Worker Reforms and the Cold War 
Freeze on Labor Progress 
By the time the Great Depression began, union registration in the ILGWU and the 
ACWA was at an all-time low, and workers in the garment industry were once again 
forced to weather a precarious economic climate, largely without the benefit of protective 
legislation. From this economic “bottoming out,” emerged a broad range of sweeping 
federal legislative changes that for nearly half a century would eliminate the worst abuses 
of the sweatshop. Ironically however, portions of this New Deal legislation, would also 
lay the groundwork for globalization of the U.S. apparel industry (Rosen 2002). 
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One of the earliest pieces of federal legislation designed to bolster the rights of 
workers was the Norris-LaGuardia Act/Anti-Injunction Bill of 1932. The Act prohibited 
“yellow dog” contracts in which workers agreed, as a condition of employment, not to 
join the union. This Act declared as public policy labor’s right to organize. In 1935, 
Congress passed the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act, which 
gave protection to workers in the private sector to organize unions, engage in collective 
bargaining over wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, and to take part in 
strikes, and other forms of concerted activity in support of their demands.  
The Act created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and gave it 
extensive power over unions. This included the power to investigate and decide unfair 
labor practice charges, and to conduct elections in which workers were given the 
opportunity to decide whether they wanted to be represented by a union.  Also during this 
year, the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) was formed as part of the larger 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), which the ILGWU briefly became affiliated with, 
until it returned to the AFL following the AFL/CIO split in 1938 <s> 7 (Illinois Labor 
History Society 2004; Wikipedia Encyclopedia 2004). 
In 1938, a key piece of labor legislation called the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) was created. The FLSA was enacted to regulate the production of goods shipped 
across state lines. The Act, administered by the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and 
Hour Division, would prove to be one of the most important pieces of legislation for 
holding contractors responsible for shipping garments manufactured in violation of 
federal wage laws. The FLSA also established a national minimum wage of .25/hour, 
guaranteed time and one half for overtime (for most industries), and prohibited most 
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employment for minors (Illinois Labor History Society 2004). By the end of the 1930s, 
new rights for workers led many reformers to triumphantly claim that the American 
sweatshop was a relic of the past. 
However, alongside these domestic labor victories of the 1930s, emerged new 
trade legislation that would ultimately set the stage for capital flight in the decades to 
come. In an attempt to avoid the protectionist and isolationist policies believed to have 
contributed to the Depression, Congress passed the first international Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement in 1934 (later known as the Trade Agreements Act).  The Trade Agreements 
Act gave President Franklin Delano Roosevelt the right to negotiate bilateral tariff 
reductions with individual trading partners (Rosen 2002). Shortly after, Congress gave up 
the authority to regulate tariffs, entrusting tariff setting to the President. In doing so, 
Congress would drastically alter the formation of U.S. trade policy following the second 
World War (ibid. 2002). 
Following World War II, labor’s position improved as the U.S. experienced 
unprecedented growth and prosperity as the major economic and political superpower in 
the world. The destruction of much of Europe afforded U.S. corporations a bountiful 
opportunity for reconstruction investment (Moody 1988), which kept labor demand high, 
and also afforded labor an opportunity to demand a bigger piece of the pie. 
Weary of stagnant war-time wages, workers began to use their growing size and 
strength to their advantage. Following the War, union membership climbed to new 
heights, and in manufacturing (the sector of the economy that houses the garment 
industry), the percentage of unionized workers grew from 40% in 1947 to nearly 50% in 
1956 (Moody 1988). Bolstered by this strength in numbers, more Americans were 
 23
striking than ever before. Concomitantly, wages in manufacturing (including the apparel 
industry) rose steadily, as well. 
As with previous labor gains however, domestic and foreign policy shifts began to 
surface, and set the stage for radical restructuring in the manufacturing industries, of 
which apparel would be the hardest hit. Thus, while U.S. corporations continued to work 
with the unions and garment workers in recognition that stable, domestic labor relations 
would be more profitable (Johns 1994), they were also simultaneously employing their 
own industrial associations and lobbyists to help ensure a long-term favorable business 
climate in Congress. 
To this end, in 1947, Congress amended the Wagner Act of 1935, and passed the 
Taft-Hartley Amendment, also known as the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). 
The Act imposed a number of restrictions on unions including the prohibition of 
jurisdictional strikes--strikes used to pressure employers to assign particular work to the 
employees it represents. It also banned secondary boycotting and picketing, in which 
unions strike, or refusal to handle goods of a business with which they have no primary 
dispute, but which is associated with a targeted business. LMRA also eliminated closed 
shops, which were contractual agreements requiring an employer to hire only labor union 
members. Related to this, the Amendment granted to individual states the right to outlaw 
union security clauses, in essence creating “right to work laws” in many states 
(Wikipedia Encyclopedia 2004). 
Taft-Hartley further limited the bargaining power of unions by requiring unions to 
provide 60 days notice to employers and certain state and federal mediation bodies before 
striking. It codified earlier Supreme Court rulings giving employers the right to express 
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their opposition to unions, provided that they didn’t threaten workers with reprisals or 
inducements to refrain from joining. It also granted the NLRB discretionary power to 
seek injunctions against unions or employers who violated the Act, and gave the right to 
employers to sue unions for damages incurred by a secondary boycott. Finally, the 
Amendment required union leaders to file affidavits with the DOL swearing that they 
were not supporters of the Communist Party as a condition of participating in NLRB 
proceedings (ibid. 2004). The Supreme Court eventually ruled this last clause 
unconstitutional in 1965-though by this time, most of the Communist Party union 
members had already been purged. 
 Despite these legislative attacks on union organizing, counter-offensives were not 
to be found among labor leaders throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In an age of increasing 
national and worker prosperity, the rapidly increasing labor unions began to operate more 
like businesses. Characterized by their heavily bureaucratic, anti-democratic structures, 
and widening gaps between officers, staffers, and members, the new “business unions” 
were incompatible with the broader vision and practices of the old social unions.  
“Income maintenance” replaced the goals of production control, full employment, and 
job security, which then in turn created a diminished function for the unions (Johns 
1994). 
 As Moody (1988) maintains, this shift in focus severely limited labors’ influence 
upon central management decisions involving production schedules, capital investment, 
and plant locations. Heedless of the early Communist predictions linking “class 
collaboration” to the hegemony of business, union leaders would be ill prepared to 
effectively fight the imminent domestic, and later, global capital flight of the apparel 
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industry. 
 
A Different Kind of UNITE: U.S. Imperialism Meets Global Capitalism in the Textile and 
Apparel Industries 
Research Question Two: Did corporate globalization have a negative impact on 
working conditions for domestic and global apparel workers? 
The hegemony of business, supported by the neoliberal economic paradigm 
would have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy agendas and the simultaneous 
shift in capital investment in foreign nations that emerged following World War II. After 
the War, the U. S. was the only industrialized country whose infrastructure and 
manufacturing capabilities had not been either demolished or severely damaged. 
Producing half of the world’s industrial output at that time, the U.S. faced the challenge 
of finding new markets to maintain domestic prosperity and stability (Johns 1994), as 
well as new international monetary organizations that could further this goal around the 
globe. 
It was within this economic world [re]-ordering that in 1944, the U.S., with 
assistance from the allied powers, created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, as a result of the UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire (Freeman 1998). The World Bank (originally the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development), began as a distinct international organization that 
provided long term loans, grants, and technical assistance, to aid less developed countries 
in their implementation of poverty reduction initiatives.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), began as the keeper of the international 
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monetary rules (including economic exchange rates), and served as the main body of 
public international management. As part of its management lending capabilities, the 
IMF was also given the authority to exercise "surveillance" over a recipient nation’s 
economy. This policing capability on behalf of the U.S. Treasury, was created to ensure 
that IMF loans were being used in a manner consistent with its objectives of promoting 
global economic stability. (Wikipedia 2004; 2003). Thus, although initially distinct, the 
dual organizational missions of reducing global poverty and increasing global economic 
stability were both seen as compatible and mutually reinforcing goals. 
Three years after the creation of the World Bank and IMF, the U.S. also 
established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Formed as a reciprocal 
trade alliance between the U.S. and 22 European capitalist countries, GATT was 
designed to promote fair and cooperative trade through decreased tariffs on imports, and 
to open markets to exchange and investment. The expressed purpose of GATT was to 
help rebuild war-torn Europe (particularly the Atlantic Alliance nations), as part of the 
European Recovery (Marshall Plan) Program. By the early 1950s, however, the U.S. 
began to use the tariff reductions as a strategy to help contain the spread of Communism 
in Eastern Europe and in the Asian-Pacific Rim (Rosen 2002). 
In the early post-war years, the chief economic stabilizer was believed to be Japan 
and its textile and apparel industries. By occupying the country and directing it postwar 
reconstruction through 1952, the U.S. State Department, was able to tailor Japanese (and 
later South Korean and Taiwanese) economic policies and political agendas to meet U.S. 
security objectives <s> 8 (Nehmer and Crimmins 1948). Specifically, the U.S. 
spearheaded the creation of new markets for high quality, low-wage garment exports in 
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the Pacific Rim, while simultaneously containing “falling dominoes” in the region. Thus, 
with Japan as its area “workshop” leader, the U.S. could promote its model of Western, 
liberal, democratic, capitalism in the East (Rosen 2002).  
Domestically, GATT was not perceived by workers and certain garment industry 
segments as optimistically.  Rather, the employment of the reciprocal trade model meant 
that for the first time in U.S. history, protective tariffs on imports would be drastically 
reduced to accommodate a variety of low cost, labor intensive imports (Barnett 1983; 
Rosen 2002). Despite the significant obstacles created by GATT, and the concomitant 
reordering of longstanding domestic economic practices, both the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations advised the apparel and textile industries to adjust. 
Recognizing the impending hardships, industry segments that had to compete with low-
wage imports and labor unions pressed forth for renewed protective legislation.  
Minor and occasional concessions were granted to the protectionists in the 1950s, 
despite the overall expansionist trend. These concessions were largely granted through 
the Trade Agreements Act, designed to limit unfair competition by creating “peril points” 
at which lowered tariffs would pose undue harm to an industry, and “escape clauses” 
where a given industry could lobby for exemption from the said injurious trade policy 
(Rosen 2002). Also, for a period of time in the 1950s, Japanese Voluntary Export 
Restraints stemmed the wave of textile and apparel imports that had been inundating U.S. 
markets (Johns 1994). 
For the apparel industry (which began to feel the effects of trade policy shifts later 
than textiles), the most noticeable change for workers in the 1950s was the onslaught of 
domestic capital flight, following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, in 1947. 
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Responding to increased competition abroad, and a desire to limit costs at home, large 
numbers of apparel manufacturers moved out of the heavily unionized, organized, and 
highly skilled areas of New York City, to out of town shops,  and especially the many 
union-free “open” shops of the South (Petras 1992).  
Unlike the North, the South was still primarily agrarian in the 1950s. Never 
having passed through the phase of industrial manufacturing, nor having experienced the 
massive European migrations, the South experienced a different economic history. With 
its political economy rooted first in slavery, and later in the poorly remunerated, non-
industrial agricultural, coal mining, fishing, and service sectors, the South was not party 
to the popular social and worker movements found in the North, borne of widespread 
immigrant labor exploitation. Due to this differing economic, political, and social history, 
labors’ ability to influence the working conditions in apparel shops at home was severely 
limited. Thus, as a result of the severely diminished strength of garment unions 
(exacerbated in large part by the rapidly increasing U.S. free trade agenda), future spatial 
mobility in the apparel industry would be much easier to accomplish in the decades ahead 
(ibid. 1992). 
By the early 1960s, the increase in “runaway shops” (both at home and abroad) 
had all but eliminated the labor-management agreements that had existed since the New 
Deal. With the first wave of domestic, garment capital flight nearly completed, low-wage 
labor opportunities became of greater value to clothing manufacturers than the value of 
domestic wage stability. Still, at this point, apparel factories were only in the beginning 
stages of offshore production; low-wage foreign imports were still believed to be the 
major threat to the industry and its workers. Although supportive of economic trade 
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liberalization, the Kennedy Administration (more than the preceding Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations) attempted to respond to the protectionists, by initiating a 
quota policy on the increasing numbers of apparel and textile imports entering the U.S. 
from low-wage nations <s> 9 (Rosen 2002). 
In establishing import quotas, the Kennedy Administration recognized that 
unlimited, mass-scale low-wage imports in a labor-intensive and low-capital industry like 
apparel, would ultimately undermine domestic apparel production. In addition to 
establishing these quotas, the Kennedy Administration also put in place program 
financing for industrial restructuring. Ultimately however, neither of the “Kennedy 
compromises” would prevent the dramatic rise of offshore productions in the 1960s, first 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan, next in South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Mexico, then 
in Thailand and the Philipines (Petras 1992), and finally on to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, India, China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and other low wage regions (Rosen 2002). 
In the 1970s, new technological innovations in the garment industry permitted 
apparel manufacturers to link global production systems resulting from faster transport 
speeds, and a transition from mass production to the more flexible and decentralized 
forms of industrial production (ibid. 2002). Ironically, this hastening of de-
industrialization in many U.S. manufacturing industries was occurring at the same time 
that the Johnson Administration was putting into place its Great Society programs. 
Similar to New Deal worker legislation reforms that did not anticipate the effects that 
unchecked trade liberalization would have upon domestic manufacturing production, so 
too, the Great Society programs of the 1970s did not adequately address the economic 
consequences that would result from mass deindustrialization. Thus, in failing to cede 
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capital flight in the many low-wage, low-skilled manufacturing sectors, foreign 
competition would soon prove too fierce for most U.S. garment workers to compete. 
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“Racing to the Bottom”: Making the South Safe for Corporate Democracy in the Reagan 
and Bush Years 
Up until the 1980s, there remained at least some pretense by the State that 
industrial restructuring and increased automation could enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic production, while limiting the number of manufacturers seeking offshore 
workers. By 1981, the increasingly lop-sided attempts to balance U.S. foreign policy and 
industry-segment interests with those of apparel workers, was rapidly coming to a halt. 
The Reagan Administration hastened this demise through a combination of free trade 
initiatives, anti-Communist military aid and interventions in the Americas, deregulation, 
and the dismantling of the American welfare state.  
Much like the previous restructuring of select Asian- Pacific Rim economies, the 
Reagan Administration’s efforts ensured that both Caribbean and Latin American 
economies would be shaped to meet U.S. political and economic agendas. Fueling the 
continuation of off-shore production in the 1980s was a special provision in the U.S. 
Tariff Schedule (USTS), referred to as 807. This provision permits cut garments to be 
exported offshore for assembly and re-imported into the U.S. with a tariff paid only on 
the value added to the garment through low-wage assembly (Ross 1997). Originally, the 
807 provision was implemented in 1963 for the purpose of encouraging “production 
sharing” by limiting tariffs for U.S. goods made in more than one country (Rosen 2002). 
From the perspective of capital, by shifting industrial investments to developing 
countries, U.S. corporations could gain access to markets protected by tariff barriers, and 
could enhance their profit potential by employing a wealth of low-wage and unorganized 
labor (Petras 1992). 
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Before long, apparel retailers and manufacturers realized that export processing 
zones (i.e. offshore assembly plants) afforded the garment industry greater allowances 
with labor (and thus with profit potentials) than had ever been possible with domestic 
production. As Rosen (2002) describes, export processing is normally conducted in 
specific industrial zones, where host countries, desperate for the jobs created by apparel 
EPZs, finance garment infrastructure, and provide tax relief to businesses for providing 
its citizens employment.  
Such financing from lending institutions (like the IMF) usually comes at a high 
price. As a condition for less developed countries (LDCs) to obtain the grants and loans 
afforded by international lending agencies, they must be willing to engage in the 
necessary “structural adjustments” required of a market economy. From the perspective 
of the lending institutions, “free markets” are the best way to stave off economic 
catastrophe (2003). From the perspective of the many workers who must toil under such 
an economy however, “free” and “fair” trade are worlds apart.  
Characteristically, export processing zones are political and economic enclaves. 
The factories in EPZs are generally geographically isolated. Barbed-wire fences, armed 
guards and/or other intimidating barriers that limit workers’ freedom and mobility also 
sometimes surround them.  Indeed, in countries like Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 
the maquiladoras are partially managed and owned by former members of the countries’ 
military juntas (Ross 1997). Further, EPZ factories are devoid of health, safety, wage, 
and other regulatory laws and measures, regardless of whether these regulations exist in 
the non-EPZ sector of the host country (Human Rights Watch 2002).  
In Guatemala for example, the country’s labor code protects women workers from 
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pregnancy-based discrimination, and affords them access to the employee health care 
system, including a full range of maternity benefits. In the maquila export processing 
zones however, factories do not uphold the same labor laws that are required in the rest 
of the country (ibid. 2002). Thus, given the grossly exploitive and unequal relationships 
that exist under these conditions, it is not surprising that EPZs are breeding grounds for 
sweatshops.  
Today, export processing zones and free trade zones are generally regarded as one 
in the same. However, for the better part of thirty years, capital pushes for offshore 
production had to contend with domestic protectionist forces in Congress, industry, and 
labor. In the early 1980s, southern textile manufacturers, eastern apparel manufacturers, 
and trade unionists formed a coalition aimed at increasing protection for domestic 
producers, securing a stronger Multifiber Agreement, and tightening global import 
controls (Lande 1991). Calling itself the Fiber, Fabric, and Apparel Coalition for Trade 
(FFACT), the unlikely allies shared the common concern that unlimited mass-scale low-
wage imports would destroy domestic apparel production.  
By this time, FFACT had good cause for concern; by 1984, more clothing was 
being imported by the U.S. than was being produced domestically (Petras 1992). In an 
attempt to stem the rising imports, FFACT introduced the Trade Enforcement Act (also 
known as the Jenkins- Hollings Bill) to Congress in 1985. The Bill required that apparel 
import expansion be tied directly to the growth of apparel purchases in the U.S. (Howell 
and Noellert 1986). Although large majorities in both the House and Senate passed the 
Trade Enforcement Act, Reagan vetoed the Bill in 1985, as he did a similar bill passed by 
the House and Senate in 1987; in 1990, his successor, President George H.W. Bush, 
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vetoed the third and final trade bill aimed at managing textile and apparel importation in 
the U.S. (Rosen 2002).  
On the cusp of free trade expansion in the Americas, one of the first nations to be 
targeted as an EPZ in the West was Mexico. Through the U.S.-Mexico Border Industrial 
Program (BIP) initiated in the 1960s, partially or entirely foreign-owned companies could 
set up factories within a virtually tax and tariff free 12.5 mile zone along the Mexican 
side of the border (Johns 1994). In an effort to attract foreign direct investment in 
Mexico, and other developing nations, formal investment conditions were established in 
the export processing zones that were characteristically quite favorable to capital and 
exploitive of labor. Specific benefits offered by host countries to lure investors included 
(and still include) tax holidays or tax concessions, low-interest start-up loans, physical 
infrastructure-including electricity, transportation, and communication facilities, physical 
plant, and sometimes, housing for factory workers. 
 Bolstered by the rapidly rising offshore EPZs, and the increasing need to compete 
with Asian imports, in 1983, the Reagan Administration widened the pool and scope of 
“sourcing” countries in the global South, by establishing the ironically named Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act. More commonly known as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, the CBI extended apparel trade between the U.S. and twenty-two countries in 
the Caribbean and Central America by allowing duty-free access to U.S. markets 
contingent upon the acceptance of the beneficiary nation’s cooperation with expressed 
U.S. economic policies. In return, 35% of all U.S. apparel imports had to originate from 
the beneficiary nations (Kamel 1990). 
Both direct and indirect foreign aid and investment were also a part of the CBI 
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(and later the Bush Administration’s expanded Enterprise for the Americas Initiative), 
though at a cost that furthered the less developed countries’ political and economic 
dependence upon the United States. Specifically, CBI participants were required to 
accept:  
U.S.-mandated exchange rate-adjustments; privatization of state-owned 
resources, production facilities, and government services; wage controls; 
elimination of energy and food subsidies; the building of export 
processing zones; the liberalization of banking; foreign majority 
participation in property ownership; tax free imports of equipment used in 
the production of export goods; and the elimination of controls on the 
remittances of profits. (Rosen 2002:133; 159). 
 
Undoubtedly, the said contingencies call into question the CBI’s professed 
objective of sponsoring direct foreign investment to assist nations in their recovery from 
debt and poverty.  Plagued by the recessions of the 1970s caused in part by two global oil 
crises, and a drastic decline in the prices paid for their major exports (oil, sugar, coffee, 
bauxite, etc.), by the 1980s, many Latin American countries were desperate for economic 
recovery (ibid. 2002). Within the context of quid pro quo economic restructuring, the 
CBI was marketed as a program to bolster open markets and assist Caribbean and Latin 
American countries with their economic recovery, while supporting democracy. 
Yet what is rarely mentioned among politicians, economists, and other policy 
makers, is that the global division of labor created in these restructured economies are 
increasingly de-skilled, low-wage, and feminized. As Enloe astutely notes (1993), as 
women moved into the export processing enclaves (comprising 90% of zone labor), 
traditionally male manufacturing sectors like sugar, oil, and bauxite, (with double 
women’s average wages), began to decrease. Therefore, by marshaling a predominantly 
female labor force in the de-skilled and low wage EPZs, both the State and capital were 
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able to preserve their power base, while enhancing profits. 
Aside from the insidious, conscious exploitation of the gendered division of labor, 
the CBI did rather little to improve the economies of the participating countries. 
Following its passage, less than seven percent of CBI exports were newly provided with 
duty-free imports. Further, real incentives for investment, like tax credits and accelerated 
depreciated allowances were not a part of CBI (Rosen 2002). Simply put, the CBI did 
little more than to continue the dependency-fostering economic policies traditionally 
forced upon the many countries of Latin America. 
In a similar vein, the Reagan and Bush administrations’ professed objective of 
promoting democracy in Latin America through counter-insurgency military 
interventions, served the opposite objectives. By containing or destroying popular, 
democratically elected governments and left-wing insurgencies in Latin America, and 
supporting authoritarian “pro-American” regimes, the U.S. bartered human rights, and 
political, economic, and social justice, for a favorable trade and corporate investment 
climate. 
Beyond the billions of dollars each year that the Reagan and Bush administrations 
funneled to support CBI nations’ new export-oriented growth model, the U.S. provided 
much economic support to U.S. apparel and textile companies, by encouraging them to 
reinvest their profits in foreign, rather than domestic operations. One particularly 
egregious tax-payer funded program initiated by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development was U.S. AID.  
Over a twelve year span, U.S.AID funded U.S. apparel manufacturers to close 
their domestic plants in the U.S. and reestablish plants in the low-cost/low-wage, union-
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free areas of Latin America. As the National Labor Committee report’s title states, with 
the support of the Reagan and Bush administrations and U.S. tax dollars, American 
apparel and textile workers were “paying to lose [their] jobs” (NLC 1992). Other 
corporate welfare programs initiated by both Administrations included: deferment of U.S. 
income taxes on overseas profits until the profits reentered the U.S.; allowing 
corporations to subtract taxes paid to foreign governments from taxes owed to the IRS; 
and rewriting the U.S. tax code to allow corporations to credit all of their foreign income 
taxes against their domestic liabilities on a dollar for dollar basis (Kamel 1990). 
Aside from helping the apparel industry directly through generous corporate 
welfare allowances and a favorable economic investment and trade climate, the State also 
assists the industry by indirect means. In 1986, the Reagan Administration passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), making it increasingly difficult for 
undocumented immigrants to find work. IRCA requires the federal government to impose 
“employer sanctions” on anyone employing an illegal immigrant. While seemingly 
reasonable on the surface, the Act most often harms the undocumented worker, and often 
empowers rather than dissuades the employer (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). 
Because so many undocumented workers are desperate for work, many will pay 
hundreds of dollars for illegal work papers (often with the aid of the contractor), and will 
work under exploitive, abusive, and harmful labor conditions for fear of being deported. 
Also, it is important to note that since virtually all of the contractors are males and most 
apparel workers are females, there is an increased layer of vulnerability that women 
experience because of their subordinate position in society, in the workplace, and at 
home. Such considerations are routinely ignored when formulating public policy 
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generally, and labor policy specifically effecting women’s lives. 
What is perhaps most ironic about IRCA is that it ignores the very unequal and 
desperate global economic conditions that force millions of immigrants to cross the 
borders into the United States in the first place (Ross 1997). Time and again, liberal and 
reactionary immigration policies are created (and then ignored) to suit the economic 
vagaries of the many U.S. industries that rely upon immigrant labor. Corporate influence 
over immigration policies of this sort are rarely revealed to the American public, 
however. Instead, in times of economic downturns, the always handy “illegal alien” 
serves as a cultural scapegoat for a variety of social ills, including the perpetuation of the 
American sweatshop.  
One final point on undocumented workers is the conflict that exists between 
IRCA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). IRCA requires that employers be 
sanctioned for knowingly hiring undocumented workers. While difficult to prove mens 
rea in terms of contractor culpability, no such criteria are needed to deport an 
undocumented worker back to her/his country of origin. Most often, when undocumented 
workers attempt to assert their legal rights to the provisions laid out in the FLSA (see 
definition on pg.13), contractors threaten to fire them, or worse, to contact immigration 
agents. Immigration authorities have the right to deport workers for not possessing the 
required legal documentation (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). 
 Of course this creates a bind for the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour 
Division who enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act. Historically, Wage and Hour has not 
reported undocumented workers to immigration officials. However, it is at least 
foreseeable, that in a post-9/11 environment, where intra-agency information sharing is 
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on the rise, and increasing national security concerns are rapidly supplanting established 
civil rights, that DOL employees may be forced to report illegal immigrant workers in the 
near future. Thus, an unfortunate, and sad irony exists for the global poor whose 
economic opportunities depend on MNCs and State immigration policies: “unlike the 
right of capital to move freely [in a globalized free market economy].....no such right is 
afforded labor” (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000:7). 
 
From Bad to Worse: NAFTA, WTO, FTAA, and the Death Knell of the Apparel Industry  
The end of the Bush Administration in 1992 laid the groundwork for one of the 
largest free trade agreements in the Americas. Congress ratified the agreement, known as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1994 during the first Clinton 
Administration. Its purpose was to liberalize trade and investment in the more capital-
intensive manufacture sectors of automobiles, electronics, and machinery, with its North 
American trading partners Canada and Mexico (Rosen 2002). 
Despite the original push toward higher valued goods, within four years of 
NAFTA’s passage, apparel became Mexico’s fifth largest export.  Nearly 98 percent of 
Mexico’s apparel export went to the U.S. (McMillion 1999), which made Mexico (who 
had been excluded from the CBI in the 1980s), the largest apparel exporter to the U.S. 
Domestically, with all quotas and duties removed, NAFTA caused unprecedented 
hemorrhaging to both Mexico and the United States’ indigenous apparel production. This 
was accomplished by making both countries unable to compete with the onslaught of 
low-wage imports from regional apparel producing countries. 
While undoubtedly impoverished before the passage of NAFTA, some 
 40
economists note that NAFTA has intensified Mexico’s poverty by sustaining inflation 
and currency devaluations (Rosen 2002). For example, according to the Department of 
Labor’s Bureau of Labors Statistics (1998), wages for manufacturing workers in Mexico 
have fallen 20 percent since 1993. In 1999, a study by the InterAmerican Development 
Bank reported that since the passage of NAFTA, Mexican consumers had suffered a 39 
percent drop in their purchasing power, and that the number of Mexican’s living below 
the poverty line has doubled since 1993 (Wallstreet Journal 1999).  
Additional evidence that free trade agreements harm apparel workers while 
enriching retailers and manufacturers in the U.S. can be found in the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. As reported by Rodrik (1998), Caribbean nations that experienced the sharpest 
wage decline from 1989 to 1998 were also the nations supplying the highest-volume of 
apparel exports to the U.S. Moreover, the report finds that countries with the worst 
workers’ right abuses, were also the very countries where wages had declined the most. 
 As trade liberalization rapidly expanded in the Western Hemisphere, and around 
the globe, in 1994, the Clinton Administration helped usher in a new trade organization 
for the 21st century. Aptly named the World Trade Organization (WTO), the new 
organization, replaced the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, which had governed 
the rules of world trade since 1947. The WTO's mandate consists of regulating world 
trade to the benefit of the international banks and transnational corporations, as well as 
overseeing the enforcement of national trade policies (Freeman 1998; Stiglitz  2003).  
 To this end, in an effort to further the global expansion of multinational 
corporations in the new millennium, the 128-member WTO is currently overseeing the 
dismantling of so-called protectionist apparel and textile quotas established in the 
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MFA.(For further discussion of MFA, see endnote 9). In phasing out these quotas, the 
apparel trade will be governed by the same trade rules as other U.S. manufacturing 
sectors. 
 The WTO’s World Trade Agreement also severely limits the ability of any one 
nation to deny entrance of goods manufactured under conditions that the importing 
country may deem objectionable. This includes anything from products made with child 
labor to products made under compulsory labor conditions. Likewise, under the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a trade agreement that will soon expand the 
provisions of NAFTA to all 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere (not including 
Cuba), corporations will be permitted to sue governments for “perceived losses caused by 
environment, health, or safety legislation”(Co-Op America Quarterly 2001:iv.). 
 Following the passage of NAFTA, for example, the U.S. Ethyl Corporation sued 
the Canadian government because of their 1997 national prohibition against the fuel 
additive MMT. MMT is widely regarded as a dangerous neurotoxin by scores of 
environmental and public health groups. Despite this fact, the U.S. corporation brought 
suit before the NAFTA tribunal charging that the ban “denied the company profits by 
creating an illegal barrier to international trade” (ibid.2001:iv). Typical of the national 
sovereignty erosions created by such trade liberalization, Canada subsequently rescinded 
the ban, paid Ethyl Corp. $20 million, and put forth a national announcement affirming 
that MMT did not pose a health risk (ibid. 2001). 
 What workers have witnessed both with the passage of NAFTA and the World 
Trade Agreement is the overturning of over a half century of U.S. laws, articulating that 
the conditions under which goods are produced matters (Howard 1997). Both NAFTA 
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and the WTO presently do not require that the national labor laws of the participants 
meet any agreed upon minimum to meet or be consistent with International Labor 
Organizations’ core standards (Moran 2002).  
 In an attempt to remedy this “race to the bottom,” the International Labor 
Organization is calling on its member nations to honor all seven of its Core Labor 
principles, as well as the WTO to include a “social clause” that includes all of these 
provisions (IRRC 1998). Undoubtedly, there are financial, developmental, cultural, and 
other impediments associated with voluntary, national labor, environmental, and public 
health regulations. It is precisely this reason that mandatory, enforceable “social clauses” 
in both existing and future trade and lending agreements, as well as corporate contracts, 
must be included to protect the rights of workers. 
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Chapter Two 
Apparel Industry Logic and Practices: Understanding the Organizational and 
Cultural Environment of the Sweatshop 
 
Inside the Apparel Commodity Chain: “Organizing” the Sweatshop from the Top Down 
Industry Overview 
 Thus far, we have examined the “return of the sweatshop” in relationship to the 
demise of industrial unionization; dramatic increases in immigration and low-wage 
imports alongside domestic and foreign capital flight to low-wage, non-union locales; 
deregulation;  unprecedented trade liberalization; and the dismantling of the Welfare 
State. Let us now turn our attention to the role that the garment industry has played in 
both contributing to and responding to the “return of the sweatshop.” 
 According to the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the year 
2000 (BLS 2003), the apparel industry remains one of largest manufacturing industries in 
the U.S., with less than 1,000 manufacturers who contract and subcontract out to 
approximately 23,000 establishments. Most of the legal establishments are concentrated 
in the smaller number of larger firms, whereas most of the illegal establishments are 
located in the larger number of small shops or in the home.  
 The underground, volatile, and transient nature of large portions of apparel 
production makes it difficult to calculate the exact number of illegal apparel shops in the 
U.S. Still, the Department of Labor estimates that over half of apparel production in the 
U.S. is operating illegally. Better known, is that the rise in illegal apparel shops in the last 
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several decades has been driven chiefly by the dramatic rise of low-wage imports and 
concomitant increase in immigration (Rosen 2002).  
 According to the American Apparel Manufacturers Association (1998) (now 
named the American Apparel and Footwear Association), by the late 1990s, apparel 
imports exceeded $50 billion, comprising nearly half of the $101 billion wholesale 
apparel market. In 1962, apparel imports only totaled $301 million wholesale, and 
comprised less than five percent of the apparel market (Rosen 2002).  By 2004, AAFA 
reported that U.S. consumption of apparel reached almost 16.5 billion garments totaling 
over $64 billion in 2003; imports accounted for an incredible 96.6%. These data indicate 
the shift in apparel manufacturing and sales to reflect the more global nature of this 
industry in the U.S. Indeed, American citizens are the largest consumers of apparel in the 
world (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). 
 With regard to domestic employment, in 2000, the “apparel and other textile 
products” <s>10 industry provided 633,000 wage and salary jobs in the U.S. (DOL, BLS 
2003a), far below its peak of 1.45 million employees in 1973 (DOL, ESA 1996).  
Currently, approximately 7.1 percent of apparel workers are unionized, which is far 
below the national average of 14.9 percent for unionized workers nationwide (DOL, BLS 
2003a).  
 In 1999, two-thirds of apparel jobs in the U.S. were concentrated in nine states in 
the Northeast, Southeast, and California (DOL, BLS 2003a). Los Angeles County, the 
only region that has experienced apparel growth in the past two decades, is now the 
largest apparel industry employer in the U.S. New York City is the second largest apparel 
employer, with the remaining regions far behind (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). 
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 In terms of occupations in the apparel industry, production workers account for 
approximately seventy percent (n=438,000) of all apparel industry employment (DOL, 
BLS 2003a). Sewing machine operators comprise the largest occupational apparel 
segment with approximately 341,000 workers <s>11. Nearly seventy-nine percent of 
sewing machine operators (n=268,026) in the U.S. are women and girls (DOL, Bureau of 
Census and BLS 2003b). This closely resembles the overall gender composition of 
apparel workers globally. According to the International Labor Organization (2000), 
women and girls typically constitute 74 percent of the apparel industry workforce.  
 For legal apparel shops, the hourly median wage of sewing machine operators is 
$7.42/hour (BLS 2003a), though the Department of Labor estimates that more than half 
of the nation’s sewing shops violate minimum wage and overtime laws (Sweatshop 
Watch 1998). Even when paid according to the federal minimum wage, sewing machine 
operators earn the lowest wages in the apparel industry and earn among the lowest wages 
of all industries in the U.S. (DOL, BLS 2003a).  
 Also, it is important to note that the occupational classification “sewing machine 
operators” includes both textile and apparel workers. Textile operators have a greater 
composition of male employees, and earn more than apparel sewing machine operators 
where female employment is concentrated. When examining wages by the industrial 
categorization “cut and sew” apparel workers, a similar methodological problem arises. 
Men comprise most of the fabric cutters; women comprise most of the apparel sewers. 
However, neither the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes, nor the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) that replaced the SIC, include specific 
occupational breakdowns by gender. 
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The Retailers 
 To understand how the apparel industry has contributed to “the return of the 
sweatshop,” it is first important to understand how the apparel commodity chain works. 
Beginning at the top, the apparel chain begins with the increasingly consolidated and 
powerful U.S. retailers. Retailers are the companies that sell garments to the public, and 
negotiate price with manufacturers or jobbers on costs and time of shipments (GAO 
1994).  
 According to Jay Mazur (1998), former president of the Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Workers (UNITE!), six retail chains account for over half of all 
apparel sold in the United States, while ten retailers account for two-thirds of all apparel 
sales sold in the U.S. (Sweatshop Watch 1998). The American Apparel Manufacturers 
Association (1998) reports that its retail sales in the U.S. now top over $180 billion. Wal-
Mart alone, has both the greatest percentage of apparel retail sales in the U.S., and is the  
largest retailer in the world, with annual sales that exceed the gross domestic products of 
192 countries in the world (Sweatshop Watch 2000). 
 Such enormous concentrations in wealth and retail power over the past two plus 
decades have shifted the balance of control from manufacturers to retailers. With this 
shift, a handful of powerful retailers have increasingly been able to set the price at which 
the garment must be produced. Top-down price setting allows the retailer to control the 
manufacturer or jobber, who must then pass the price squeeze to those below them on the 
commodity chain -- workers (Greenia 2001). In order to secure profits amidst these price 
squeezes, the manufacturer or jobber (discussed below) must find the most competitively 
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priced contractors or subcontractors. With tens of thousands of contractors and 
subcontractors competing for work, wages are kept to a bare minimum.   
 In this fiercely competitive environment, contractors and subcontractors feel 
enormous pressure to cut corners and “sweat out” the labor from their workers, in order 
to secure increasingly slim profit margins, and stay in business. As a result, workers are 
frequently forced to endure sub-poverty wages in unstable, unsafe, and unhealthy work 
environments, because retailers have largely been able to divorce themselves from the 
human costs of producing the garments that they sell.  In sum, the apparel industry 
remains an excellent example of the processes of capitalism described by Karl Marx one-
hundred and fifty years ago. 
 How did a handful of retailers accumulate so much power? According to 
Bluestone et. al. (1981), the “retail revolution” had two phases. The first phase began in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s with the national franchising of department stores. By 
1977, four large holding companies -- Federated Department Stores, Allied Department 
Stores, May Department Stores Company, and Dayton Hudson Corporation -- owned 807 
retail outlets, the vast majority of America’s locally based department store chain outlets 
(ibid. 1981). 
 With the economic downturn, and the subsequent shrinking of the middle-class, a 
new market was created for off-price and discount store chains (Cheng and Gereffi 
1994), as well as niche stores that appealed to more specific age, income, and ethnic 
groups among the buying public. Within a ten year span, smaller, traditional higher-
priced retailers became less able to compete with the onslaught of low-end goods 
produced and sold for “power retailers” like Wal-Mart and Kmart (Rosen 2002). 
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Consequently, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the major players engaged in 
widespread mergers and acquisitions, forcing many of the smaller retailers out of 
business. 
 Corporate restructuring also brought about other significant changes in the 
industry. Significantly, over the past two and half decades, apparel has become 
increasingly fashion-based. In order to stimulate and maintain high levels of consumer 
demand in an increasingly saturated market, retailers have adapted by producing more 
rapid style changes. For example, less than 30 years ago, traditional retailers changed 
their merchandise an average of 3.3 times a year. Today’s retailers change their mix of 
merchandise more than twice as often (Rosen 2002). And, according to Bonacich and 
Appelbaum (2000), many fashion-oriented firms (most notably in L.A.) change their 
clothing lines every month. 
 New “quick response” technological innovations at the upper-end of apparel, has  
allowed the industry to keep pace with frequent style, color, and fabric changes, which, 
coupled with intense marketing campaigns, increases consumer demand and clothing 
purchases. Moreover, “quick response” technology has allowed retailers to sell smaller 
batches of clothing closer to the point of sale, which has helped retailers limit the 
traditional excess of inventories, mark-downs, overstock, and other operating expenses. 
Of equal benefit, new technology, including bar coding and electronic data control 
systems, has even helped retailers collect demographic data from the consumers at the 
point of sale (ibid. 2000). This undoubtedly helps retailers plan more efficient and 
profitable marketing strategies. 
 With these technological innovations, retailers can not only enhance efficiency, 
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but can also use technology to track the production and location history of garments. As 
reported by the textile and apparel resource magazine JustStyle, tracking the entire supply 
chain from top to bottom has now become a fiscal necessity (as opposed to an 
impossibility) (Greenia 2001). From the apparent vantage point of large retailers 
however, there presently appears to be little legal or financial incentive to use this 
technology in a manner that would also help workers. The example below speaks to this 
point. 
 In the EPZs in the Guangdong Province of China, apparel workers for Wal-Mart 
work between twelve and thirteen hours a day, six to seven days each week. A National 
Labor Committee investigation (2000) of apparel pay stubs showed that workers earned 
from three to ten cents an hour. Despite these paltry wages, nearly half of the workers 
surveyed by the NLC actually owed their company money after employee deductions 
were taken from their paychecks for dormitory fees, food, job placement fees, temporary 
residency permits, and various fines. When the Chinese Wal-mart workers protested 
similar conditions, all were fired (NLC 2000). 
Ironically, when examples such as the one above come to light, retailers often 
claim that they were unaware of the abysmal conditions under which their clothing was 
made. By outsourcing labor, both retailers and manufacturers can legally claim that 
apparel assemblers work exclusively for the various contractors and subcontractors who 
employ them. In doing so, retailers and manufacturers can avoid both tax liabilities and 
labor laws legally required of traditional employers (Howard 1997).  
Although several attempts at joint liability legislation have been initiated over the 
past decade by the ILGWU (subsequently UNITE; now named UNITE HERE) <s>12, 
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industry lobbyists have strongly opposed any attempts at regulation, and have threatened 
to move their companies overseas, should such legislation pass. To date, no federal law 
exists that holds retailers or manufacturers financially liable for labor law violations that 
occur in either legal or illegal contracting shops <s>13 (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000).  
As of this writing, New York is the only state to hold manufacturers and contractors or 
subcontractors jointly liable for labor law violations. 
 
Manufacturers and Jobbers 
 Directly below the retailer in the commodity chain is the manufacturer or jobber. 
The manufacturer designs garments that appear under their brand (or label), supplies 
textiles and materials, arranges for production (usually with independent contractors), 
and wholesales the finished garments to the retailers (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; 
and GAO 1994). According to Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000), the term manufacturer 
is ordinarily used to describe businesses that own and operate their own factories. This 
term is used correctly when referring to companies that produce in-house. For example, 
in New York City, where the more stable men’s ware predominates, the term 
manufacturer more accurately describes this structural sector, then in fashion-sensitive 
Los Angeles, where most “manufacturers” neither own nor operate their own factories 
(ibid. 2000). 
 Similar to the role of the manufacturer, the jobber also sets or negotiates the price 
for the garments,  obtains the financing, buys fabric and sizes, cuts and bundles them for 
production, and markets them to retailers. Unlike the manufacturer however, the jobber 
does not produce the garments in house or employ any of the production workers. 
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Instead, a jobber contracts out all production to independent contractors or subcontractors 
(Mazur 1998). 
 Today, most manufacturers are principally designers and marketers. If the retail 
buyers like a particular manufacturer clothing “line” (a part of a larger design collection), 
the retailers order the number of garments that they want.  Contracting arrangements are 
established only after the retailer has ordered the specified number of garments from the 
manufacturer or jobber. From the perspective of the manufacturer, this allows for greater 
flexibility, by only responding to orders that have been placed. For the contractor 
however, he (rarely she) never knows when or if his next order will be forthcoming 
(Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000) 
 
The Contractors and Subcontractors 
Below the manufacturers or jobbers in the apparel chain are the contractors and 
subcontractors. The contractors hire sewing machine operators, cutters, pressers,  
ancillary workers, and supervise the actual production of garments (Mazur 1998).To 
further save on costs, the contractor can also subcontract out work to another (usually 
unregistered) shop, who may then outsource the work to industrial homeworkers (for 
discussion of homework, see endnote 1). 
 Customarily, garment contractors employ few workers in their shops. The 
Department of Labor data rarely distinguish the number of contractors from the number 
of legally registered manufacturers. . However, at least in California, the DOL uses state 
registration lists to obtain contractor samples. Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) estimate 
that in Los Angeles County (the largest apparel producing region in the U.S.), most shops 
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employ less than 20 workers. Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil (1999) report that 
there are approximately 6500 apparel firms operating in CA, and that 75% (n=4875) 
employ less than 20 people. According to the authors, approximately 45% have four or 
fewer employees. 
 Likewise, Jay Mazur (1998) former UNITE president, estimates that over half of 
the garment contractors in the U.S. employ fewer than 20 workers. In a national DOL 
study cited by Appelbaum and Bonacich (2000) in 1998, the Department found that the 
average contractor’s shop employed thirty-three people. 
 In addition to their ordinarily small size, contracting shops are generally under-
capitalized, short-lived businesses. Operating as “outside” independent entities, jobbers 
and manufacturers do not assist in the capital investment of contracting shops. 
Consequently, contractors themselves pay the costs of operating a garment factory or 
shop. Because of the relatively low capital start up, little technological knowledge, ease 
with which contractors can set up shop, and the potential to earn an adequate (and 
sometimes very good) standard of living, contracting remains an attractive employment 
option for immigrants with sufficient education and capital to invest (ibid. 2000).  
 With the concomitant increase in immigration, garment imports, and “flexible” 
production however, contractors must operate in an increasingly cutthroat environment. 
Largely because of these factors, contractors often resort to illegal labor practices, which 
in turn jeopardize the livelihood of legitimate, law-abiding contractors. Thus, as 
contractors are pitted against a plethora of illegal (and legal) shops, each tries to be more 
“flexible” (i.e. competitive) than the next. As Mazur (1998:143-144) states, “contractors 
cannot compete based on different production methods, machinery, or other efficiencies.  
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They compete based on offering a lower price for producing the garment. [Thus], the 
jobber [or manufacturer] controls labor standards by forcing the contractor through fierce 
competition to drive down wages.” 
 The benefit of the contracting system to retailers and employers is immense. As 
Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) articulate, outsourcing to contractors provides the 
following benefits: externalization of risks; reduction of worker-related costs; provides 
legal (and moral) evasion of labor law violations; and severely limits efforts to unionize 
workers.  Each of these “benefits” allows the retailers and manufacturers to distance 
themselves from the harms that their industrial structuring and practices create, while 
conveniently creating an immigrant “middleman” scapegoat to pin all of the troubles of 
the industry upon.  As the director of one garment industry association stated, “if Asians 
would just stop abusing their own, we’d be rid of sweatshops” (Volpp 2002:507). By 
pathologizing particular cultures (Koreans, Chinese, etc.), retailers and manufacturers can 
frame the discourse surrounding immigrant contractors as deviant “cultural oppressors” 
devoid of any macro-structural political, economic, or social context. For example, 
The assumption that immigrants bring with them to the United 
States a less democratic and more inhumane culture....deflects 
attention from multiple sources of labor abuse. Workplace violations 
against immigrant workers are not connected to: the lack of U.S. 
labor enforcement; historical legal relationships such as 
subcontracting that were explicitly created and judicially 
sanctioned... to immunize companies from legal responsibility; the 
support of the U. S. government for greater rights for corporations; 
or the pursuit of profit by transnational corporations on the global 
assembly line (Volpp 2002:511). 
 
The Workers 
 As discussed in chapter one, drastic increases in offshore production has led to a 
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concomitant rise in low-wage imports. As wages spiral downward in developing 
countries (due in part to the increases in corporate-led globalization), more and more 
immigrants have entered the U.S. desperate for almost any type of employment. 
Although the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the 
Census do not collect citizenship data on apparel and textile workers, virtually all of the 
garment literature notes that apparel workers are overwhelmingly foreign born, most of 
whom have emigrated from the many countries of Asia and Latin America (Bonacich and 
Appelbaum 2000; Green 1996; Ross 1997; Louie 2001; Petras 1992; Rosen 2002; 
Sweatshop Watch and Korean Immigrant Worker Advocates 1996; Su 1997; UNITE 
HERE 2004; and Volpp 2002). According to the joint BLS and Census Bureau Current 
Population Survey (2003b), of the 341,000 sewing machine operators in the garment 
industry 38.5 percent are Latina/o, 13.9 percent are Asian, and 14.2 percent are African 
American. 
 Adding to the vulnerability of occupying a subordinated gender, immigrant, race, 
and/or ethnic status in the U.S., workers must also compete with the most exploited labor 
populations around the globe.  In doing so, workers are forced to accept whatever their 
contractors are willing/able to pay them. The increase in world poverty, and attendant 
rise in the number of U.S. immigrants heightened by corporate globalization, has only 
made capital stronger in controlling virtually every aspect of how the industry operates.  
 For the apparel assemblers (particularly the sewing machine operators and 
pressers), the work is largely de-skilled, does not require any English, and is labor 
intensive. As stated in the industry overview subsection above, sewing machine operators 
comprise the largest number of apparel production workers in the industry. The job of the 
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sewing machine operator is to assemble or finish clothing or non-clothing, accessories, 
furnishings, etc.,. According to the DOL (2003), most sewing functions require operators 
to specialize in only one specific sewing function, though factories and shops that employ 
“team assemblers” allow workers to perform all of the different tasks assigned to the 
assembly team. 
 Undoubtedly, apparel workers perform highly particularized, repetitive, and 
mundane tasks. While the nature of apparel production harms workers in terms of health, 
safety, and compensation, the organization of apparel production work is of great benefit 
to the industry. From a corporate perspective, specializing in a single (or limited number 
of tasks) promotes efficiency. By training workers in limited, repetitive tasks, it is less 
likely that workers will learn other aspects of production (which in turn would increase 
their skill set and marketability). In short, the production process is designed to create 
and maintain a low-skilled, dependent, and expendable labor pool.  
 In addition to how the gendered division of labor fosters exploitation, the industry 
also benefits from the cultural aspects of the contractor/employee relationship. The 
[male] contractors (mostly immigrants themselves) rely upon the paternalistic 
relationships that characterize unequal gender relationships (both at work and at home) to 
ensure docility and compliance among their workers. As previously discussed, the 
contractor may exploit informal social networks in the community to procure a cheap, 
compliant labor pool. Often abusing the familiarity and trust that the worker has for the 
contractor, the contractor may beguile the worker into accepting an informal contract, 
which then enables him a much greater opportunity to falsely report worker hours and 
wages. 
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 Lacking the education, skill, and opportunities for advancement associated with 
better paying forms of employment, many workers feel trapped with few or no other 
viable work options. And, while some immigrant workers do attempt to fight back 
against exploitive labor practices (see Louie’s Sweatshop Warriors), these efforts are 
constantly being thwarted by threats of deportation, job loss, anti-unionization policies, 
illnesses, injuries, and by the sheer exhaustion from excessive work hours and grueling 
labor conditions. 
 An additional hardship faced by apparel workers is that most are paid by the 
piece-rate system. In the piece rate system, workers are paid according to each procedure 
they finish. For example, a worker is paid a certain amount for every zipper that is 
attached to a pair of pants, or every skirt that is hemmed. As discussed in chapter one, 
one of the major compensation problems with the piece rate system is that the rates are 
determined by what the manufacturer pays to the contractor or subcontractor. In doing so, 
if the manufacturer does not compensate the contractor sufficiently (which is normally 
the case), the worker winds up earning sub-poverty wages (Louie 2001).  
 Moreover, when workers become too proficient, contractors often penalize their 
productivity by paying them the minimum wage rate rather than piece rate. Conversely, if 
worker productivity is not high enough, workers’ piece rates save contractors money, as 
their output rate is lower than the minimum wage (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). 
Other obstacles that workers often face include: paying for their pay checks in order to 
“get on the books”; coping with cultural backlash within immigrant communities (i.e. 
pitting Chinese mainlanders against immigrants from Hong Kong); racial and ethnic 
discrimination; sexual harassment; threats of INS referral; blacklisting by contractors 
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against workers who speak out; and a myriad of work-related health and safety problems. 
 Let us now turn our attention to the role that gender plays in the creation and 
sustenance of the American and global sweatshop. 
 
Theorizing the Gendered Nature of Corporate-State Crime in the Apparel Industry 
 Research Question Three: Does the apparel industry and the State engage in the 
hyper-exploitation of gender to further each of their respective interests?    
 Any analysis of apparel workers and the garment industry must be rooted in an 
understanding of the role that gender plays in affecting and executing corporate and state 
strategies and practices.  Moreover, these strategies and practices must be examined 
within the context of global patriarchal relations, which generally are most acute in the 
world’s poorest countries. For the present analysis, theorizing gender centers a key, but 
often neglected variable that profoundly impacts one’s type of work, occupational 
environment, and status within one’s industry and occupation.  Theorizing gender also 
permits us to analyze corporate and state decision-making that often uncritically passes as 
genderless or gender-neutral action. To this end, we will examine the overwhelmingly 
female-occupied apparel workers in terms of what Groves and Lynch (1990) term 
“structured life choices.”  
 The basic premise of structured life choice is that human agency is in part 
determined (or structured) based upon a variety of intersecting structural, cultural, and 
individual-level factors or variables. Certain human classifications like gender, race, and 
ethnicity, for example are unchangeable “ascribed” statuses. These classifications are 
given meaning by the relative value assigned to each in a given society. Further, these 
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classifications intersect with one another, so that occupying multiple privileged or 
subordinated statuses will tend to  enhance or constrain one’s life opportunities 
respectively (Lynch, 1996).  
 To give a more concrete example, a person who occupies the gender category 
male, the racial category Caucasian, comes from the middle-class, and the citizenship 
category American-born, can generally expect to have access to a broader range of life 
choices relative to a middle class person who occupies the gender category female, the 
racial category Asian, and the citizenship category foreign-born. Put another way, the 
meanings that a given society attaches to human classifications like race, gender, class, 
age, immigration status, ability, etc., have real consequences in terms of shaping the 
quality of one’s life. These variables may include such things as access to safe, sanitary, 
and affordable housing, decent education, a living wage, and basic health care (Lynch, 
Michalowski and Groves 2000).  By examining gender (as well as immigration status, 
race, and ethnicity) within the context of structured life choice, we can more readily see 
the many ways in which these classifications influence the conditions and opportunities 
affecting one’s life, and for the purpose of this analysis, one’s employment opportunities 
and conditions. 
 To understand how sweatshop conditions exist for apparel workers (especially 
women workers) at the bottom, we must first review what we have learned about the top. 
Specifically, in what ways do state and corporate agendas and practices exploit domestic 
and global hierarchical gender relations, in the apparel division of labor?  
 In chapter one, we discussed how from its earliest inception, apparel production 
was relegated first as unpaid “women’s work” inside the home, and later as one of the 
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earliest and most poorly paid forms of labor in which women were allowed to participate. 
Exploiting both essential skills and needs, historian Nancy Green (1996:414) maintains  
the garment industry is perhaps one of the most transparent examples of 
capitalism’s use of patriarchal schemas to link women’s reproductive 
functions to their productive ones. Outwork and homework find a 
justification in a discourse based on the need [for] women to stay at home 
with their children and take care of the domestic chores. Homework is 
linked to housework, production to reproduction. 
 
 By promulgating the notion that women are “naturally” suited for sewing work 
due to their supposed patient nature, manual dexterity, nimble fingers and sense of style  
(ibid. 1996; and Rosen 2002), apparel employers can shift the discourse away from 
structural and cultural determinants to biologically-based factors that link women and 
sewing (for discussion related to law, see Rhodes, 1998). Moreover, this essentialist 
paradigm reifies women’s occupational segregation and low wages in the apparel 
industry (Rosen 2002).  
 Ironically, despite women’s professed superior sewing talent, women apparel 
workers are usually paid less than their male counterparts, even when they are 
performing identical tasks or out-producing their male counterparts. According to the 
International Labor Organization (2000), during the late 1990s when there were roughly 
30 million workers in the global textile, clothing, and footwear industries, 80 percent of 
the lowest-wage production workers were women. More specifically, male workers 
earned wages that were generally twenty to thirty percent higher than female garment 
workers (ibid. 2000). 
 Also, according to Moran (2002), most frequently, the wage difference occurs for 
no other reason than because contractors and subcontractors believe that young women 
and girls (especially immigrants), can be paid less because of their perceived docility, 
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and because their employers believe that they are less likely to complain about disparate 
treatment than their male co-workers. 
 In the U.S., immigrant women and girls (particularly those lacking citizenship), 
are indeed the most exploited apparel workers of all. As Bonacich and Appelbaum 
(2000:174) contend, “in general, there appears to be a strong correlation between the 
status of one’s occupation and status as a citizen.” Not surprisingly then, women from 
less developed countries comprise the majority of migrants seeking among the least 
compensated forms of employment in the U.S.: maids, vendors, maquila operatives, and 
service industry workers (Louie 2001). 
 In justifying lower wages for women apparel workers, shop and plant owners 
often claim that women require only a supplement to the main family income (ibid. 
2002). The reality however, does not support this opportunistic assumption. Both 
globally and domestically, the majority of women garment workers are single, divorced, 
widowed, or otherwise the sole or primary wage earner for the household (ibid. 2002).  
 In export processing zones, women workers constitute approximately 80 percent 
of the workforce (Rosen 2002). Still, even when women comprise a larger proportion of 
the skilled labor in the plant or shop, they are rarely in supervisory or management 
positions (Moran 2002). Such examples speak volumes to the patriarchal gender norms 
surrounding the value of women’s labor relative to men. 
 Overwhelmingly represented in the lowest tier of the apparel division of labor, 
women workers are particularly vulnerable to employer abuses and harassment. For 
example, in Bonacich and Appelbaum’s (2000) research of the Los Angeles apparel 
industry, they found an absence of formalized rules, regulations, and grievance processes  
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in the shops they surveyed, and a lack of corporate and governmental oversight of the 
illegal practices that factory owners and supervisors used to maintain control over their 
employees. Specifically, Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) reported the following types 
of employer harms against workers: forbidding workers to take restroom or water breaks, 
demands for sexual favors, arbitrary punishments (including switching workers to old, 
slow machines, as a way of limiting their pay), arbitrary firings, and complaints of being 
verbally and physically abused by factory owners and supervisors. Such practices are 
intended to intimidate an already vulnerable worker population into tolerating (or at least 
not contesting) abusive and demeaning work conditions. 
 Other exploitive gender-specific employer practices include singling out women 
and girls for layoffs when the slow season arrives (Louie 2001), requiring women 
workers to take birth control pills, mandatory pregnancy testing, and firing women 
workers who become pregnant while employed with the apparel shop (in the U.S., a 
violation of the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act) (Millen and Holtz 2000). In 
Tijuana, it is not uncommon to assign hazardous and difficult jobs to pregnant women so 
that they will leave “voluntarily” before the company must legally pay maternity benefits 
(Rosen 2002). Most egregiously, Millen and Holtz (2000) report that in the Northern 
Mariana Islands, some transnational apparel companies have required pregnant workers 
to terminate their pregnancies in order to keep their job. 
 While most of the above examples appear to stem from plant and shop owners 
(i.e. contractors and subcontractors), these harms can only be sustained in a corporate- 
state environment that privileges power and profits over worker welfare, compensation, 
and safety, from the top to the bottom of the commodity chain. As Robert Ross (2002) 
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articulates in his review of Rosen’s Making Sweatshops, “.[in helping to create the 
globalization of the U.S. apparel industry]...the U.S. sacrificed its apparel workers [first] 
on the altar of the anti-Communist crusade and then of free trade ideology.” By pursuing 
a domestic State policy of tariff phase outs, unprecedented allowances of low-wage 
imports, and a laissez-fare approach to corporate mergers, acquisitions, retail 
monopolization, union avoidance, and capital flight, the State knowingly and willfully 
disregarded the welfare of an entire category of its own apparel production workers.  
 As evidence of these policies, apparel “restructuring” in the U.S. has caused a 
greater loss of jobs in the past thirty years than in any other manufacturing industry in the 
country (Rosen 2002). Moreover, according to the Department of Labor’s, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2003), wage and salary employment in the apparel industry is expected 
to decline 16 percent through 2010, compared with an increase of 16 percent for all other 
industries combined. Also, since most of these workers are women, and since most 
women apparel workers are re-employed in feminized employment service sectors, these 
workers tend to be permanently downwardly mobile (ibid. 2003).  
 Moreover, in following these imperialist-global capitalist paths, first in Asia, then 
in Latin America, the Caribbean, Mexico, and sub-Saharan Africa,  the U.S. gave grossly 
insufficient consideration and protection to the lives of workers and citizens (the world 
over) who would be most harmed by these policies. Today, virtually every continent is 
effected by the apparel trade, as well as the U.S. dominance of global trade policies. And, 
as Wonders and Danner (2002) articulate, the key engine fueling this globalization could 
not exist without the hyper-exploitation of women. 
 We conclude this section with an example of one transnational retailers’ 
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participation in corporate-state malfeasance, and the manner in which this mega-retailer 
operates. Nike is one of the largest and most widely recognized athletic shoe companies 
in the world. Its television commercials in the U.S. are known for promoting 
empowerment among a diverse group of athletes, most notably women and racial 
minorities. Nike’s clever marketing campaign however, belies the treatment of the global 
workers who produce its athletic ware.  
 Specifically, Nike, an American-owned company, has always had all of its 
production factories overseas. More than one-third of Nike’s products are manufactured 
in Indonesia, where New York Times columnist Bob Herbert (1996) reports that the 
minimum wage  was deliberately set below the subsistence level in order to increase 
foreign direct investment. In addition to having a dismal human rights record, Nike 
founder and CEO Phil Knight pays workers in Indonesia $2.20 a day, while his own Nike 
stock is worth $4.5 billion (ibid. 1996). Such corporate practices (in this example) aided 
by the Indonesian government, create a form of double exploitation where third-world 
workers are paid a pittance abroad, while consumers (particularly in the U.S. and 
elsewhere) pay grossly inflated prices that have little connection to the cost of actually 
producing the product. 
 Finally, in theorizing the gendered nature of corporate-state malfeasance in the 
apparel industry, we must also consider the “hidden” retail practice of ubiquitous 
consumer marketing. To say that something is both hidden and ubiquitous may at first 
appear to be an oxymoron. However, retail marketing in recent decades has become so 
pervasive and entrenched in our cultural psyches, that consumerist desires can often 
appear organic rather than carefully created, orchestrated, and manipulated by skillful 
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industry marketers. The message proffered by advertisers is to “consume, consume, 
consume” in an already satiated first world market, while ignoring the fact that most third 
world workers assembling these clothes toil in excess of 12 hour days earning in one day 
less than half of the federal U. S. minimum wage. 
 Let us now turn our attention to the role that the State plays in shaping the laws 
that impact worker health and safety in the U.S. In the following chapter, I will discuss 
the evolution of occupational safety and health legislation in the U.S., and the political 
and economic climates effecting occupational safety and health decision making and 
practices.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Political Economy of Worker Health and Safety Legislation in America   
 
 Qualitative Research Question Four: Did State regulation impact occupational 
injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry? 
The Origins of Worker Health and Safety Legislation  
This chapter explores a topic not commonly addressed by criminologists: 
occupational safety and health legislation (for an exception see, Frank, 1993, 1986, 1985; 
Frank and Lynch, 1992). No discussion of contemporary labor conditions in America is 
complete without an understanding of why and when occupational health and safety laws 
were created, what types and in what context these laws were developed, and what 
influences have helped shape the makers, breakers, and enforcers of  occupational safety 
and health laws. It is important to note here that similar to U.S. labor law in general, 
occupational health and safety legislation (with notable exceptions) is not industry-
specific. While there are no apparel-only safety and health laws, the laws that do exist are 
generally intended to cover this industry. 
In examining the history of occupational health and safety legislation, we uncover 
how political, economic, and social forces have shaped the structure and culture of the 
apparel work environment, the technology and tools used in the process of production, 
the relationships between capital and labor, and the relative safety or hazardousness of 
every American workplace. As such, we begin our discussion by examining the 
coalescing forces that prompted the nation’s first safety and health labor laws. 
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Although the American Industrial Revolution began in the late 1700s, the safety 
and health considerations of factory and other laborers were almost entirely ignored by 
the State for nearly one hundred years. Recalling chapter one, labor legislation in general 
came only after years of extreme labor abuses and intense struggle in states most 
populated by the major waves of European migration. Likewise, many of the earliest laws 
aimed at protecting the health and safety of workers were created in the most 
industrialized states, including Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, and Illinois (Wooding & Levenstein, 1999). Home to one of the nation’s first 
industries, Massachusetts passed the first child labor law, created the first bureau of labor 
statistics, and in 1877, passed the first state factory inspection law in the country, 
allowing for government-paid factory inspectors (Rebinowitz 2002).  By 1890, twenty-
one states had some type of worker health standard concerning accident prevention and 
workplace ventilation, and by 1920, thirty-five states had health and sanitation 
provisions, some of which required hazardous dust and fume removal for selected 
industries (Wooding & Levenstein 1999). Standards varied widely by state, and were 
largely enforced by inspectors who had little or no scientific background or training. 
 Related to this history, workers’ compensation laws, commonly regarded as the 
catalyst for industrial hazard prevention by employers, began to form early in the 
twentieth century (U.S. Department of Labor 1998).  Coverage began with civil 
employees and spread as states passed laws through the last half of the century (ibid. 
1998).  According to Wooding and Levenstein (1999:76), “by 1914, twenty-one states 
had compensation laws, and by 1950 all states had enacted some form of workers’ 
compensation.”  
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The fact that workers’ compensation laws developed more rapidly than worker 
health and safety laws most likely reflects the privileging of business interests in being 
able to determine the conditions of the work environment. With workers’ compensation 
legislation only, businesses could control what health and safety practices they wished to 
adopt in the workplace. State mandated safety and health requirements for businesses 
could undoubtedly be far costlier and more burdensome for employers to adopt. By mid-
century, industrial hygiene programs were forming and becoming law in most states 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1998).  As defined by OSHA (DOL, OSHA 2003:2) 
industrial hygiene is the science of the “study and control of occupational disease and 
other environmental factors affecting employee health.” 
 At the federal level, issues of occupational health at this time were mainly 
research topics rather than the focus of targeted legislation (Nothstein 1981). Not until 
1936 did the federal government finally became involved in occupational safety and 
health regulation with the passage of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (Mintz 
1984). The Walsh Healy Act allowed the Department of Labor to dictate certain safety 
standards for federal government contract work (Wooding and Levenstein 1999). A 
decade later, the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), despite its basic antagonism  
toward labor rights, contained one safety and health provision that allowed employees to 
walk off a job that was “reasonably believed” to be especially dangerous (Nothstein 
1981).  
 The year after LMRA’s passage, President Truman initiated the first conference 
on industrial safety. The Eisenhower Administration continued this tradition, though no 
substantive legislative advancements were seen in worker health and safety legislation 
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until the mid-1960’s. From the vantage point of the State, the increasing costs of 
insurance claims and workers’ compensation payments, coupled with lost production 
time, were presumed to be sufficient incentives for most employers to provide safe work 
places (ibid. 1981). As Nothstein (1981:3) asserts “greater productivity and safer working 
conditions were thought to go hand in hand, since fewer injuries meant more time on the 
job and more production.” 
 Increased productivity and efficiency for industry and increased compensation for 
labor, however, did not necessarily translate into safer workplaces. According to 
Wooding and Levenstein (1999), safety standards at the time were narrow, largely 
cosmetic, and poorly enforced by inspectors lacking the necessary professional training 
in key fields like medicine, engineering, and chemistry. Moreover, workers’ 
compensation payments by employers did not provide the deterrent effect that the State 
had presumed. As we shall see in the following section, by 1960, many American 
workplaces were still extraordinarily dangerous. 
 
1960s to the Emergence of the OSH Act 
 The limited role of the government began to widen in the 1960s with the 
Congressional enactment of a collection of Acts, including the Contract Work Hours and 
Safety Standards Act, the Construction Safety Act, the Service Contract Act, and the 
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act. As before, the Acts only covered a 
limited number of employees and industries (Nothstein 1981). However, in 1965, the 
Public Health Service published the report “Protecting the Health of Eighty Million 
Workers” (most commonly known as the Frye Report). The Report, widely promoted by 
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AFL-CIO staff economist George Taylor, set in motion key recommendations that would 
inform later legislation. Although the specific recommendations of the Report were not 
adopted, it drew the attention of health professionals to workplace safety and health 
issues, thus galvanizing an important component of the scientific community that had not 
existed previously (Wooding and Levenstein 1999).   
 It is worth noting here that although research in occupational medicine had 
existed since the early 1900s, limited government, as well as medical community 
responses to workplace dangers prior to the late 1960s largely ignored occupational 
illnesses and diseases. Likewise, it is worth noting that labor leaders were also limited in 
their responses to workplace injuries and illnesses until this time. As Wooding and 
Levenstein (1999:83 ) contend “union leaders responded only when rank and file 
activism indicated growing unrest among workers about job safety and health, or when 
they realized the value of finding a new issue to garner rank and file support.” 
 Returning to the Frye Report, following its release, Congress enacted further 
measures to protect workers in the mining industry with the passage of the Federal Metal 
& Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act in 1966 and the Federal Coal Mine Safety & Health Act 
in 1969 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1998).  In the midst of these Congressional efforts, 
President Johnson proposed an occupational safety and health program like none 
previously in place in the U.S.  Congressman O’Hara and Senator Yarborough introduced 
the bills on behalf of the Administration, with key assistance from Secretary of Labor, 
Willard Wirtz (Mintz 1984).  In his testimony before the Senate in 1968, Wirtz drew a 
stark picture of workers’ safety in the United States: 
Every minute we talk, 18 to 20 people will be hurt severely enough to 
have to leave their jobs—some of them never work again.  In the time 
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these two sentences have taken, another 20 people—one every second—
have been injured on the job—less seriously, but in most cases needlessly.  
Today’s industrial casualty list—like yesterday’s—and tomorrow’s—and 
every working day’s week after month after year—will be 55 dead, 8,500 
disabled, 27,200 hurt...The clear, central issue in S. 2864 is simply 
whether the Congress will act to stop a carnage which continues only 
because people don’t realize its magnitude, and can’t see the blood on the 
things they buy, on the food they eat, and the services they get (Hearing 
on S. 2864, 1968:69). 
 
 Despite the fact that by the late 1960s, job related accidents accounted for more 
than 14,000 annual deaths, 2.5 million job related disabilities, and an estimated 300,000 
new cases of occupational disease (OSHA 2003), industry employers eschewed the 
program proposal and blocked the passage of S.2864 and H.R. 14816 (Mintz 1984). One 
year later, the 91st Congress took up the issue again, where a pair of bills was introduced 
in both the House and Senate (Nothstein 1981). 
 Predictably, major disputes centered almost entirely on labor-management lines 
with labor endorsing a bill sponsored by Senator Harrison A. Williams Jr., and 
Congressman William A. Steiger, and management favoring the Administration’s 
version. Numerous hearings and conferences were held on the issue, in an attempt to find 
a common ground between labor and management concerns (ibid. 1981).  As Nothstein 
(1981:4-5) documented, by the following year, “agreement was finally reached between 
the conferees on the general duty clause, imminent danger clause, and priorities for 
inspection, investigations, and recordkeeping.” On December 29, 1970, President Nixon 
signed the OSH Act into law. 
 The OSH Act “assure[d] so far as possible every working man and woman in the 
nation safe and healthful working conditions….” (OSHA 2003). In addition to creating 
OSHA, the OSH Act created the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
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(NIOSH) as its research branch under the Department of Health and Human Services. 
NIOSH researches various occupational safety and health problems, provides technical 
assistance to OSHA, and recommends official standards to be considered by OSHA for 
policy adoption (ibid. 2003). The OSH Act also created the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), which reviews appeals and contested inspection, 
results by businesses (Levenstein and Wooding 1997). 
Under the purview of the Act, the Assistant Secretary of Labor (also known as the 
OSHA Director) was granted authority to enact the following: 
Promulgate safety and health standards; conduct inspections and 
investigations, issue citations and propose penalties; set abatement fines 
for correcting unsafe or unhealthy work conditions; require employers to 
keep records of job-related injuries or illnesses; petition the courts to 
restrain imminent danger situations; approve or reject state plans for 
administering and enforcing the Act; provide information and advice to 
employers and employees concerning compliance; and provide evaluative, 
consultive, and promotional programs to assist federal agencies in 
implementing job safety and health programs for federal employees 
(OSHA 2003). 
 
OSHA: The First Decade 
 Although Nixon signed the OSH Act into law and effectively created the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), OSHA remained largely symbolic until the 
Carter administration took office.  Levenstein and Wooding (1997:70) note that, “under 
the Nixon and Ford Administrations, a hostile White House and, for the most part, 
indifferent administrators left the agency adrift, reluctant to set or enforce standards, let 
alone explore the more radical possibilities inherent in the Act.” 
Immediately after OSHA’s passage, the Nixon Administration adopted the relatively 
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lax 450 health standards used by the old Bureau of Labor Standards. The old labor 
standards were largely developed by private industry over the course of several decades, 
and most were created with little or no scientific evidence to support their adoption. As 
such, from its very inception, OSHA positioned itself to be unable to control health 
hazards in American industry (Wooding and Levenstein 1999).  
During OSHA’s first three years, only three new health standards were adopted. 
Further, OSHA failed to use package regulations on fourteen suspected carcinogens, 
favoring instead the more limited approach of individual based regulations. Likewise, in 
enforcement, few inspectors were recruited to the new agency, and the relatively rare 
application of fines served offered little deterrent value. In the early years, the average 
fine for violating a safety or health standard was less than $50, and the maximum fine for 
the most serious violations averaged only $625 (ibid. 1999). Another problem in the early 
years was OSHA’s small business focus. By centering mostly on small businesses, 
OSHA antagonized a group that would later use the rallying call of “entrepreneurial 
freedom” to successfully stymie many OSHA initiatives. This anti-state intervention, 
anti-regulatory populism was later employed by the Reagan and both Bush 
Administrations who were generally inimical to state intervention in the workplace. 
Following President Carter’s election, OSHA had mixed success. At the beginning of 
his term, President Carter seemed committed to maintaining OSHA’s presence by 
appointing Dr. Eula Bingham, who ran the agency from April 1977 until January 1981. 
As described in a recent Industrial Safety and Hygiene News (2005:8) article: 
Emotional and combative, Bingham came out swinging, issuing rules on 
cancer policy, benzene, cotton dust, lead, employee access to exposure and 
medical records, chemical labeling (right to know) and hearing conservation. 
She chided business for expending "too much effort in opposing regulation as 
 73
a basic strategy," and was honored by the United Steelworkers for making 
OSHA "the kind of regulatory agency we had hoped it would be."  
 
Despite Bingham’s best efforts, neither she nor subsequent administrators could alter 
the fact that OSHA was designed with a stronger directive than its resources would 
allow. By the late 1970s, priorities began to shift with the economic crisis, and President 
Carter grew increasingly concerned about the burden that the OSH Act would place on 
businesses. More and more, regulation became dictated by “cost-benefit” analysis, which 
effectively limited the role of government when such action threatened the economic 
success of business (Zinn 1999). And, as in the past, final standard setting continued to 
progress at a glacial pace.   
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OSHA: The Deregulation Years 
After Carter left office, the mild gains made by OSHA to protect workers were 
almost entirely lost.  President Reagan’s tenure in the White House lead to the slashing of 
any power that OSHA had left.  As Zinn (1999: 575) recorded 
[Reagan] appointed as head of OSHA a businessman who was hostile to 
OSHA’s aims. One of his first acts was to order the destruction of 100,000 
government booklets pointing out the dangers of cotton dust to textile 
workers.   
 
Zinn (1990:575-576) goes on to quote political scientist William Glover’s criticism of 
Carter and Reagan: 
OSHA appears caught in a cycle of liberal presidents—who want to retain 
some health and safety regulatory programs, but who also need economic 
growth for political survival—and conservative presidents, who focus 
almost exclusively on the growth side of the equation.  Such a cycle will 
always need to subordinate the need for safe and healthful workplaces 
....ensuring that commitment to OSHA will only be as strong as the 
priorities of business will allow. 
 
Other critiques of the Reagan years and their effect on OSHA support this 
assertion.  Beginning with Reagan’s tenure, the OSHA budget was cut, the number of 
inspectors fell, complaints from workers were discouraged, and a number of other actions 
resulted in an agency that was slow, moving toward voluntary compliance, and lacking in 
performance initiatives (Levenstein and Wooding, 1997).  Because of Reagan’s decision 
to move OSHA directly under the supervision of the Office of Management and Budget, 
the OMB created elaborate and near impossible hurdles to surmount in formulating new 
standards, while old standards were modified to provide policies more suitable to 
business interests (ibid. 1997; Wooding and Levenstein, 1999).  This action not only 
weakened the agency, but also resulted in a loss of credibility in the eyes of employers 
and employees alike (Wooding & Levenstein, 1999). 
 75
 
Workers’ Health and Safety Under the Clinton Administration 
Similar to the Carter-Reagan policy shifts, Wooding and Levenstein (1999:96) 
note, “the Clinton administration seemed to offer a return to more liberal politics after 
over a decade of conservative ideology, though little was done to stem the decline in 
OSHA during its early years.”  Demonstrative of this philosophical shift, in 1995, 
President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore co-authored and published a small booklet 
entitled The New OSHA: Reinventing Worker Safety and Health.  In their text, Clinton 
and Gore (1995: 1-2) pointed out what they saw at the time as the two fundamental 
problems with OSHA:  (1) the [economic] cost of occupational injuries and illnesses 
remained substantial ($110 billion a year), despite the fact that overall occupational 
injury and illness rates had declined since the 1970s and (2) the public perception of 
OSHA remained one of an agency mired in red-tape and non-specific industry standards.  
To remedy these problems, the President and Vice-President called for a three 
pronged approach that included strong, targeted enforcement, clear regulations, and a 
focus on the most hazardous regions of industry (ibid. 1995).  Unfortunately for OSHA 
(and more importantly for workers), the plan did not include a protocol for dramatically 
increasing funding and staffing, nor did it address the various deficiencies in standard 
setting, inspections, enforcement and penalty collections. By shifting the measurement of 
OSHA’s performance from the total number of inspections to a “results oriented” 
measurement system, OSHA could focus on fewer, (and by its classification schema), 
more hazardous work sites. In short, the Administration hoped that the results orientation 
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of OSHA would provide the agency with more “bang for its buck” (Levenstein and 
Wooding 1997:409). 
 Beyond the Executive Branch’s window dressing approach to health and safety 
regulations, glaring gaps in occupational health education and training were little 
improved during the 1990s. Occupational health physician, Michael Lax (1996), notes 
that little time is spent in medical school curricula on occupational illness. In the early 
1980s, four hours was the average length of time given to occupational disease in U.S. 
medical schools.  A repeated study 10 years later showed similar findings (ibid. 1996).  
In addition to the lack of uniform medical training in occupational disease, 
physicians rarely ask for a patient’s work history, which could provide important medical 
information about the types of toxic exposures with which the worker may have come 
into contact. This is particularly critical when one considers that the EPA only regulates a 
fraction of possible carcinogens that are produced each year, and that OSHA lacks 
regulations on most chemicals that have been identified as carcinogenic by the National 
Cancer Institute (Shapiro 1989). Raising awareness among workers and health care 
providers regarding at least some of these toxic exposures could provide an important 
catalyst for action, and could help force more rapid standard changes. 
 By President Clinton’s second term, a majority Republican Congress was in 
place, and would prove to be about as inimical to labor as either the Reagan or Bush Sr. 
Administrations. In 1997, Georgia Republican Representative, Charles W. Norwood, was 
appointed Chair of the 1997 House Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. As 
Subcommittee Chair, Norwood oversaw all OSHA legislation including the OSHA 
Reform Act of 1997—a Bill that unsuccessfully attempted to effectively abolish the 
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agency (Schlosser 2001). In this capacity, Rep. Norwood had this to say about ergonomic 
injuries: “many workers get repetitive-stress injuries not from their jobs, but from skiing 
and playing too much tennis” (ibid. 2001).  
While the above exemplifies a gross disconnect with the labor conditions of 
millions of American workers, it also demonstrates the all too common history of 
appointing agency and committee heads whose political and/or economic agendas clash 
with the very organizations they are entrusted to serve.  
To be sure, most examples of state malfeasance in this regard are not quite so 
overt. More common are the subtle practices that dilute the OSH Act, as when the 105th 
Congress enacted legislation prohibiting quotas from being used to rate OSHA employee 
job performance (Rabinowitz, 2002).  While seemingly benign on the surface, the 
legislation helped create an official disincentive for OSHA investigators to inspect as 
many job sites as they were able. Rather, as stated previously, the new legislation helped 
to cement the increasing trend toward voluntary partnerships, outreach, and voluntary 
compliance with businesses. In the next section, I will discuss how trends such as these, 
have impacted civil and criminal penalties imposed on employers who violate OSHA 
standards, and will discuss the impact that President George W. Bush’s Administration 
has had upon the agency, thus far. 
 
OSHA in the Twenty-First Century 
Since the creation of the OSHA Act, U.S. employment has doubled, and now 
stands at nearly 115 million workers at 7 million job sites (OSHA 2003). According to 
OSHA (2003:3), each year almost 6,000 Americans die from workplace injuries; as many 
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as 50,000 workers die from illnesses in which workplace illnesses were a contributing 
factor; nearly 6 million employees suffer non-fatal workplace injuries; and the direct and 
indirect cost of occupational injuries and illnesses totals more than $170 billion (an 
increase of $60 billion in less than 10 years).  
As evidenced above, the economic, physical, and psychological costs are 
immense.  While overall workplace fatalities and occupational injuries and illnesses have 
markedly decreased since OSHA’s passage (OSHA 2003), critics maintain that this has 
more to do with the transformation of the American economy and OSHA’s methodology 
than it does a dramatic increase in the agency’s performance (Brill ;Wooding and 
Levenstein 1999). The very fact that this under-funded agency spends just $3 per worker 
each year in addressing occupational health and safety (ibid. 1999) demonstrates the 
[lack of] regard in which the State holds its workers.  
Less than ten years ago, it was also estimated that in order for OSHA to inspect 
every workplace in the country (at the time, more than 6.5 million job sites), it would 
take just shy of nine decades (Wooding and Levenstein 1999; see also The Demise of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration: A Case Study in Symbolic Action  
Calavita, Kitty, Social Problems, 1983, 30, 4, Apr, 437-448). Today, there are 7 million 
job sites, and even fewer OSHA inspectors than there were a decade ago. Of these 7 
million job sites, according to former OSHA director John Henshaw, only 2% are 
presently being inspected each year (Cohen and Goldstein 2004). 
 Cooper (2003) notes that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, OSHA was 
conducting about 36,000 inspections a year on a budget of about $445 million, for 2003.  
Compared with the EPA, OSHA has a budget about ninety-four percent smaller (the EPA 
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has the largest budget of any federal regulatory agency, and is also the largest federal 
agency. OSHA polices workplaces – the EPA polices the entire U.S.).  Arguably, these 
two agencies have different resources because OSHA is largely concerned with activities 
within the plant’s boundaries, while the EPA is mainly concerned with a plant’s impact 
outside of its boundaries (ibid. 2003). Nevertheless, there is little denying that OSHA is 
grossly underfunded. 
In addition to budget limitations, which affect many federal agencies’, 
appropriation riders approved by Congress continue to block or hinder OSHA from 
undertaking particular actions, rather than mandating that it perform additional actions 
(Rabinowitz 2002).  For example, in the mid-seventies, the first appropriation rider 
passed by Congress “excluded businesses with 10 or fewer employees from most of 
OSHA’s recordkeeping requirements” (Rabinowitz 2002:55).  In industries such as 
apparel where many shops have fewer than 10 employees, this provides a license to 
contractors and subcontractors to simply ignore safety and health rules that are not cost-
effective or convenient.  
Other appropriation riders throughout OSHA’s history have included small farm 
exemptions, specific immunities for small businesses, exemptions for low injury rate 
industries, and the blockage of ergonomic safety standards (ibid. 2002). Such 
appropriation riders negate effective data collection practices, which in turn can disguise 
the nature and extent of harm in the workplace. Again, as exemplified in the apparel 
industry, OSHA excludes most garment shops from planned inspections, and does not 
include most shops in their survey data. Thus, it should come as no surprise that OSHA 
categorizes apparel as a low-injury rate industry since it omits the majority of smaller and 
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perhaps less safe workplaces from inspection. It is for these and other reasons why this 
author cautions against over-reliance on OSHA data for interpreting the direction, extent, 
and characteristics of occupational injuries, illnesses and fatalities in general, and in the 
apparel industry, specifically. 
 It should be emphasized that workplace injury and illness statistics need to be as 
detailed, thorough, and inclusive as possible. The more detailed and inclusive the data 
are, the more likely that harms will be counted, affected parties will be mobilized, and 
political and/or economic pressures can be applied to force more appropriate standards. 
Take but one example: the Mexican (and Mexican-American) worker. Although 
occupational injuries and illnesses overall have been decreasing in recent years, for 
Mexican workers employed in the U.S., the reverse is true. According to an AP 
investigation from 1996-2002 (Pritchard 2004), a Mexican worker gets killed on the job 
every day. In several Southern and Western U.S. states, a Mexican worker is four times 
more likely to die than the average U.S.-born worker (ibid. 2004). Ten years ago, 
Mexican workers were about 30 percent more likely to die on the job than native-born 
workers; now they are about 80 percent more likely. The AP (2004:1-2) investigation 
also reported that although the number of Mexican workers in the U.S. increased by 
about half (from four million to six million during 1996-2002), the number of deaths rose 
by about two-thirds from 241 to 387. Most disturbingly the AP (2004:2) report found that 
Mexicans are nearly twice as likely as the rest of the immigrant population to die at work. 
In response to reports such as these, OSHA recently began to focus greater 
attention upon Hispanic workers, initiating new training programs for this purpose 
around the country. The programs are designed to target injury rates among Hispanics 
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that are twenty-three percent higher than all other ethnic groups (Ramstack 2003). Non-
English speaking workers, especially immigrant workers, have multiple and intersecting 
vulnerabilities that put them at greater risk for workplace injuries and illnesses. As 
detailed in chapter two, these include communication barriers, fear of job loss, (or 
deportation if employed illegally), differing cultural perceptions of occupational risk, and 
a lack of knowledge surrounding U.S. labor laws. Collectively, these factors create an 
environment where occupational injuries and illnesses are prone to be significantly 
greater than they would be otherwise. 
President Bush’s move to relax immigration laws paved the way for OSHA’s 
former administrator, John Henshaw, to lead an effort to extend workers’ safety to 
include all workers, “regardless of their language or their immigration status” (Ramstack, 
2003). Whether this will materialize into decreased injury and illness rates for immigrant 
workers in the future remains to be seen. 
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President George W. Bush’s Stamp on OSHA 
Under President Clinton, both Democrats and Republicans alike maintain that in 
the last few years, he put so much emphasis on the passage of the ergonomics standard 
that many other proposed rules were overlooked prior to his departure. In an 
unprecedented move, the new Bush Administration placed a temporary freeze on all 
pending rules passed toward the end of the Clinton Administration. Following the 
President’s initiative, Labor Secretary Elaine Chao instructed the entire Department to 
find items to eliminate. By the end of 2003, Bush had eliminated over half of the 44 rules 
pending from Clinton’s last days in office. Moreover, from 2000-2004, OSHA eliminated 
almost five times as many standards as it had completed, most of which were 
considerably narrower than the older standards being eliminated (Goldstein and Cohen 
2004). 
 For example, one of the eliminated proposed standards, which had been under 
consideration since the Reagan Administration, would have updated the lists of hundreds 
of industrial chemicals to which workers could be exposed. By rejecting the proposed 
standards, the new Administration argued that it made more sense to regulate each 
substance, one at a time. Here we see that the Clinton Administration supported 
streamlining chemical exposure standards by relying on past scientific research, which 
was also an efficient means of updating OSHA’s workplace standards. The Bush 
Administration, however, favored a much more bureaucratic, inefficient approach by 
requiring that each chemical be reexamined individually, and perhaps subject to further 
testing when this work had already been accomplished (see for example, Devra Davis’s 
book, When Smoke Fell Like Water 2002). 
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OSHA’s Inspection, Enforcement and Penalty Assessment Policies 
OSHA is most known for its ability to cite employers for civil penalties due to 
violations of its workplace safety and health standards.  As discussed previously, with its 
current number of investigators, OSHA is only able to investigate approximately two 
percent of the seven million work sites in America. Thus, its investigations tend to center 
around large, high risk industries and employment sites. Inspections can be planned or 
unplanned, and in the latter case, the employer is not legally granted advanced notice of 
OSHA’s inspection. According to OSHA (2003), employers receiving advanced notice of 
an unplanned inspection can receive a criminal fine of up to $1,000, or a six-month jail 
term or both. 
Given that the Courts have generally granted businesses due process rights similar 
to or in excess of what is granted individual citizens, it is important to note that 
employers generally have the same protections that apply to state inspections, as well. In 
Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc. (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that OSHA cannot enter any 
private premise for inspection purposes unless it first obtains either the employer’s 
consent or a warrant issued by a court authorizing inspection. OSHA also must have 
probable cause for obtaining the warrant, though the Courts have generally granted 
OSHA’s request to conduct their health and safety investigations (Kellman 1999).  
Nevertheless, such a requirement is yet another added burden that OSHA must 
face when conducting inspections.  
In terms of civil penalties, presently, the maximum penalty per OSHA violation is 
$70,000 for a willful or repeated violation, and $7,000 for a posting, serious, other than 
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serious, or failure to abate violation. On the failure to abate violation, OSHA may impose 
a maximum penalty of $7,000 per day. According to OSHA (2003: 26), willful violations 
are when the employer intentionally and knowingly commits an offense, or when the 
employer commits the offense with plain indifference to the law. A serious violation is 
where the violation creates a substantial probability that death or serious harm could 
result and that the employer knew or should have known the hazard. Other than serious 
refers to a violation that has a direct relationship to job safety and health, but probably 
would not cause death or serious physical harm. A failure to abate a violation refers to a 
situation where an employer fails to correct a previously cited violation before the 
prescribed abatement date. Employers may appeal inspection results; however, 
employees may not contest citations, penalties or lack of penalties imposed by OSHA 
(GA0 2003). 
In a recent GAO (2004) study, the Office found many cases where OSHA 
inaccurately classified the gravity of offense in four of the five regions that they audited 
in 2002. In other words, the gravity of offense often did not comply with the types of 
injuries and illness that resulted from the violation. Moreover, the GAO (2004) found 
that OSHA improperly reduced employer penalties in four of the five inspected regions 
during 2002, and in three of the five regions in 2003. Other problems found included 
improper follow-up inspections of serious, willful, repeated, or imminent danger 
situations in three of the five regions in 2002, and two of the five regions in 2003. And 
finally, the GAO (2004) report found that documentation and management review of 
penalty determinations and reductions were improper or lacking in all of the regions in 
2002, and in four out of the five regions in 2003. All of these problems have lead the 
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GAO to conclude that OSHA has much work to do in ensuring that the intent of the OSH 
Act is being followed, and that OSHA employees are complying with this legal mandate. 
Let us now turn our attention to OSHA’s enforcement of criminal health and 
safety workplace violations.  As mentioned in the beginning of this section, OSHA is 
well known for its ability to impose civil sanctions on safety and health violations. What 
is less known is the extent to which the organization can insist on criminal enforcement 
of certain violations. Although OSHA cannot directly prosecute for violations, it can 
recommend and refer such requests to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Byrum, et al. 
2001).  According to Byrum, et al. (2001) however, in most cases, the OSHA Area 
Director refers any potential actions to the appropriate Regional Administrator who will 
then usually determine with an OSHA Solicitor, whether or not to push the referral 
toward the DOJ. As we will see momentarily, OSHA does not refer the majority of even 
its most serious criminal violations to the DOJ, nor does the DOJ prosecute most of the 
criminal cases it receives from OSHA. 
Criminal violations of safety and health laws include willful violations causing 
death to an employee, filing false statements to federal and state authorities, and 
disclosing the date of an upcoming inspection (ibid. 2001). A recent report by the New 
York Times (Barstow 2003:1) found that from 1982 to 2002, OSHA investigated 1,242 
cases where it concluded that worker deaths were caused by their employer’s “willful” 
safety and health violations. Despite the fact that these were criminal violations, OSHA 
declined to refer cases to the DOJ in 93% of those cases. More egregiously, at least 70 of 
the employers who caused willful violations that resulted in employee deaths were repeat 
offenders (many of whom had avoided prosecution for both the first and subsequent 
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offense(s). Equally as disturbing, according to Barstow (2003:1) is OSHA’s reluctance to 
seek prosecution even when “the violations caused multiple deaths; when the victims 
were teenagers; and even where reviews by administrative judges found abundant proof 
of willful wrongdoing.” 
According to Barstow (2003), during this same 20-year period: OSHA referred 
just 196 of its 1,242 willful death cases to the DOJ. Although the DOJ declined to 
prosecute the majority of cases, they obtained 81 convictions (largely through pre-trial 
settlements). Only 16 cases resulted in jail or prison sentences.  
The DOJ maintains that this is largely because killing a worker is only a 
misdemeanor under federal law, punishable by six months in jail, which is far less than 
an individual would receive for a manslaughter conviction. Even a subsequent conviction 
of a willful violation standard that causes the death of an employee does not increase the 
penalty standard. Further, DOJ ( Nash 2004 ) maintains that, given the relatively vague 
language of the OSHA Act, it is extremely difficult to meet the “beyond all reasonable 
doubt” burden required of criminal cases. Finally, DOJ claims that since very few OSHA 
compliance officers are trained to investigate criminal cases, they often unintentionally 
“botch cases” which then cannot be used by federal prosecutors (ibid. 2004). 
In the next chapter, I will outline the meaning that OSHA’s inspection, 
enforcement and penalty process has for the apparel industry and its workers, and in the 
conclusion chapter, what needs to be done to make OSHA a more effective agency in 
protecting the health and safety of American workers. 
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Chapter Four 
The Government’s Response: A Crime by Any Other Name 
Policing the Apparel Industry: Compromising  Worker Safety, Health, and Compensation 
through Regulatory Sabotage  
It is important to note the linguistic and pragmatic differences regarding the 
control of business/corporate crime and deviance committed by employers in the 
workplace, versus the control of traditional street crimes or deviance committed by 
individuals. In apparel, the former is managed by federal and state regulatory agencies 
including the Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration’s Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 
As previously discussed, both WHD and OSHA have investigative powers, can assess 
civil penalties (usually fines) for law violators, and can refer criminal violations for 
prosecution to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Byrum et al., 2001). In practice 
however, criminal prosecutions against retailers, manufacturers, or contractors are 
extremely rare. 
According to an auditing report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1994), 
one of the many enforcement problems limiting the WHD is its resource problems. Since 
1989, the WHD has 17 percent fewer enforcement resources for all of its regulatory 
objectives, 6 percent more employers to cover, and additional laws to enforce (ibid. 
1994). Responsible for investigating violations of the minimum wage, overtime, child 
labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and since 1993, the Family and Medical 
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Leave Act and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, WHD faces the large task of 
enforcing wage laws nationwide with less than 1500 full-time employees (DOL 2003). 
With a $152.4 million budget and 945 inspectors in 2002, the Wage and Hour 
Division completed 1,000 civil cases, 336 of which involved monetary violations. 
Employees receiving back wages totaled 7,842, and collectively, garment workers 
received $5,933,609, or approximately $756.64 for each employee (DOL, WHD 2003). 
While the Wage and Hour 2002 Statistics Fact Sheet boasts of its ten year high 
enforcement record, in the apparel industry, where half of the shops are operating 
illegally, and wage violations are routine, only about one percent of workers receive back 
wages from their employers. Furthermore, despite the chronic violations that plague 
contracting shops in the apparel industry, no criminal prosecution referrals were listed by 
the Department of Labor’s WHD. 
Similar to the Wage and Hour Division’s budget, OSHA’s budget and resources 
are insufficient for the task at hand. In 2002, OSHA’s federal budget was $443 million, 
with 2,316 full-time employees, including 1, 123 inspectors to cover seven million job 
sites nationwide (OSHA 2003). While WHD and OSHA have recently been attempting to 
coordinate their enforcement activities in the garment industry, legal and administrative 
limitations, coupled with varying state and federal labor regulatory priorities have limited 
this effort (GAO 1995). 
One such problem is that while garment industry experts identify the industry as a 
hotbed of dangerous workplaces, OSHA currently does not target garment shops for 
programmed health or safety inspections. As previously stated, presently, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) industry-level injury data used by OSHA for targeting inspections, 
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do not classify apparel as a high hazard industry. While this at first appears to contradict 
the available data on the industry, a closer examination reveals the discrepancy. Chiefly, 
OSHA does not include in its annual Data Initiative Survey workplaces in manufacturing 
with fewer than 40 employees, nor does it require employers with 10 or fewer employees 
to keep illness or injury records. With over half of all contracting shops operating 
illegally, and with generally small numbers of employees working at most garment shops 
(GAO 1995), it is not especially surprising that the majority of occupational injuries and 
illnesses in this industry are severely undercounted. Also, as a result of OSHA’s 
classification schema, fewer potential referrals are shared with the Wage and Hour 
Division for joint enforcement. 
By omitting such a large sample of possible workplace injury and illness cases in 
the apparel industry, agencies like OSHA can overstate successes, and mask the dark side 
of workplace hazards because injuries and illnesses to workers in smaller shops are never 
recorded. As Harry Brill (1992) states, the failure of public officials to perform their 
duties is a violation of their legal obligations. Most persons would readily recognize that 
a police officer who refrains from saving a life when s/he has the ability and mandate to 
do so, is violating the law. So too, is the federal or state regulator or agency that fails to 
act when the law requires action.   
The above demonstrates one of the most significant differences between the roles 
of federal and state civil regulators and federal, state, and municipal law enforcement. 
The function of the police, regardless of jurisdiction is to serve primarily as the formal 
social control agent of the state. As such, law enforcement is entrusted with broad powers 
to stop, question, search, seize, detain, and exercise the state-sanctioned use of force in 
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the course of making a lawful arrest.  The word enforce means “to compel observance or 
obedience to” (American Heritage Dictionary 1994). The State relies upon the coercive 
power of the police to garner obedience from individual citizens, with overwhelming 
emphasis upon its major Index I “street” crimes.  As previously discussed, no such 
sweeping powers are granted to state regulatory agencies like OSHA and WHD. In fact, 
much of the legislation that regulates health, safety, and wage violations in the workplace 
emphasize cooperation, partnerships, alliances, and voluntary compliance with 
businesses, rather than the tough enforcement rhetoric that is the staple of federal, state, 
and local law enforcement initiatives.  
 
Understanding the Linguistic Tools and Regulatory Practices that Obfuscate Corporate  
Law Violations and Allow State Agencies to Violate their Legal Obligations 
If one examines the definition, to “regulate” means “to control or direct according 
to rule, principle, or law; to adjust to a specific requirement....or to adjust for accurate 
and proper functioning” (American Heritage 1994). As the definition implies, regulatory 
functions are designed to offer administrative rules or guidelines of permissible business 
practices. 
Not unintentionally, the State employs a much softer touch with regard to how it 
attempts to control crime and malfeasance by corporations or businesses. Unlike the 
police function or mandate that compels obedience to the law, the function of federal and 
state regulators relies to a much greater degree on collaboration and assistance rather than 
compulsion.  
In general, the present incarnation of regulation is to assist corporations in their 
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observance and compliance with the law by making policy recommendations, 
coordinating voluntary internal monitoring efforts, making very occasional inspections to 
ensure compliance, and for the most egregious cases, assessing fines and other civil 
penalties (Brill 1992).  These differential mandates help explain how the State can often 
appear at once, militant, overzealous, and overreaching in its efforts to control street 
crime, while its efforts to control business and corporate crime are considerably less 
obtrusive. 
 Both the nature of apparel work, and the impunity with which many unlawful 
garment shops are permitted to operate, create a particularly unsafe and unhealthy 
workplace environment for employees. With respect to job site hazards, in a 1995 study 
by the General Accounting Office, the Agency found that typical sweatshops contained 
exposed electrical wiring, blocked aisles, unguarded machinery, poor lighting, and 
insufficient temperature and ventilation controls.  
 In terms of occupational injuries and illnesses, common reports in both legal and 
illegal apparel shops include severe hand, wrist, and elbow musculoskeletal disorders 
(including carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and hand-arm vibration syndrome); lower 
back musculoskeletal disorders; musculoskeletal disorders of the neck and shoulder 
(NIOSH 1997); and nerve disorders.  
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 Despite the fact that NIOSH and other state health agencies have singled out 
apparel as one of the worst industries for ergonomic injuries (and have labeled ergonomic 
disorders as one of the greatest causes of employee injuries overall), OSHA still does not 
include a separate recording column for musculoskeletal disorders in its annual injury 
and illness survey. By lumping musculoskeletal disorders with other injuries, it becomes 
much more difficult to press for national, uniform ergonomic standards.  
In attempting such a standard, the Clinton Administration fought to require 
employers to redesign workplaces if they were hazardous, and compensate people who 
became disabled. The Administration believed the standard, covering more than 6 million 
work sites at an estimated cost of $4.5 billion for employers, was the biggest step the 
government could take to protect the greatest number of employees. Unfortunately for 
workers, in 2000, Congress and the Bush administration vetoed the standards (Goldstein 
and Cohen 2004). 
In addition to musculoskeletal disorders, punctures, lacerations, and eye strain, 
are common to apparel workers (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000).  Moreover, there are a 
number of toxic harms that confront apparel workers, including elevated levels of  
formaldehyde, asbestos, cotton dust, powdered dye and other volatile organic 
compounds.  These toxins, in combination with poor indoor ventilation, increase 
respiratory illnesses (OSHA 1991; OSHA 2003). According to OSHA (2003), cotton dust 
may contain a combination of several harmful substances if inhaled or ingested, including 
ground-up plant matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, and other contaminants. 
Cotton dust is one of the largest illness threats to textile and apparel workers and a 
leading cause of lung disease. 
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 To protect against dust inhalation, many apparel workers wear protective 
respirators on the job. In 1993, 26, 431 apparel workers wore respirators. At the time that 
OSHA proposed respirator standard revisions in 1993, the total annual cost for the 5,238 
respirator using establishments, would have been $355,540 or 0.06% of the total 
establishments’ profits (OSHA 1993). After five years of information gathering and 
proposed rulemaking, OSHA amended the standard in 1998. Despite the 
characteristically glacial speed in which it took OSHA to adopt the new standard, the 
issue of respirator quality was yet to be decided.  
 In 2004 and 2005, 3M, the leading manufacturer of disposable masks since the 
1970s, aggressively lobbied OSHA to grant their disposable masks the same safety rating 
as the more sophisticated respirators. Although several industrial hygienists from NIOSH 
and the Chair of the American National Standards Institutes (ANSI) testified that the 
disposable masks provided inadequate protection to workers, OSHA nevertheless granted 
the same safety rating to disposable masks as it did the respirators (Goldstein and Cohen 
2004). Given the relative ease with which proper protective gear can limit lung disease 
among workers, OSHA’s decision regarding this standard demonstrates yet another 
example of its dereliction of duty.  
 Related to this, OSHA is presently considering a proposed rule that would require 
employees (rather than employers) to pay for the costs of personal protective equipment. 
In the apparel industry, where this practice is already common, the passage of such a 
standard would continue to penalize low-wage laborers for their employment “choice,” 
and discourage employees from taking the necessary job-related safety precautions.  
 As evidenced above, the structure and culture of OSHA, work to limit overall 
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safety and reform measures rather than to support it.  One final example of this point: the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (which collects survey data for OSHA), does not link the 
specific source of worker injury or illness in its annual survey with the respective 
occupational category, nor does it collect the number and types of potential carcinogens 
by industrial or occupational exposure. Because of this limitation in how illness data are 
collected, the number of carcinogens in the apparel industry and the number of toxic 
exposures in garment shops across the country remains unknown. Thus, while the BLS 
reports that the annual fatality rate in apparel remains at less than a fraction of one 
percent, the long-term fatality rate due to occupational disease may be far higher (Leigh 
et al 2004). 
 
The Paradoxical Government: Who Will Police the Lawmakers? 
 By now it is apparent that overcoming harmful and exploitive labor conditions in 
apparel and other manufacturing industries necessitate a government that has the political 
will, resources, and expertise to effectively serve its workers. When state and federal 
policies contradict one another, or are not mutually supported, when labor inspector 
shortages limit enforcement and compliance efforts, and when information sharing 
between government agencies is stymied, workers are denied their legal right to safe and 
healthy workplaces. Equally as important, such occurrences signal a government in crisis. 
 But what if eliminating sweatshops wasn’t necessarily a goal shared by all 
legislators? What if the very existence of sweatshops was defended as a stage in 
economic development that a country must go through to in order to develop and 
prosper? Or defended as better than the alternatives for poor people living in less 
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developed countries (or immigrants living in the U.S.)? Or defended as the only way in 
which corporations can meet consumer demands for low prices? Or defended as an 
unavoidable by-product of the apparel supply chain (Greenia 2001)? 
 At this point, we now know that each of these defenses are myths. Nevertheless, 
they are very powerful myths routinely offered by mainstream economists, retailers, 
manufacturers, their marketers, and lobbyists who maintain that the entire anti-sweatshop 
movement is both misguided and harmful to apparel business interests. From this vantage 
point, virtually all government  regulatory interference creates artificially-imposed 
barriers to free trade, thereby limiting the company’s (or more broadly the industry’s) 
profitability. Consequently, retail and manufacturing power brokers rely upon the 
government to defend its business interests by opposing regulation and/or reformist 
interests. 
 Certainly relative to labor, capital is in a far more advantageous economic, 
political, and social position to have its interests supported, codified, and vigorously 
enforced. To this end, in order to sustain this position of privilege, the interests of capital 
must be promoted on multiple and mutually reinforcing structural, cultural, and 
individual levels. One of the most important ways to accomplish this is to influence the 
very laws, organizations, and practices that govern one’s industry or business. In doing so 
however, capital promoting efforts must be carefully orchestrated and managed in a 
manner that obscures any appearance of corporate/state conflicts of interests, hypocrisy, 
militant labor opposition, exploitation, and/or harm. Equally as important, these efforts 
must be promoted and protected in a manner that does not give the appearance of evading 
corporate accountability. 
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 In examining the history of U.S. labor laws (as we did in Chapter One), it is 
evident that the profoundly skewed distribution of wealth and power has carried over to 
the protections afforded to capital and labor, by its government.  Within this system, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that embodied in the design of labor laws are the structural and 
cultural imbalances that promote its very violation. Indeed, in the case study that follows, 
we see one of the many examples of the supremacy of a capitalist political economy. 
In 1994, when the Clinton Administration sought to increase the wages of 
garment workers in the Northern Mariana Islands capital, Saipan, <> 15 
the island gov’t [wanting the business], paid the law firm of Preston Gates 
Ellis and Rouvelas Meeds $4 million to stymie the effort.  Saipan 
government officials hired a legion of well-connected Washington 
lobbyists led by former Republican Whip Tom DeLay aide, Jack 
Abramoff, to “impeach” the anti-sweatshop campaign. Abramoff and his 
family contributed $18,000 to DeLay’s campaign coffers, and both DeLay 
and fellow Republican Dick Armey were treated to trips to the island, 
where they.....made impromptu visits to factories that were given 
advanced notice, and “spiffed up” for the occasion. ......all attempts to hold 
hearings on improving the wages and working conditions of the Saipan 
workers were subsequently blocked by the Republican Whip (Stein 1999). 
 
 The above example demonstrates the complexities and the seeming contradictions 
existing within a democratic government. Domestically, different segments of the same 
government often work toward achieving purportedly different goals. In the case of the 
Clinton Administration’s efforts, the stated goal was to improve sweatshop conditions in 
the U.S. by increasing wages and working conditions. At the same time though, in other 
countries and regions removed from the intermittent gaze of U.S. regulatory agencies, the 
Clinton administration, through its passage of NAFTA, and support of other neo-liberal 
trade policies, has helped accelerate the deterioration of wages and working conditions in 
many areas of the developing world. By comparison, the DeLay, Armey, and Abramhoff 
agenda appear more motivated by individual gain, though such micro-level political 
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capitalizing may also have serious, long-term, and far reaching consequences for 
workers.  
 This chapter concludes the qualitative portion of the dissertation’s historical-
comparative analysis. Briefly recapping chapters one through four, I began chapter one 
with an overview of the birth, decline, and resurrection of the American sweatshop. In 
this chapter, two major qualitative research questions were posed. Qualitative research 
question one asked: Did size of and participation in union activity influence better 
working conditions for apparel workers? Undoubtedly from chapter one, the reader has 
learned that apparel labor unions were instrumental in combating the conditions of the 
early American sweatshop, and that the larger their size and strength, the more influential  
they were in improving domestic apparel working conditions. 
 Qualitative research question two, also in Chapter One, hypothesized whether 
corporate globalization had a negative impact on working conditions for domestic and 
global apparel workers? Once again, the answer was affirmative. Chapter One chronicled 
the burgeoning fusion of post-WWII U.S. imperialism and global capitalism in the 
apparel and textile industries.  From this historical analysis, the reader was informed of 
how these post-War changes began to loosen the restrictions on low-wage imports 
entering the U.S., and how the textile and apparel industries responded by shifting 
domestic production to low-wage, non-union locales abroad. In the last part of chapter 
one, the reader gained a greater appreciation of how deregulation, unprecedented trade 
liberalization, and the dismantling of the American Welfare State, all hastened dramatic 
decreases in domestic apparel employment, real wages, and working conditions. 
 In Chapter Two, the third qualitative research question queried: Does the apparel 
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industry and the State engage in the hyper-exploitation of gender to further each of their 
respective interests? On both counts, chapter two demonstrated that the apparel industry 
and the State has in fact exploited gender inequality for their own gain. As evidence of 
this, the reader was introduced to the caste-like system of the apparel commodity chain, 
and was shown how the organizational and cultural environment of the industry utilized 
particular categories of women and girls to facilitate a more profitable, compliant, and 
expendable surplus labor pool. With respect to the State-component of the equation, 
chapter two tied together the effects that acute gender oppression has had upon the degree 
of exploitation of apparel workers.  
 Specifically, Chapter Two tied together how historically, the State allowance of 
certain harmful labor practices (i.e. homework, export processing zones, pregnancy-
based firings, etc.) have all used gender as a tool to constrain women’s economic 
mobility and employment opportunities, negate their labor rights, and punish women and 
girl workers who attempt to combat or change their exploitive labor conditions.  
 In Chapter Three, I posed the fourth and final qualitative research question of the 
dissertation: Did State regulation impact occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel 
industry? As with the three preceding hypotheses, the answer is yes, although with less 
specific data relevant to the apparel industry. In chapter three, I discussed how overall 
workplace injuries, illnesses, and fatalities have decreased in virtually all labor industries 
(including apparel) since the passage of OSHA. Although State regulation has fallen far 
short of the OSH Act’s original goals, state intervention in the workplace has translated 
into fewer toxic exposures and occupational hazards for domestic apparel workers.  
 In Chapter Four, I extended the discussion of the political economy of worker 
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safety and health legislation from chapter three to include the important topic of 
regulatory sabotage. Namely, I discussed the chronic problem of understaffing and under-
funding the OSHA and WHD budgets (see results and discussion, Chapter Six, for further 
elaboration on this issue).  Also, I demonstrated how OSHA’s inspection, enforcement, 
and penalty assessment policies largely privileged the conciliatory approach of 
teamwork, partnerships, and negotiation in attempting to garner corporate compliance. 
Such strategies demonstrated the enormous power that employers have in pursuing profit 
without having to give serious consideration to their employees’ health and safety. 
Finally, I discussed how capital’s influence on law creation and law enforcement has 
created enormous conflicts of interest between capital and the State, and how ultimately 
this translates into unequal treatment for workers before the law. 
 Let us now turn our attention to the remaining portion of this study which 
examines quantitative summary statistics from the Department of Labor and the Apparel 
and Textiles Industry, to uncover the safety, health, and remuneration conditions of 
apparel workers.  
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Chapter Five 
Research Methods 
 In the research methods chapter, I attempt to bridge the qualitative, historical 
component of the doctoral dissertation with the quantitative comparative analysis 
component, which uses contemporary government and industry data to examine the 
employment conditions and issues facing apparel workers today. Using the principle of 
triangulation, (which applies different data collection techniques to examine the same 
variable(s) (Neuman 1994), I employ quantitative methods to augment and support the 
qualitative portion of this study.  
 The quantitative data involves secondary data analysis of several governmental 
data sets: (1) Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (OSHA Log) data and 
Occupational Employment Statistics, (2) the Employment Standards Administration’s 
Wage and Hour Division data, and (3) Economagic’s Apparel and other textile products 
industry (SIC) data. These data are employed to provide a richer understanding of what is 
known and not known about the current employment conditions of apparel workers, and 
the political and economic realities that effect this industry and its workers. 
 Before we turn our attention to the quantitative component of this dissertation, I 
provide the reader with a methodological map that outlines my purpose and rationale for 
selecting the historical-comparative analysis, and makes clear the connection between 
past and present conditions of apparel workers. Below is a discussion of the qualitative 
research methods that I employed for the first half of this study. Recalling the four 
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research questions posed in chapters one through chapter three, I now endeavor to define 
the methodology guiding these questions, as well my reasoning in selecting this 
particular type of method. 
 
Defining H-C Qualitative Methodology and Rationale for Selection 
 An historical-comparative (H-C) research approach is a type of historiography, a 
method of doing historical research, or of gathering and analyzing historical evidence 
(Neumann 1994). According to Mariampolki and Hughes (1978:104-105), historical-
comparative research “seeks to explain and understand the past in terms of sociological 
models and theories.”  It may be used when asking research questions about macro-level 
changes, or it may be employed to uncover common patterns that reoccur in different 
historical moments or geographical spaces (Babbie 1995).  When applied appropriately, 
H-C provides researchers a richer understanding of the social processes that operate over 
a length of time. Equally as important, H-C helps raise new questions and stimulates 
theory building (Neuman 1994). 
 Given H-C’s emphasis on broad structural and cultural processes, many of its 
earliest applications incorporated a mixture of sociology, history, political science and 
economic theory. Recognizing the applicability of this method in explaining the evolving 
interplay between industry and State, each aforementioned discipline helped to inform 
my analysis of the preceding chapters. More specifically, in chapters one through four, I 
used the H-C method to explain how and why sweatshops were created, driven largely 
underground, and then resurrected by State and apparel industry culture and practices. 
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Limitations of Historical-Comparative Method 
 The limitations of the secondary historical evidence include the potential for the 
researcher to “receive” inaccurate historical accounts (Neuman 1994), including accounts 
that have been skewed by the primary researcher’s social milieu or individual biases.  It 
is also possible that the researcher employing the H-C method may omit findings that 
have been overlooked or ignored by previous researchers collecting primary data (ibid. 
1994). One way of lessening these potential inaccuracies is to consult as many 
multidisciplinary texts, readers, and narratives of the topic under study. By consciously 
striving for a strong balance of breadth and depth, the likelihood of obtaining a more 
accurate and holistic accounting of the researcher’s subject matter should increase. 
Additionally, mixed methodologies that combine first-account field research and 
historical-comparative design would likely lessen the extent of the limitations described 
above.  Despite the potential of these remedies however, one inherent limitation remains 
in that, as a non-experimental method, the qualitative hypotheses cannot be falsified—as 
required of all positivistic, scientific research designs.  
 
Qualitative Research Questions 
The following four research questions address the major foci of the first half of this  
dissertation, using a qualitative historical comparative approach. 
1) Did/does size of and participation in union activity influence better working 
conditions for apparel workers? 
2) Did/does corporate globalization have a negative impact on working conditions 
for domestic and global apparel workers? 
 103
3) Did/does the apparel industry and the State engage in the hyper-exploitation of 
gender to further each of their interests, respectively? 
4) Did State regulation impact occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel 
industry? 
 
Operationalizing Key Variables in H-C Research Questions 
The discussion below describes the variables analyzed to address each research question. 
 Qualitative Research Question One.  Apparel unions refer to the labor 
organizations that represent the broad category of garment workers (i.e.  International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers of 
America, UNITE HERE, etc.). Participation refers to any member activities in support of 
the union (i.e. strikes, walkouts, stoppages). Working conditions refer primarily to 
conditions of health, safety, and compensation. Apparel workers refer to the group of 
employees who cut and sew fabrics and related materials into clothing (Classified under 
SIC: 23 apparel and other textile products). See recent SIC change under “apparel 
industry” definition.  
 Qualitative Research Question Two.  Globalization is a term that is used to define 
“the historic convergence of diverse national economies into a single, capitalist world 
economy dominated largely by transnational corporations” (Wonders and Danner 
2002:166). Global apparel workers refer to any apparel workers not employed in the 
continental U.S. 
 Qualitative Research Question Three.  The State broadly refers to the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of government, as well as the specific “institutions of 
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political governance” (Michalowski 1993:175) that create and enforce the public policies 
of a nation.  
 Qualitative Research Question Four.  Government regulation refers to state and 
federal legislation designed to bolster the rights of workers. Legislation including the 
National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act are all examples of twentieth century legislative reforms that have 
attempted to improve workplace conditions for U.S. employees, of which apparel 
workers remain a part. 
 According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (2003: 
9), occupational injuries refers to a physical harm “caused by a work related event or an 
instantaneous exposure in the work environment.” Injury examples include: cuts, sprains, 
lacerations, punctures, burns, fractures, repetitive motion injuries, etc. In contrast, 
occupational illnesses refer to “any abnormal condition or disorder (other than one 
resulting from an occupational injury), caused by exposure to a factor associated with 
employment” (ibid. 2001:9).  Occupational illness examples include: skin diseases or 
disorders caused by work exposure to chemicals, plants or other substances; respiratory 
conditions associated with breathing hazardous biological agents, chemicals, dust, gases, 
vapors, or fumes at work; poisoning evidenced by abnormal concentrations of toxic 
substances in blood, other tissues, bodily fluids, etc.,  that are caused by the ingestion or 
absorption of toxic substances into the body; and other diseases brought upon by air or 
blood-borne contaminants in the work environment. 
 The apparel industry refers to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Major 
Group 23: apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials. 
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The major industry group known as “the cutting and needle trades,” consists of 
establishments producing clothing and fabricating finished products by cutting and 
sewing purchased woven or knit textile fabrics and related materials (OSHA 2003). Note: 
Following 2002, the BLS adopted the new intra-continental governmental standard to 
code all industries in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The new system, called The North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) replaced the earlier Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which were used by the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of the Census until 2001 and the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor 
Statistics until 2002. Apparel manufacturing is now classified under the NAICS code 
315. 
 Now that I have operationalized the key variables in the qualitative research 
component of this study, and have provided the rationale for why the historical-
comparative approach was selected, let us continue to the next stage of this chapter which 
examines the quantitative research method employed in this dissertation. 
 
Quantitative Data Sources and Rationale for Selection 
 As stated in the previous section, in order to provide the comparison component 
to this study’s H-C analysis, I analyze secondary data from the Department of Labor, 
Employment Standards Administration’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as 
well as from Economagic, for the years 1993-2002.  
 The time frame, 1993-2002, was selected in order to analyze the most recent ten 
year apparel employment condition trends with directly comparable apparel industry 
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data. Because the government’s industrial classification system completed its change 
from SIC to NAICS following 2002, anything after 2002 would be similarly, albeit not 
directly comparable to previous data. Moreover, selecting this time frame encapsulates 
nearly the first decade after the passage of NAFTA. In furtherance of qualitative research 
question two (did/does corporate globalization have a negative impact on working 
conditions for domestic and global apparel workers):  the quantitative data provide 
contemporary indicators of globalization’s effects on apparel unionization declines 
(addressed in qualitative research question one), overall industry job loss, and on the 
more complex picture of apparel worker safety and health. 
 In addition to governmental data on the working conditions of apparel workers, I 
also employ budget, investigator, and inspection data on the two primary state 
organizations/divisions responsible for overseeing these workers: OSHA and WHD. I 
chose these data to identify the resources that each agency possesses to ensure safe, 
healthy, and fair employment conditions for apparel workers, as well as determine the 
number of apparel workers being assisted and inspections being performed by OSHA and 
WHD.  
 Finally, I include apparel industry data from the economic time series website 
Economagic to ascertain the productivity of the apparel industry, its profits, and the level 
of worker exploitation.  These data provide a contemporary portrait of both the economic 
conditions of apparel employees and their industry. As such, in advancement of 
qualitative research question three (does the apparel industry and the State engage in the 
hyper-exploitation of gender to further each of their interests, respectively), these data 
offer evidence of the continued labor exploitation of young immigrant women and girls 
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in the apparel industry. 
 
Quantitative Research Design and Rationale for Selection of Sources 
Two major sources of survey data were selected for the quantitative portion of 
this study. The first and chief secondary data source used in the analysis was the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’s Occupational Injuries and Illnesses: Counts Rates and 
Characteristics (OIICRC), compiled from the Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries 
and Illnesses (ASOII).  ASOII is the only routinely collected national data concerning 
occupational injuries and illnesses among U.S. workers (DOL 2002).  For over 30 years, 
the BLS has compiled ASOII survey data as a part of its mandate articulated in the 1970 
OSH Act. ASOII employs a stratified random probability sample of approximately 
250,000 private sector establishments and provides estimates of workplace injuries and 
illnesses on the basis of information employers provide (ibid. 2002). 
In providing the rationale for the selection of ASOII, it must be noted that 
presently, no comprehensive (i.e. multiple data source) national surveillance system 
exists for collecting occupational injury and illness data. Instead, the measurement of 
workplace injuries and illnesses in America relies upon a patchwork of data sources 
including the Bureau of Labor Statistics Annual Survey on Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses, the Occupational Data Initiative Survey, workers compensation records, and 
physicians records (Azaroff et al. 2002). Thus, for apparel researchers seeking nationally 
collected annual occupational injury and illness data, ASOII presently remains the only 
option. 
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 Returning to the topic of quantitative data sources employed in the dissertation, 
the second source of secondary survey data used was the BLS’s annual survey 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). The OES includes mean hourly, median 
hourly, and mean annual earnings by detailed occupation, including occupations in the 
Apparel Industry. Collected on a national level each year, the OES are collected by State 
employment or labor agencies through distribution of questionnaires and electronic 
means to measure employment earnings.  
 I selected the OES program for measuring apparel earning statistics because it 
includes more types of earning data relative to the National Compensation Survey (NCS).  
The OES also utilizes the Standard Occupational Classification system (SOC), which 
captures the more precise measure of sewing machine operators (versus all apparel 
worker) wages.  Most significantly, the OES program includes establishments with 5 or 
more workers, while up until 1999, the NCS program only included establishments with 
50 or more workers (ibid. 2004).  
 A few limitations of the OES program should be noted. First because the OES 
data are collected by state employment agencies, the methodology employed by each 
state will vary, making data from some states more or less valid. (Similar criticisms have 
been made about data sources like the FBI’s UCR for example; still, there are enough 
similarities between state collection methods to make the data comparable). A second, 
limitation is that the OES (like the NCS) excludes homeworkers. Finally, the OES have 
less detailed wage data, differentiating by employee, employer, and establishment 
characteristics relative to the NCS. 
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 The remaining data sources from the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 
Annual Budget of the U.S. Government data, WHD and OSHA apparel inspection data, 
and Apparel and Textile Industry profit and production data are all listed under their 
respective graphs in the following Results and Discussion chapter. 
 Let us now turn to the quantitative research questions informing the comparative 
analysis component of this study. After each question or subgroup of questions, I explain 
why each is posed, and how each relates to, and provides further elaboration of the 
qualitative research questions addressed in the first half of this study. 
 
Quantitative Research Questions for Secondary Data Analysis 
Question 1).  Is there a correlation between the Employment Standards Administration’s  
annual budget and number of Wage and Hour Division investigators employed, from 
1993-2002?  
 
Question 2).  Is there a correlation between the Department of Labor’s Employment 
Standards Administrations, Wage and Hour Division’s annual budget and the number of 
Wage and Hour Division cases completed in the apparel industry, from 1993-2002? 
 
Question 3).  Is there a correlation between the number of Wage and Hour Division  
investigators and the number of cases that they completed, from 1993-2002? 
 
 Research questions one and two address the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) allowance of the state organization entrusted with ensuring that the 
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nation’s labor laws and standards are enforced, and workers’ labor rights are protected. 
Question one addresses whether there is a relationship between the financial resources 
afforded ESA, and its ability to sufficiently staff its Wage and Hour Division. 
Independent of staffing issues, question two assesses whether the ESA budget 
specifically impacts the number of completed cases in the apparel industry. Question 
three seeks to uncover whether increases or decreases in the number of WHD 
investigators impacts the number of apparel worker compensation cases that the Division 
completes.  
 All three questions are designed to examine whether sufficient financial resources 
are available for enforcing the many labor laws overseen by the Wage and Hour Division. 
The budget issue is significant for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the number of Acts that 
the WHD has been entrusted to enforce has increased during the 10 year period under 
study (1993-2002). Secondly, according to Marvin Levine’s (2003) important study on 
The Peril’s of Child Labor in the U.S., the United States has more of its children 
employed in the workforce than any other developed industrialized country in the world. 
Related to this, Levine finds that since 1981, there has been a relaxation in the 
enforcement of federal child labor law provisions in America, including standards in 
employment environment, safety, hour, and wage standards. Thus, while these questions 
do not address labor conditions generally, or children’s labor conditions in particular, 
they do address whether the WHD budget, the number of investigators, and the number 
completed cases in the apparel industry have kept pace with the rise in WHD’s 
enforcement responsibilities. 
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Question 4).  Is there a correlation between the injury and illness rate of apparel workers 
and the number of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) apparel 
industry inspections, from 1993-2002? 
Question four addresses whether apparel worker safety and health is impacted by OSHA 
enforcement efforts, and whether state regulation impacted apparel industry injuries and 
illnesses. 
 
Question 5).  Is there a correlation between the OSHA budget and the number of 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections in the apparel 
industry, from 1993-2002? 
As with quantitative research questions one and two, the OSHA budget is a measure of 
how the organization is prioritized by the State, and how its fiscal resources impact the 
Administration’s ability to ensure the safety and health of all of its workers. Recalling 
qualitative research question four, it was postulated that financial resources would be  
related to the State’s ability to enforce safety and health laws, and that  apparel industry 
health and safety inspections would  be impacted to the degree that enforcement is 
present or absent. 
 
Question 6).  Did the number of domestic apparel workers employed decline from 1993-
2002?  
The purpose of question six a is to demonstrate whether dramatic increases in corporate 
globalization alongside dramatic decreases in apparel unionization has had an impact on 
the size of the domestic apparel workforce. 
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Question 7). Did Apparel industry profits increase from 1993-2002? 
Question seven provides a measure of industry data to demonstrate the relative strength 
or weakness of the Apparel industry during the period under study. This question 
assesses in part whether the Apparel Industry benefited (or not) from the passage of 
NAFTA, and also provides an evaluation (independent of employee production) of how 
the apparel industry fared during this period. 
 
Question 8). Is there a correlation between Apparel Industry profits and the Apparel 
Production Index from 1993-2002?  
Question eight addresses whether Apparel Industry profits are impacted by apparel 
industry output (i.e. level of industrial production). The question examines whether a 
correlation exists between the annual capital return in the Apparel Industry and the level 
of garment production. This question also captures the degree to which industry profits 
have increased or decreased relative to the production output of apparel workers. Finally, 
the apparel production index provides another measure of exploitation which is measured 
in quantitative research question eight. If as hypothesized, apparel industry profits do not 
rise or fall in proportion to the production output, then industry compensation is being 
awarded by means other than the volume of garments being produced by workers. 
 
Question 9). Did the level of exploitation of apparel workers increase from 1993-2002? 
As the final quantitative measure in the dissertation, question eight seeks to compare 
apparel industry profits with the average weekly wages that are paid to apparel workers. 
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Exploitation is measured as the average weekly worker wage divided by weekly apparel 
industry profits, multiplied by 100,000. The results of this equation provide a general 
measure of exploitation by converting apparel worker wages into a proportion of apparel 
industry profits. The quantitative measure of exploitation builds upon qualitative question 
three which asked in part whether the apparel industry engaged in the hyper exploitation 
of gender to further its (profit) interests.  
 
Operationalizing Key Variables in Quantitative Research Questions 
In this section, definitions are provided to clarify key terms or concepts used in 
the quantitative research questions. Terms or concepts used in the quantitative research 
questions that have already been defined here, or elsewhere in the text, are omitted to 
avoid redundancy. Also, commonly understood terms (i.e. average weekly wages, 
average annual employment, etc.) are not operationalized here. For ease of presentation 
and clarity, terms and concepts are presented relative to the research question to which 
each relates. 
Research Question One.  Completed cases refer to the number of closed cases that 
the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) completed nationwide in the apparel industry, from 
1993-2002. Data on the total number of investigations that were still on-going at the end 
of each calendar year were not provided to me by the WHD. 
Research Question Two. Wage and Hour Division Investigator refers to 
inspectors that enforce and garner compliance with the minimum wage, overtime, child 
labor, and other employment standards laws and regulations (Budget of the U.S. 
Government 2002). 
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Research Question Four.  OSHA Inspections refer to the number of investigations 
conducted by OSHA’s Compliance Safety and Health Officers during the given year. The 
data often, but do not necessarily represent the number in which all activity associated 
with the inspection ceased (OSHA 2005).  OSHA inspections are broken down by the 
total number of federal, state, and apparel industry inspections in chapter six.  
Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rate refers to the number of injuries and/or 
illnesses per 100 full-time workers and were calculated as: (N/EH) X 200,000 where: N = 
number of injuries and/or illnesses; EH = total hours worked by all employees during the 
calendar year; and 200,000 = base for 100 full-time equivalent workers (working 40 
hours per week, 50 weeks per year). For a definitional review of occupational injuries 
and illnesses, see qualitative methods section. 
 Research Question Eight.  Apparel Industry Production Index refers to the score 
that result from measuring the relative garment output amount produced by apparel 
workers, during the years 1993-2002. The index includes ten years of data, and uses the 
average year in the data set (1997) to create a standardization points. Since the average 
index score during this time period was 100, this is the standardization point that is used 
in the data. 
 Research Question Nine.  Rate of Exploitation of Apparel Workers  
For the purposes of the present study (as stated above), the rate of exploitation is 
defined as the average weekly worker wage divided by weekly apparel industry profits, 
multiplied by 100,000. Although it is customary to multiply exploitation measures by 
100, doing so would not permit the reader to visually identify the level of exploitation 
displayed in this graph (see results section for research question eight). The results 
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provide a general indication of exploitation by converting wages into a proportion of 
industry profit. The higher the rate of exploitation, the more profit the apparel industry 
generates relative to the average salaries paid to apparel workers. 
 
Reliability Concerns: Underreporting and Underrecording as Limitations of Safety and 
Health Data in the Apparel Industry 
The utility of ASOII specifically, and governmental secondary survey data in 
general, is that it provides an opportunity for the researcher with in-depth knowledge of a 
given industry to evaluate and critique the methodology employed by both the primary 
and secondary data collectors (i.e. employers and OSHA/BLS). Related to this is the 
ability to assess what we know versus what we do not know and why.  
In the apparel industry for example, we know that establishment size, nature of 
industry, and demographics of employees (and employers) all impact the degree to which 
occupational injuries and illnesses are officially counted or not counted. Regarding 
establishment size, as stated in chapter two, OSHA does not require including in its 
annual Data Initiative Survey workplaces with fewer than 40 employees, and does not 
require employers with fewer than 10 employees to keep injury or illness records. This is 
methodologically problematic considering that the Department of Commerce’s Economic 
Census reported in 2002 that 94% (n=13,038) of all apparel establishments are classified 
as small, very small, or micro. Five percent (n=670) were classified as medium, and less 
than one percent (n=68) were classified as large.  
Keeping in mind that over half of apparel shops are believed to be operating 
illegally, with an untold number of immigrant and undocumented workers, it becomes 
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readily apparent that the BLS is missing an extraordinarily large sample of small 
workplaces (and hence workers)  from its annual injury and illness survey.  Thus, when 
examining the occupational injury and illness rates of apparel workers it is important to 
recall that government data exclude large segments of apparel workers because many 
work in small establishments excluded from the BLS survey. By logical extension, BLS’s 
annual survey only captures a portion of all injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry. 
In terms of the nature of the industry, since smaller establishments have the 
lowest capital investment, lowest level of technology, are the least stable (i.e. most 
transient), experience the most downward pressure, and are the most likely to be 
operating illegally (Sabel, O’Rourke, and Fung 2000), the very large number of small 
apparel establishments is of serious concern from the standpoint of workplace health and 
safety. 
With respect to employee-employer demographics, both are significant to 
occupational injury and illness reporting because vulnerable populations are less likely to 
inform their employers when they are ill or injured in the workplace. According to 
Azaroff (2004), this occurs for many reasons including: fear of being considered careless, 
being labeled a complainer, experiencing report-related retaliation, harassment, or 
firing—and for the majority of undocumented workers—the fear of being deported.  
Even under the most favorable reporting conditions, the BLS survey excludes 
injury and illness cases that do not result in a visit to a physician or hospital, loss of 
consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or job transfer. With this in mind, it is 
important to note that there are many criteria which must be met before one’s work 
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related illness or injury is counted in BLS’s ASOII. According to Azaroff et al. (2002: 
pg. #), these eight steps include:  
1. Private employer pays employee according to legal processes 
2. Event occurs on shop floor, and worker perceives that she is injured or 
sick 
3. Worker perceives injury or illness as work-related 
4. Worker perceives desirability of reporting injuries or illnesses to 
supervisor 
5. Supervisor perceives that the worker has a legitimate worker-related 
health problem 
6. Supervisor allows worker to take a full day away from work, or 
provides restricted work, or worker perceives means to pay for 
medical treatment, obtains medical treatment, and informs the 
supervisor 
7. Supervisor logs the injury according to OSHA record-keeping 
requirements 
8. Log is sampled by BLS survey 
 
I will discuss the significance of these barriers in the next chapter. 
 
Non-Sampling Limitations 
In addition to sampling and other limitations in the BLS’s Occupational Injuries 
and Illnesses Survey, non-sampling errors also exist. These include the inability to obtain 
information about all cases in the sample, mistakes in recording the data, and definitional 
difficulties. To be sure, such recording errors exist in all forms of data. There are, 
however, specific errors in the recording of health data that can affect the validity of 
these data (Leigh, Markovitz, Fahs, and Landigren 2000). One of the biggest non-
sampling errors of concern is the long-term latent illnesses and diseases caused by known 
or unknown toxic exposures. If the worker does not know that s/he has been exposed to a 
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harmful substance, or does not recognize or correlate an illness with a past exposure, the 
information will go unreported and the harm undercounted.  For example, as previously 
discussed in chapter two, because the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not link the specific 
source of worker injury or illness in its annual survey with the respective occupational 
category, the number and types of potentially carcinogenic exposures in garment shops 
across the country will continue to remain undercounted, and may help justify less 
stringent oversight of this industry than what is needed to effectively safeguard apparel 
workers’ health and safety. 
 As stated above, the chief concerns using the ASOII to measure occupational 
injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry are undoubtedly underreporting and 
underrecording. These problems amount to missing data which fall under the umbrella of 
reliability limitations. For researchers using secondary data analysis, lost or uncollected 
data artificially lowers the number and rate of injury and illness counts. While such 
problems may occur consistently throughout these data, or hopefully occur infrequently 
enough to have minimal impact, the possibility of lost or uncollected data could lead the 
reader to unwittingly misinterpret data or draw unwarranted assumptions or conclusions, 
particularly if there is a pattern to the omission. (See discussion section in following 
chapter). 
 
Measurement Validity, Occupational Employment Statistics 
 There is at least one limitation of the Occupational Employment Statistics that 
needs to be revealed: the OES excludes private household workers. Most types of 
“homework” are illegal in the U.S.  The DOL does not, however, estimate the extent of 
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this type of illegal work form. However, as the historical record shows, homeworkers 
have always been the most exploited and poorly paid of all apparel workers. Again, given 
the illegal nature of homework, and the fact that these workers are almost always 
undocumented, the reader should be aware that the mean and median weekly wages in 
this survey are artificially inflated because of the exclusion of homeworkers in the 
apparel industry. 
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Industry Data Limitations 
 While the majority of the quantitative data in this dissertation rely upon 
government sources, industry data are used to measure apparel industry profits and the 
apparel production index. Such data are significant in terms of understanding the entire 
picture related to the employment conditions of apparel workers and the organizational 
health, practices, etc. of the industry. As a largely private industry, apparel associations 
are generally not required to share business related information with the general public. 
Not surprisingly, apparel industry trend data are not easily found on the internet, and data 
that are available generally exclude important information like data source, methods for 
collection, contact information, etc. 
 For example, when retrieving apparel industry data from the website, 
economagic.com, (which houses thousands of government and industry data files), I was 
barred from viewing any additional information save the data file itself. When I 
attempted to view key information, such as data source, I was informed that I would need 
to become a paid subscriber to retrieve such information. Likewise after searching the 
various apparel industry association sites, I was barred from accessing their statistics 
pages without first becoming a paid subscriber. Such subscriptions routinely cost 
thousands of dollars, and for practical purposes, are not a viable option for most 
researchers. In short, apparel industry data are provided in a very limited format, and 
often exclude how the data were collected and measured. 
 In this chapter, I discussed the appropriateness of using existing statistics, 
specifically secondary data, in analyzing occupational injuries, illnesses, and 
compensation in the apparel industry. Survey sources included the Bureau of Labor 
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Statistics Annual Survey on Occupational Injuries and Illnesses and the Occupational 
Employment Statistics Survey. Other research from OSHA and WHD databases were 
employed to provide personnel and enforcement statistics on the apparel industry, as was 
apparel industry data to provide information on industry profits and production. 
Quantitative research questions were presented to articulate the hypotheses of the second 
half of this study, and definitions were provided to operationalize key variables in the 
study. Finally, data limitations were presented to inform the reader of the study’s 
confines.  
The next chapter examines the results of apparel industry injury, illness, and 
compensation data from the years 1993-2002, and discusses the significance and 
implications of these results. 
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Chapter Six 
Results and Discussion 
 This chapter provides apparel industry summary data and correlation statistics on 
occupational injuries and illnesses, employee and industry characteristics, and OSHA and 
WHD regulatory statistics. In this chapter, I present an introductory summary of the 
quantitative research findings and the results of each quantitative hypothesis posed in the 
previous methods chapter. The results for each question are presented in graph format. 
After the presentation of each graph, I describe the correlation statistics or apparel 
industry summary data, and provide an interpretive analysis of each finding. At the 
conclusion of this chapter, I bridge the qualitative H-C portion of this dissertation with 
the quantitative secondary data analysis presented in this chapter, to demonstrate where 
apparel workers stand today in terms of compensation, health, and safety. 
 Examining the years 1993-2002, Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicate that the 
Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division, and Occupational 
Safety and Health budgets all generally increased, though in terms of real dollars this 
amounted to a stable (rather than an expanding) appropriations budget (Weil 2003).  
Also, according to the BLS’s ASOII, as with many other manufacturing industries, the 
rate and number of reported occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry 
steadily decreased despite the fact that fewer apparel industry safety and health 
inspections were being conducted by OSHA. Less surprising were the continuing annual 
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plunges in the number of U.S. apparel workers and the concomitant hemorrhaging in the 
number of unionized employees. With fewer U.S. apparel workers, a loss in domestic 
apparel production output also occurred from 1993-2002.  Finally, apparel industry data 
demonstrate that from 1993-2002, overall profits decreased, but not as rapidly as the 
apparel production output. Most significantly, apparel worker exploitation increased, as 
the gap between industry profits and workers’ wages widened. 
 Let us now turn our attention to the results where I first restate each quantitative 
hypothesis from the previous chapter, show the graph that illustrates these results with a 
corresponding description, and then discuss each of the findings in greater detail.  (Note: 
in order for each graph, description, and footnote to be shown on the same page, each 
graph begins with a new page). 
 Quantitative Question One asks: Is there a correlation between the Employment 
Standards Administration’s (ESA) annual budget and the number of Wage and Hour 
Division (WHD) investigators employed, from 1993-2002? Let us see the graph below to 
answer this question. 
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Graph 1: Correlation Statistics Examining Employment Standards Administration 
(ESA) Budget (in millions of dollars) and number of WHD cases <s>15 
 
Correlation (R) = -0.106; Sign. = 0.770  
 
The above graph illustrates that the Employment Standards Administration (ESA) 
budget and the number of Wage and Hour Division (WHD) cases are not significantly 
correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to 2002, the ESA budget did 
not significantly impact the number of WHD cases. 
 From 1993-2002, for all years save one, the ESA Gross Budget (and the 
Enforcement of Wage and Hour Standards Budget) increased. During this time, the 
overall ESA budget grew 64% from $263 million in 1993 to $411 million in 2002. 
Despite this upward trend however, consistent upward trends were not found in the 
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number of cases completed by WHD investigators. In fact, the number of cases from 
1993 to 2002 varied considerably from a high of over 1900 cases in 1998 to a low of 
1000 cases in 2002. As evidenced by the above graph, WHD cases generally increased 
until 1998, after which a sharp decline occurred between 1998 and 1999, and a smaller 
decline occurred following 2000. 
 One possible explanation for these findings is what I have termed the “the El 
Monte” effect. Between 1995 and 1998, the apparel industry was a major focus of 
regulatory enforcement efforts due to the sensational El Monte slaveshop case that placed 
the industry under an intense media, political, and activist spotlight. It is possible that as 
the spotlight cooled and a modest amount of industry changes were made by some key 
apparel industry players,  the case numbers dropped to the levels seen at the beginning of 
the 1990’s (that is, prior to the renewed attention paid to sweatshops found in the mid-
1990s).  
 Also of possible import is the fact that the Employment Standards Administration 
(and the Wage and Hour Division) have many industries to inspect and several Acts to 
enforce. Budgetary allowances alone, while critical for staffing personnel, do not 
necessarily determine where the enforcement efforts will be. Therefore, future research 
on the ESA, WHD, and the apparel industry should examine more closely what variables 
impact how enforcement efforts will be directed. Also of interest for future study, is what 
variables most significantly impact the recovery and amount of back wages for apparel 
workers. 
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 Quantitative Question Two asks: Is there a correlation between the Department of 
Labor’s Employment Standards Administrations, Wage and Hour Division’s annual 
budget and the number of Wage and Hour cases completed in the apparel industry, from 
1993-2002? Let us now turn to graph two which shows the relationship between the 
WHD budget and the number of WHD investigators. 
Graph 2: WHD Budget and WHD Investigators <s>16 
 
Correlation (R) = .825; Sign. =0.003 
 
The above graph illustrates that the budget of Wage and Hour Division (WHD) 
and the number of Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigators are significantly  
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correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to 2002, as the WHD budget 
increased, so too did the number of WHD investigators. 
 From 1993-2002, the WHD Enforcement Budget grew at approximately the same 
rate as the overall ESA budget. During this time, the WHD Enforcement Budget 
increased 59% from $95 million in 1993 to $161 million in 2002. From 1993-1996, the 
number of WHD investigators was generally constant. Then from 1996-1998, the graph 
demonstrates a fairly modest increase in the number of WHD investigators, followed by 
another leveling off period for the remainder of the study. 
 The graph supports my basic expectations in so far as budget increases should 
also correlate with increases in personnel (in this case, the number of investigators). 
Unlike graph one however, which charts WHD apparel cases only, graph two charts the 
number of all WHD investigators. In other words, the budget should theoretically have a 
larger impact on the whole of its personnel (# of enforcement investigators) compared to 
the accomplishments of WHD personnel in a single industry (# of completed cases in the 
apparel industry). 
 That stated, it is still possible for the number of WHD investigators to be 
impacted by special initiatives directed toward one particular industry, especially if the 
industry is being targeted for special enforcement initiatives (i.e. the “NO SWEAT” 
program). Indeed, under the leadership of Labor Secretary Robert Reich, the Department 
of Labor instituted a “No Sweat” program in 1995. The program drew attention to 
retailers and manufacturers who assumed responsibility for monitoring the labor practices 
of  contractors making their garments. Given that WHD is the primary enforcement 
mechanism for ensuring fair labor practices, it appears that the number of investigators 
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increased while the “No Sweat” initiative was operational (1996-mid 1999), and then 
leveled off after the program was discontinued. 
Quantitative Question Three asks: Is there a correlation between the number of 
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigators and the number of cases that they  
complete from 1993-2002? Let us now turn to Graph 3 which examines the impact that 
the number of WHD investigators has upon the number of completed WHD cases. 
Graph 3: Correlation Statistics Examining WHD Investigators and WHD Cases 
<s>17 
 
 
Correlation (R) = 0.039; Sign. 0.914 
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The above graph illustrates that the number of Wage and Hour Division (WHD) 
apparel cases and Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigators are not significantly 
correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to 2002, the number of WHD 
investigators did not significantly impact the number of WHD cases completed in the 
apparel industry. 
As restated from graph two, from 1993-1996, the number of WHD investigators 
was generally constant. Between 1996-1998, the graph demonstrates a fairly modest 
increase in the number of WHD investigators, which then levels off for the remainder of 
the years under study. Consistent overall upward trends were not found in the number of 
apparel cases completed by WHD investigators, despite the fact that there were more 
investigators during this time to complete such cases.   
Previously articulated in graph one, the number of cases from 1993 to 2002 varied 
considerably from a peak of over 1900 cases in 1998 to a low of 1000 cases in 2002.  
Demonstrated by the above graph, WHD cases generally increased until 1998, after 
which a sharp decline occurred between 1998 and 1999, with a brief recovery, followed 
by smaller, but still rather sizeable declines from 2000-2002.  
 The lack of correlation between the number of WHD investigators and cases may 
indicate that a relatively constant rate of investigators were assigned to the apparel 
industry, and that increases or decreases in the overall number of investigators did not 
specifically impact apparel investigations.  Another possible (perhaps more likely) 
explanation is that, given the shrinking nature of the domestic apparel industry and its 
workforce, fewer WHD investigators performed apparel industry investigations, despite 
the overall increase in the number of WHD investigators during this time period. 
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 Finally, it is important to note that three different data management information 
system configurations were used to calculate the number of completed cases in the 
apparel industry from 1993-2002 (see footnote 2). Although enough trend years exist in 
both the old and new WHD data systems to demonstrate that no correlation appears to 
exist, such findings might be more pronounced because of the various information 
management systems used. Ultimately, further research in this area will help determine 
whether apparel cases are most influenced by industry size, regulatory/enforcement 
targeting, some combination of both, or some other variable not addressed here. 
 Quantitative Question Four asks: Is there a correlation between the injury and 
illness rate of apparel workers and the number of Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) apparel industry inspections, from 1993-2002? Let us now turn 
to Graphs 4a and 4b which examine the correlation between the apparel industry safety 
and health inspection rate and the rate of non-fatal apparel injuries and illnesses. 
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Graph 4a: Apparel Industry Injury and Illness Rate <s>18 
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Correlation (R) = -0.378; Sign. = .282 (See graph 4b below for illustration of OSHA 
inspection rate). 
 
The above graph illustrates that the injury and illness rate of apparel workers and 
the number of apparel industry inspections conducted by OSHA (shown in graph 4b 
below), are not significantly correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to  
2002, the number of apparel industry inspections performed by OSHA did not 
significantly impact the illness and injury rate of apparel workers. 
Examining Graph 4a, the reader can see that the recorded rate of apparel industry 
occupational injuries and illnesses fell each year from 1993-2002. As seen in the straight 
line graph, during the period under study, according to the BLS’s Annual Survey on 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, the recorded injury and illness rate for apparel 
 132
workers was nearly cut in half, from 9.0 in 1993 to 4.6 in 2002.  
 In order to better understand the possible explanations for secondary data that 
contradict the extant sweatshop, health economics, and occupational and environmental 
medicine literatures, it is important to highlight the areas of agreement and departure by 
BLS staff economists and occupational/environmental safety, health, and medicine 
scholars. Firstly, I should note that the recorded drop in occupational injuries and 
illnesses during the period under study is not unique to the apparel industry. According to 
BLS staff economists Conway and Svenson (1998), most industries experienced a 
significant injury and illness decline during the mid to late 1990’s. Secondly, I should 
note that the BLS economists while expressly acknowledging the many limitations 
associated with reporting and recording occupational injuries and illnesses, nevertheless 
accept the ASOII’s recorded decline as valid. 
 According to Conway and Svenson (1998), the major reasons for the recorded 
decline could be summarized in three areas: (1) there was a growing awareness of 
workplace hazards by unions, employers, and the insurance industry during this time; (2) 
employers instituted risk reduction plans to further address potential workplace hazards; 
(3) OSHA reforms shifting away from enforcement and toward an increased focus upon 
partnering, outreach, and industry compliance all helped to create safer work 
environments. 
Although Conway and Svenson’s (1998) analysis was not industry specific, since 
no specific industries were singled out for exclusion in the authors’ analysis, we can 
assume that the drop in apparel injuries and illnesses recorded in BLS’s ASOII would be 
explained by Conway and Svenson using the same criteria above. If we look at the first 
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rationale, the reader will recall that unions were not a likely source of assistance to 
apparel workers during this time. By the 1990’s, approximately 7% of apparel workers 
were unionized (UnionStats.com 2002), which is less than half of the national average for 
unionized private employees. Considering that apparel union membership has 
experienced significant declines every year since its peak in 1971 (American Worker at a 
Cross Road Project 1998), it is unlikely that  that 7% of the unionized apparel workforce 
(found only in the few larger shops) contributed to the near halving of recorded 
workplace injury and illness rates.  
Also an unlikely source for improving overall worker safety and health during 
this time were apparel employers. Again, recalling earlier findings by the General 
Accounting Office (1994) that estimate half of all apparel shops to be operating illegally, 
it is not probable that employers were largely responsible for halving the recorded injury 
and illness rate from 1993-2002. Furthermore, as Seligman et al. (year) note, contrary to 
BLS reports, eight major studies find that small firms have the worst record keeping and 
the highest occupational injury and illness rates. With 94% of garment shops classified as 
small, very small or micro (U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Census 2005), it must be 
remembered that such firm characteristics are highly correlated with intense downward 
economic, political, and social pressures that frequently have negative impacts on 
workplace health and safety. 
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An additional rationale provided by Conway and Svenson (1998) for the decline 
in recorded workplace injuries and illnesses was that (in part because of the explosion in 
health care costs) the expenditures on workers’ compensation claims had doubled from 
$22.3 billion in 1985 to $45.7 billion by 1992, simultaneously placing downward 
pressures on workplace injury/illness reporting and recording---and increasing “risk 
reduction” strategies in many industries.  Such dramatic rises in costs caused the 
insurance industry as well as many other industry lobbyists to pressure the State into 
creating new workers’ compensation legislation (ibid. 1998). Similarly, health care costs 
in general dramatically skyrocketed over the past two decades, with recent estimated 
costs of occupational injuries and illnesses averaging nearly $170 billion annually 
(OSHA 2003). 
As Conway and Svenson (1998) report, in response to increasing industry 
pressures, the State initiated legislative changes including: increased prosecution and 
penalties for fraudulent compensation claims, curtailment of benefits paid, introduction 
of medical and case management regulations that more closely scrutinized workers’ 
compensation claims, and the introduction of large deductible insurance options to 
employers.  
The fact that both health care and workers’ compensation costs rose during the 
1990’s and 2000’s is not contested by occupational health, safety, and medicine scholars. 
What are challenged are some of the very explications provided by insurance and other 
industry lobbyists surrounding the need for workers’ compensation reform. According to 
industrial hygienist, Lisa Cullen (1998), in 1998, workers’ compensation costs were less 
than one and one half percent of payroll, down from a high of slightly more than two 
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percent in 1993. Moreover, reports Cullen (ibid.), between 1992 and 1998, workers’ 
compensation costs to employers decreased 38%. However, employers did not pass this 
benefit on to their workers; benefits to workers declined 35% during this same period.  
On the issue of fraudulent worker compensation (WC) claims, Leigh et al. (2000) 
found in their groundbreaking study on the Costs of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 
that the insurance industry was largely inflating estimates of WC fraud (and by extension 
misinforming and misguiding policymakers), and that about two percent of all workers’ 
compensation dollars were due to fraudulent claims.  
What appears ironic about industries’ reports of routine workers’ compensation 
abuse, is the deafening silence regarding worker safety and health issues that might have 
been and continue to be impacted by WC reforms. Namely, in the 1990’s, insurers began 
to impose greater requirements for proving work relatedness for occupational injuries and 
illnesses, while wage replacements decreased (Azaroff 2004). In the apparel industry, 
where muscular skeletal disorders are higher and more severe than in most industries 
(Leigh et al. 2004), MSDs mysteriously started to decline shortly after the changes in WC 
legislation, after having been on the rise since 1986 (Azaroff 2004).   
This alone might be explained by real improvements in workplace health and 
safety if we did not see a simultaneous comparable flip flop between serious and less 
serious workers’ compensation claims. As Azaroff et al. (2004) cite in their illuminating 
and exceptionally well researched work “Wounding the Messenger: The New Economy 
Makes Occupational Health Indicators Too Good to Be True,” between 1993 and 1997, WC 
claims in 37 states showed decreases of an estimated 36% in permanent total disabilities, 26% in 
partial disabilities, 9 % in temporary total disabilities, and 6% in medical only claims (Ceniceros 
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2001). On the other hand, light duty cases of disability rose by about 50% from 1992-1997 
(Fletcher 2001). 
The precise measure of how downward legislative and industrial pressures 
impacted occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry during the period 
under study is not known. However, there is a large body of evidence to suggest that the 
expansive and penetrating industrial and governmental policy shifts of the 1980’s and 
1990’s, increased the level of precarious employment, decreased wages and 
opportunities, and helped to create a super-vulnerable population of immigrant workers 
(Azaroff 2004). 
All of the above directly impact the apparel industry in the United States. 
Specifically, according to the Bureau of the Census’s 1992, 1997, and 2002 Economic 
Censuses (U.S. Department of Commerce 1996; 2002; 2005), the  number of larger 
manufacturers in the apparel industry shrunk dramatically during the study period. For 
example, in 1992, there were 4,632 medium or large apparel firms (ibid. 1996). By 2002 
there were only 738 medium or large apparel firms, and only 10% of these firms were 
classified as large (ibid. 2005). While it should be noted that Economic Census utilized 
the SIC classification system for 2002, and NAICS for the 1997 and 2002 data, the 
downward trends for each period are consistent for all years and establishment sizes. 
Today, what remains of domestic apparel production are chiefly smaller firms and 
homeworkers. Small firms are much more likely to be uninsured and non-unionized, and 
as stated before, small firms have the worst occupational injury and illness reporting 
track record (Seligman 1988) Even the World Bank finds that smaller firms that are 
either less capable of adopting safe work practices or are less exposed to negative public 
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relations may be reluctant to make the necessary remediations for a safe and healthy 
workplace (Sabel, O’Rourke, and Fung 2000).  
Other factors that may have impacted apparel occupational injury and illness 
reporting include a decrease in access to health care for larger numbers of workers. For 
example, in the 1990’s more industries (including apparel) sought flexibility to take on 
and shed employees at irregular, short-term intervals according to market changes 
(Azaroff et al. 2004). This increase in contingent (short term) workers was trumpeted by 
the apparel industry as “just in time” fashion. While undoubtedly the flexibility was 
useful from the industry’s standpoint of profit making, the negative aspects for workers 
meant that fewer of them would be eligible for health benefits, unemployment insurance, 
or workers’ compensation. This is of significant concern from the standpoint of health 
and safety because contingent labor is associated with increased job hazards and 
decreased reporting (Azaroff 2004).  
Also of significance, is that between 1977-1998, the average annual health 
insurance premiums share per worker increased three and one half times while real wages 
during this time declined. During this time, many low wage employers stopped providing 
health insurance benefits at all (ibid. 2004). 
Related to the above is the growth in immigration (before and) during the period 
under study. According to the Kaiser Commission (2000), the proportion of immigrants 
rose steadily from 4.7% in 1970 to 10% in 2000. Significantly, Azaroff reports that 
(2004:9) “just as these large (immigrant) populations were arriving, immigration reform 
measures legally forbade large sectors of the workforce from living or working in the 
U.S., but provided neither the policies nor resources for consistently enforcing these 
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prohibitions.” This hyper-exploited labor class could thus be simultaneously hired and 
fired with little protections or oversight from the State. 
Returning to an earlier finding by Conway and Svenson (1998) affirming the 
decline in workers’ compensation claims during the 1990’s, Fletcher (2001) reports that 
the industries reporting the greatest declines in the frequency of workers’ compensation 
claims during the 1990’s were precisely those newly staffed by immigrants: apparel, 
restaurants, grocery stores, and hotels. In response to both the decline in union 
membership in these industries, as well as the need to organize greater numbers of 
immigrant workers, Unite Here formed in 2004. With a membership of only 440,000 
members in 2004 (Unite Here), UH represents workers in a broad range of immigrant 
populated industries including apparel, textile, distribution/retail, gaming, hotel, airport, 
laundry, and multi-service. 
Now that I have unpacked the many limitations associated with ASOII’s recorded 
apparel injury and illness data and the purported decline in the rate of sick and injured 
workers, let us now look at the line graph for the apparel inspection rate which provides 
the number of apparel industry inspections performed by OSHA, for every 100,000 
workers.  
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Graph 4b: Number of OSHA Apparel Inspections per 100,000 Workers, 
1993-2002 <s>19  
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(For Correlation Description, See Graph 4a) 
 
Graph 4b demonstrates the broad shifts in the rate of apparel industry inspections  
conducted by OSHA, from 1993-2002.  Due to the significant decrease in the number of 
apparel workers from 1993-2002, the measure of  OSHA apparel inspections was 
standardized to allow for equivalent, cross year comparisons (inspections were measured 
per 100,000 workers). During the period under study, the largest number of apparel 
industry inspections occurred in 1996 (n=1,078), one year after the explosive El Monte 
case in California. However, when examining the highest rate of apparel industry 
inspections, the reader can see that the rate of OSHA apparel inspections was the highest 
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in 2001, with 163 inspections for every 100,000 workers. Why inspection rates decreased 
between 1997-1998 and again between 2001 and 2002 is not known. What both years 
have in common is that they represent the first years under different Labor Secretaries 
(Alexis Herman and Elaine Chao, respectively). Perhaps the first transitional years for 
both labor chiefs initially lowered the rate with which OSHA conducted apparel industry 
inspections, as each determined where enforcement efforts should best be targeted. 
As reiterated from the correlation description above, what is known, is that 
despite the general overall increase in the rate of apparel industry inspections (save 1997 
and 2001), there does not appear to be a significant correlation between the rate of 
apparel industry inspections and the rate of occupational injuries and illnesses in the 
apparel industry.  These findings may offer support for the hypothesis that external 
factors (i.e. increases in workers’ compensation premiums, health care costs, 
immigration, coupled with harsh legislative changes in the areas of immigration and WC 
reform) lowered the reporting and/or recording of occupational injuries and illnesses, and 
that neither inspections nor improvements in OSHA’s business outreach efforts during 
this time period made workers any safer.   
Recalling chapter four on OSHA, with respect to the Administration’s 
enforcement strategy, OSHA attempt to maximize its minimal enforcement budget, by 
targeting larger, unionized workplaces. Given what we already know about the nature of 
the apparel industry, and its very small number of unionized and large establishment size 
shops, it is fair to assume that OSHA’s current inspection strategies would have any 
meaningful impact on occupational injuries and illnesses in the apparel industry. 
Quantitative Question Five asks: Is there a correlation between the OSHA budget 
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and the number of Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspections in the 
apparel industry, from 1993-2002? Let us now turn to graph five where we will examine 
the impact that the OSHA budget has had upon the number of inspections in the apparel 
industry. 
Graph 5: Correlation Statistics Examining Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Budget and Number of OSHA Apparel Inspections <s>20 
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The above graph illustrates that the budget of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and the number of apparel industry safety and health inspections 
are significantly correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to 2002, as 
the OSHA budget increased, the number of OSHA apparel industry inspections 
decreased.  
Examining Graph 5 above, the dotted line shows the Gross Budget Authority of 
OSHA from 1993-2002.  Similar to the overall upward trend of the ESA Budget, 
OSHA’s budget has grown 65% from $291 million in 1993 to $445 million in 2002. As 
Weil (2003) reminds us however, in terms of real dollars, the budget for this time period 
should be interpreted as stable, rather than growth. Also, similar to the case of WHD, it 
must be remembered that OSHA inspectors have more work to do today than they did in 
the early 1990’s. By the early 2000’s, there were (and continue to be) many more 
workers (120 million) and job sites (7 million) to inspect than there were in the early 
1990’s. 
 As evidence of this under-funding, with a total budget of $450 million in 2002, 
this meant that less than $4 was being spent for every American worker. By OSHA’s 
(2003) own accounting , each year more than 6,000 Americans die from workplace 
injuries; nearly 50,000 die from toxic workplace exposures;  and nearly 6 million suffer 
from non-fatal workplace injuries and illnesses at an annual cost of $170 billion. As such, 
the allotted budget for each year remains insufficient relative to the injuries, illnesses, 
and fatalities that plague many American workers and workplaces. 
 In Graph Five, the significant inverse correlation that exists between the OSHA 
budget and apparel inspections may be explained largely by one intervening variable:  
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number of apparel workers. From 1993-2002, the number of apparel workers fell for each 
consecutive year. From 1997 onward, as the number of apparel workers decreased, so too 
did the overall number of apparel industry inspections. Thus, in context, the increased 
OSHA budget (while appearing to be related to the number of apparel inspections), 
seems to have merely overlapped in large part with the decrease in the number of apparel 
industry inspections. One final note on the issue of inspections, is that during the 1990’s 
under the Clinton Administration, OSHA moved away from enforcement toward industry 
outreach, partnering, and collaboration to address workplace injuries and illnesses 
(Conway and Svenson 1998). Such reforms could have also played a role in the 
decreased number of apparel industry inspections. 
Quantitative Questions Six asks: Did the number of domestic apparel workers 
decline from 1993-2002? Let us now turn to Graph Six which illustrates the precipitous 
decline in the annual average employment numbers of apparel workers.  
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Graph 6: Average Annual Employment of Apparel Workers, 1993-2002 <s>21 
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 Graph Six demonstrates that between 1993 and 2002, the annual average number 
of apparel workers decreased by almost two-thirds, from approximately 977,000 
employees in 1993 to about 354,000 employees in 2002. While the number of domestic 
apparel workers had been decreasing for over a decade prior to the early 1990’s, the 
passage of NAFTA in 1994 greatly accelerated the pace of outsourcing, and drastically 
accelerated the rate with which apparel jobs were eliminated in the U.S. In fact, as 
Hottenrott and Blank (1998) report, as of 1997, NAFTA registered job losses appeared to 
contribute to an approximate 23% nationwide net job loss in the apparel industry. 
 The precipitous decrease in the number of apparel workers during the period 
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under study supports qualitative question two which asked whether corporate 
globalization had a negative impact on the working conditions of domestic and global 
apparel workers. Domestically, globalization remains the primary reason for apparel job 
loss; abroad, globalization is chiefly responsible for driving down apparel wages around 
the world. 
 Quantitative Question Seven asks: Did Apparel Industry profits increase from 
1993-2002? Let us now turn to Graph 7 where we will examine Apparel Industry Profits 
from 1993-2002. 
Graph 7: Apparel Industry Profits, 1993-2002 <s>22 
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Graph 7 demonstrates that overall, the apparel industry has experienced a rather 
dramatic decrease in profits from 1993-2002. During the period under study, apparel 
industry profits peaked at $2.05 billion in 1993, and were at their lowest in 1999 with 
$1.3 billion in profits. The line graph further shows that apparel industry profits 
plummeted from 1993-1995, and then leveled off for about a year before rebounding 
slightly between 1996-1997. From 1997-1999, apparel industry profits endured another 
significant decline, before gaining the only sizeable increase in profits the following year. 
Finally, following 2000, apparel industry profits tumbled once more, albeit not as 
precipitously as in the early 1990s. 
 In interpreting the overall decrease in apparel profits, there are several possible 
explanations, many of which overlap with one another. Firstly, relative to many other 
major manufacturing industries, the overall profit margin in the apparel industry is razor 
thin (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). There are a few large apparel firms which post 
handsome profits. However, as stated previously, most of the apparel firms are small, 
very small, or micro-sized. What this means in terms of profit distribution within the 
apparel industry is that there is essentially two unequal manufacturing sectors in apparel: 
the few number of big players that reap the lion’s share of profits and the larger number 
of small players, whose profits are generally quite limited (ibid. 2000). 
Following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the removal of the last of the protective trade tariffs, we see a significant decline in 
the total profits of the domestic apparel industry. As supported by industry specialists, the 
Department of Labor, and apparel unions alike, domestic apparel industry profits were 
undoubtedly negatively impacted by the acceleration of outsourcing following the 
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passage of NAFTA. What is interesting to note however, is that profits did not fall as 
dramatically as production output (see Graphs 8a and 8b).  
Another possible outcome of decreasing profits which is relevant to the findings 
in this study, is that, as previously discussed, falling profits may have made employers 
more reluctant to report or record occupational injuries and illnesses due to escalating 
health care and workers’ compensation costs. Although the shrinking apparel workforce 
might have had the effect of making State inspections more feasible, such intense 
downward financial pressures within this industry should not be ignored when studying 
what effects and to what degree significant profit losses have had upon the employment 
conditions of domestic apparel workers.   
Quantitative Question Eight asks: Is there a correlation between Apparel Industry 
profits and the Apparel Production Index from 1993-2002? Let us now turn to Graphs 8a 
and 8b which examine the impact that apparel worker output (measured as the apparel 
production index) has had upon apparel industry profits. 
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Graph 8a: Correlation Statistics Examining Apparel Industry Profits and Apparel 
Production Index, 1993-2002  
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The above graph illustrates that the apparel production index and apparel industry 
profits are not significantly correlated. That is, during the period extending from 1993 to 
2002, the apparel production index did not significantly impact profits in the apparel 
industry.   
As stated in the previous graph, profits in the apparel industry as a whole did not 
decline as much as the apparel production output.  This may indicate that manufacturers, 
jobbers, and contractors were able to save costs in other ways (i.e. increasing contingent 
labor force, job eliminations/layoffs, reduction in real wages, and skimping on health and 
safety measures). Or, it may also indicate that the return on the smaller number of higher 
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wage, American made garments were substantial enough to stem the overall profit loss 
relative to the overall production output loss. 
What is certain is that in a post-NAFTA apparel industry environment, workers 
fared far worse than their capital counterparts, and that worker exploitation increased 
even during a time when overall industry profits remained low. For a look at how apparel 
worker exploitation grew between 1993 and 2002, please see Graph Nine. 
Graph 8b: Apparel Industry Production Index, 1993-2002  
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(See Correlation Description for Graph 8a above). 
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Because the independent variable (apparel production output) is measured at a 
different level than the dependent variable (apparel industry profits), the meaning of the 
apparel index line in Graph 8a is difficult to discern. Therefore, Graph 8a is used to show 
the (lack of) correlation between apparel production output and apparel industry profits, 
and Graph 8b is used to illustrate the degree to which apparel output has fallen. 
 As recalled from the chapter on Research Methods, the apparel production line 
graph is an index that measures ten years in a data set to determine the average score or 
standardization point. Between 1993 and 2002, the standardization point of 100 occurred 
in 1997. Using this measurement index, the reader can see the degree to which apparel 
output exceeded, met, or fell below its production capacity. 
 Graph 8b shows that the overall production output of apparel workers decreased. 
From 1993-1998, apparel production output is within three units of the standardization 
point, save 1995, when production measured a high of 107. It should not be surprising 
that as the number of apparel workers decreased, and the number and rate of apparel 
imports increased, domestic production would drastically be scaled back. 
The apparel production index graph is yet another indicator of the many ways in which 
corporate globalization has harmed domestic (and global) apparel workers.  
 Finally, the apparent lack of correlation between worker production and industry 
profits, where profits were falling at slower pace than production, may signify (as said 
previously), that the apparel industry compensated in other ways than apparel sales, or as 
Lynch (2005) suggested, that the industry earned enough of an overall profit in the larger 
firms manufacturing American made, higher cost garments.  
Quantitative Question Nine asks: Did the level of exploitation of apparel workers 
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increase from 1993-2002? Let us now examine the rate of apparel worker exploitation, 
which measures the rate of apparel industry profit relative to employee compensation.   
Graph 9: Rate of Apparel Worker Exploitation, 1993-2002  
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As recalled from the previous chapter, for the purposes of this study, exploitation 
is defined as average weekly worker wage divided by weekly apparel industry profits, 
multiplied by 100,000. The results provide a general measure of exploitation by 
converting apparel worker wages into a proportion of apparel industry profits, and may 
be considered to be an alternative operationalization of the rate of surplus value (Marx 
1974).  
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Using the formula described above, the overall rate of apparel worker exploitation 
increased between 1993-2002, from a low of .667 in 1993 to a high of 1.15 in 2002. In 
fact, for every year save 1997 and 2000, the rate of exploitation consistently increased, 
and showed an overall increase of 72 percent. What these findings signify is that over a 
ten year period, apparel workers were producing more relative to what they were getting 
paid. Put another way, the gap between apparel industry profits and apparel worker 
wages widened between 1993 and 2002.  
Thus, while much discussion regarding apparel compensation in industry and 
government literature surrounds the apparel industry’s overall low profit margin (relative 
to other manufacturing sectors), predictably, there is virtually no discussion in either of 
these bodies of literature about the ratio of industry profits to apparel wages, nor of an 
“acceptable” or desirable level of worker exploitation. To use Marxian terminology, at 
least publicly, there is no unpacking of what the apparel rate of surplus-value ought to be. 
What we do know is that a sizeable amount of apparel worker exploitation exists 
regardless of whether their productivity increases or decreases. 
 In sum, the measure of exploitation is yet another important indicator of the 
worsening employment conditions for domestic apparel workers. With the decrease in 
labor power (unionization) and the concomitant increase in globalization, not only were 
more apparel workers losing their jobs, but those that remained in the domestic apparel 
labor force were toiling under more exploitive economic conditions than they were at the 
beginning of the 1990’s. 
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Summary of Findings 
 In closing, let us summarize what we have learned in the Discussion and Results 
chapter. From our nine quantitative research questions we have learned that between the 
years 1993 and 2002, the ESA and WHD budgets significantly impacted the number of 
WHD investigators, but that neither budget was correlated with the number of WHD 
cases completed. Such findings seemed to indicate that other external factors (political 
pressure, media attention, etc.) as well as organizational variables (number of 
investigators working apparel cases, number of yearly cases involving multiple labor 
violations, etc.) may have played a more important role in determining how many apparel 
cases were completed each year by the Wage and Hour Division. 
 In our safety and health related budget questions, we learned that the annual 
OSHA budget was inversely correlated with the total number of OSHA apparel industry 
inspections. As the OSHA budget increased, OSHA apparel inspections decreased. Given 
the fact that the apparel workforce was precipitously declining at the same time that the 
overall OSHA budget was increasing, the inverse correlation between budget and number 
of inspections appeared to be spurious.  
With respect to the impact that OSHA apparel inspections have had upon the 
industries’ injury and illness rate, we learned that the two variables were not significantly 
correlated. With abundant supporting data from the occupational safety, health, and 
medicine literatures it was determined that (1) OSHA inspections were not  targeting the 
smaller, non-union, uninsured, transient, high-risk firms that employed large numbers of 
immigrant and contingent workers; and (2) that ASOII’s recorded decline in apparel 
industry occupational injuries and illnesses  was likely the result of an increase on the 
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macro (structural) and micro (organizational) economic and political downward pressures 
on reporting and recording. Specifically, increases in immigration, punitive changes in 
immigration legislation, welfare reform, access to health care, including (anti-)workers’ 
compensation legislation, all served to increase the obstacles for employee-employer 
injury/illness reporting and recording. Such an explanation negates the role played by 
OSHA inspections, because it challenges the findings of decreased apparel injury and 
illness rates. 
 In this chapter, the reader was also reminded that only a tiny fraction of apparel 
workplaces are ever inspected by OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officers 
(CSHOs). Therefore, even if the data were both valid and reliable, given the current 
(nominal) OSHA inspection practices, it is unlikely that inspections would significantly 
impact occupational injuries and illnesses one way or the other. This does not imply that 
inspections do not work. Rather, it implies that the inspections conducted during the 
study period were performed at too low a rate to have meaningfully improved the safety 
and health of the apparel industry workforce. Future research may wish to consider factor 
analyses that measure the degree to which specific OSHA, other State, and industry 
practices impact injury and illness rates in the apparel industry.   
 Our last group of quantitative questions measured the economic conditions of the 
apparel industry and compared these conditions with those of apparel workers. To do this 
we examined apparel industry profits, apparel industry profits in relationship to apparel 
production output, and the rate of exploitation (i.e. apparel worker weekly wages as a 
proportion of apparel industry profits).  
 What we learned was that overall, apparel industry profits generally decreased 
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during the period under study. The hyper-accelerated pace of globalization brought upon 
by NAFTA, eliminated the last of protective quotas and tariffs, and dramatically 
increased apparel imports and apparel job losses in the U.S. Moreover, “the race to the 
bottom” exacerbated by globalization, meant that domestic retailers had to sell clothing 
more cheaply, which negatively impacted every link in the apparel commodity chain. 
 In examining the relationship between apparel production and industry profits, we 
uncovered no significant correlation. Both apparel production and industry profits 
generally fell from 1993-2002. However, the apparel production index illustrated that 
output dropped much more quickly than did apparel industry profits. What this likely 
signifies is that the apparel industry was successful in cutting costs elsewhere, so that 
profits were not nearly as effected as they would have been had they declined in 
proportion to apparel output. This also could have signaled that apparel profits (in the 
few larger firms) were large enough to stem at least some of the overall profit loss. 
 These findings lead us to our final quantitative research question which measured 
the rate of exploitation as the proportion of apparel wages relative to apparel industry 
profits. From these data, we discovered that the overall rate of apparel worker 
exploitation increased from 1993-2002. Put another way, we uncovered that the gap 
between workers’ wages and industry profits widened, and that by study’s end, apparel 
workers were producing more garments relative to what they were getting paid. 
 Finally, the link between the qualitative/historical comparative analysis and the 
quantitative secondary data analysis is that, at the beginning of the 21st century, domestic 
apparel production (save the fashion district of Los Angeles) is rapidly vanishing in most 
U.S. cities and states. With the elimination of the final protective quotas and tariffs in 
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apparel, the industry will continue to expand its global production, which will generally 
mean lower wages for the remaining domestic apparel workers, and the continued 
increase of immigrant workers who themselves are often exploited by the expanse of 
corporate globalization. 
 For the majority of non-native born, domestic apparel workers operating without 
a union contract, negotiating better wages and safer and more healthful working 
conditions are often as challenging today as they were at the turn of the twentieth 
century. To be sure, federal labor legislation (including both wage and health and safety 
laws) have and do help. There is little denying that workers benefit from protective 
legislation—though because such a large proportion of the industry is believed to be 
operating illegally—such protection is often not afforded to apparel workers. And, in the 
present anti-immigrant legislative climate, workers must contend with increased ICE 
raids, anti-immigrant local ordinances, and an overall nativist sentiment that often causes 
immigrant workers to avoid public institutions that might otherwise provide much needed 
safety, health, and compensation assistance. 
 In short: has OSHA helped? In the few larger firms that are more vulnerable to 
negative public relations, and who are financially capable and willing to reorganize 
business practices prioritizing safety and health, I would argue, yes. OSHA-industry 
outreach and partnerships may also prove effective for such firms. However, it is unlikely 
that voluntary compliance alone (or even as a majority strategy) will decrease 
occupational injuries and illnesses. For too large a number of smaller firms, apparel 
shops remain as dirty, dangerous, and to only a slightly lesser extent, as poorly 
remunerated as they did prior to the passages of the OSH Act. 
 157
 Let us now turn to the Conclusion chapter, where I summarize the overall 
dissertation findings and provide future research and policy recommendations for 
improving the health, safety, and compensation of apparel workers. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the role that corporate and 
governmental malfeasance has played in creating and sustaining the American and global 
sweatshop. Employing an historical comparative approach, we learned first that the 
power of labor unionization was a significant and necessary force in combating unsafe, 
unhealthy, and poorly remunerated working conditions. We also learned the pitfalls of 
union organizing where ownership and control over production, were traded upon by 
union leaders for the narrower and more variable gains of income maintenance, 
particularly following the Second World War. Today’s apparel union, UNITE HERE 
(formed July 2004), is all too aware of this history, and has consolidated membership 
outside of its apparel and textile base with several service industries that share in 
common a majority of female immigrant workers. As in the past however, union 
leadership is still heavily male dominated, and according to the Unite-Here website, 
overall active membership has not grown past 440,000 members since the new union’s 
formation in 2004.  
As is replete in the sweatshop literature, union organizing must continue to 
internationalize if there is any hope in salvaging domestic apparel production in most 
regions and cities in the U.S. The sweatshop literature is clear: apparel labor and 
compensation conditions abroad must first improve in key areas so that domestic workers 
do not continue to be pitted against the most vulnerable worker populations around the 
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globe. Certainly, without such labor power, the surviving domestic apparel workers will 
continue to face an uphill battle in securing their fundamental labor rights. 
 Following the first chapter, we learned that the genesis of corporate globalization 
was ironically borne during the decade that began New Deal worker reforms. The origins 
of trade liberalization, which was not mobilized until after World War II, began during an 
era of labor reform and promise. Yet even with the tangible, meaningful gains for apparel 
workers, the countervailing trend of privileging State power and objectives (most notably 
the U.S.’s anti-Communist foreign policy agenda), all but ensured that these gains would 
be ultimately be temporary. As unionists and apparel workers would painfully be 
reminded in the decades to come: only workers can organize, agitate, and formulate labor 
policies that serve their best interests.  
 Thus, it is apparent from the query on corporate globalization’s effects, that 
domestically, labor in general, and apparel specifically, have paid a heavy price in terms 
of the decline of their real wages, the number of hours worked, and the quality, safety, 
and health of their work environment. Domestically, apparel workers are routinely pitted 
against their global sisters and brothers (and with one another), by retailers, 
manufacturers, jobbers, contractors, and subcontractors in pursuit of the lowest cost 
region, establishment, or worker. Such fierce competition is exacerbated by the fact that 
many of the nation’s apparel workers are immigrants (often lacking required 
documentation) which puts them at great odds with securing better working conditions.   
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Globally, these conditions are even worse. As Karl Marx observed some 140 
years ago in his first volume of Das Kapital, as labor productivity increases, the value of 
the workers’ output and compensation decreases. Likewise, the sweatshop literature 
uniformly reports that despite the increase in productivity of apparel workers in EPZ’s 
since the early 1990’s, these workers continue to see their real wages decline, year after 
year. Such an inverse relationship between the volume of goods produced and the 
compensation provided for that work, characterizes the very unequal balance between 
capital and labor in a capitalist political economy generally, and under corporate 
globalization, specifically. 
 Of course it must be recalled, that both domestically and globally, not all workers 
are exploited similarly. As discussed in chapter two, the intersecting statuses of race, 
class, gender, immigration, age, and country of origin, collectively shape a person’s 
available opportunities and choices, of which employment is a significant part. It is not 
accidental that young, largely immigrant, women and girls dominate the apparel trade 
around the globe (including the most exploited EPZ regions), and that their labor is 
classified as low-skill and largely replaceable. Corporate globalization could not exist, 
and capitalism could not exist without vulnerable worker populations (particularly female 
populations) to exploit.  
By creating and sustaining categories of marginalization, both the State and 
capital benefit by having a readily available supply of pliable labor, whose demands can 
be more readily ignored precisely because of the statuses with which they occupy. In 
apparel, sewers (who are largely women) can be paid less than cutters (who are largely 
men) because their labor is defined as less valuable. Immigrant workers can be paid less 
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than native-born workers because of their perceived willingness to work for lower wages. 
The young in particular can be manipulated and intimidated more easily than their older, 
more experienced counterparts. 
Another point on which sweatshop scholars are clear, the greater the number of 
intersecting marginalized statuses that one occupies, the more likely she or he will 
occupy a low wage, low status, labor intensive, hazardous, and poorly compensated job. 
Both the State and capital know this of course, which is why tensions are ever present 
between the roles of each in facilitating or limiting harms befalling workers. 
We have learned from previous chapters that State regulation certainly has the 
potential to help apparel workers, and as seen in other industries, OSHA has generally 
been most effective in its early years, and when targeting larger, unionized workplaces 
(Weil 2003). Unfortunately, none of the optimal conditions above have existed in the 
apparel industry for decades.  Moreover, the effectiveness of OSHA generally, and in the 
apparel industry specifically, has been hampered by chronic under-funding, under-
staffing, under-inspecting, (employee-employer) under-reporting, and (employer)under-
recording.  
As a contemporary scorecard, the purported goals set forth in the OSH Act are not 
even close to being realized today. Chief among OSHA’s limitations is its resources. 
Sufficient resources are a must in order to create the necessary safety and health 
standards used by CSHO investigators in citing employee violations. Without such 
standards, there is no regulation to violate. Of course standards must be accompanied by 
a sizeable cache of well-trained inspectors who can effectively target their resources at 
industries with known health and safety violations. At present however, major under-
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reporting and under-recording problems in an industry with such a large volume of 
illegally operating apparel shops has created an erroneous perception by OSHA that 
apparel is a low hazard industry. With such a classification, and the concomitant nominal 
regulatory oversight, it remains extremely doubtful that with (1) the growth in economic 
insecurity; (2) the exclusion of increasing numbers of immigrant workers from reporting 
systems; and (3) the spread of incentive systems rewarding low injury and illness reports 
(Azaroff 2002), that apparel worker injuries and illnesses have been declining. 
With the continual shift away from enforcement, as exemplified by the 
approximate 2% of American workplaces presently inspected by OSHA CSHO’s, the 
major regulatory emphasis remains upon cooperative programs, and employer education 
and information efforts. As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, capital (through 
heavy industry lobbying of the State) has historically been quite successful at largely 
dictating the conditions and compensation of labor, determining (only after strenuous 
worker protestations) what it considers to be the most obvious and egregious hazards, and 
deciding how it plans to remedy existing hazards or respond to regulations, regulators, 
and sanctions.  
In the apparel industry, as in many industries, as worker and union strength 
declined, and as de-regulation, de-industrialization, capital flight, and corporate 
globalization expanded, capital’s strength in controlling the health and safety regulatory 
process widened considerably. Today, cooperative programs and (largely) voluntary 
compliance amounts to industry “self”-regulation. While according to Weil (2003), there 
is some evidence that this approach may have some utility with large, unionized 
businesses that are vulnerable to negative publicity, the apparel industry simply does not 
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fit this description. Simply put, to utilize a regulatory strategy of voluntary compliance 
and cooperation with an industry possessing so many documented vulnerabilities, 
limitations, and illegal practices amounts to governmental malfeasance.   
 
Historical Comparative Analysis in Sum 
 To summarize the historical and modern era findings, by the early 21st century, 
apparel workers remained among the lowest paid workers of those employed in the 
manufacturing sector, and in the bottom 10% of all wage earners in the U.S. With the 
contemporary rise of corporate globalization in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, 
domestic apparel employment, unionization, and production began (and continues) to fall 
to this day. The overall apparel industry itself has seen a decline in profits, although at a 
much smaller rate than the apparel production loss. For workers, this has meant an 
increase in the exploitation of their labor. And, as stated in the previous results and 
discussion chapter, the small number of large manufacturers are responsible for the lion’s 
share of apparel industry profits, which signifies that a small number of manufacturers 
(and of course retailers) are most responsible for the cut-throat cost cutting that occurs at 
each step along the commodity chain.   
 Labor power in apparel, as measured by union enrollment, has decreased every 
year from 1975 to 2004 despite two mammoth mergers in the past decade. Likewise, 
trade liberalization and quota and tariff elimination has heralded huge job losses for 
workers and worse economic conditions for domestic workers who have unwillingly been 
forced into competition with apparel producers in the developing world. 
 To be sure, globalization has also worsened conditions for the apparel industry as 
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their falling profit margins have demonstrated. As the demise of protectionism became 
apparent, and industry adjusted by moving many of its factories overseas, those 
remaining in the U.S. and employing domestic workers, responded in kind by cutting 
costs wherever possible. The apparel industry’s relative success in this endeavor was 
shown to us, as we learned that apparel profits did not decline in proportion to what the 
industry was earning (i.e. what workers were producing). Likewise, the increase in 
economic exploitation demonstrated the resilience of industry in adjusting costs to reduce 
profit loss, while highlighting the increasing economic vulnerability of apparel workers 
as their numbers and strength decreased. 
 The more complicated nature of this study’s analysis has been evaluating the 
“report card” of state regulation in the apparel industry. Clearly compared to over a 
century ago (when there was no nationally-based wage, safety, or health legislation, nor 
were there inspectors to enforce standards or regulations), apparel workers overall fare 
better today than they did then. The Wage and Hour Division collects at least a few 
(sometimes several) million dollars each year on behalf of apparel workers. And OSHA, 
for its part, conducts several hundred inspections in the apparel industry each year, in 
addition to its standard setting, outreach, education and training, compliance and other 
partnership-based programs.  
 In the final analysis however, what we have are modest attempts by the State to 
protect apparel workers through the limited regulatory efforts of OSHA and WHD. As 
demonstrated repeatedly throughout this dissertation, neither are adequately funded or 
staffed, and OSHA in particular, has increasingly grown more industry-friendly over the 
years. Quite simply, the impact of WHD and OSHA is much less than what it ought to be 
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(and could be) if worker compensation, safety, and health were a national priority, and if 
policymaking and enforcement were not so closely wedded to corporate interests. 
 
Overcoming Obstacles: What Ought to be Done 
There are several steps that the apparel industry, the State, unions, workers, and 
consumers can do to improve the health, safety, and economic conditions of apparel 
workers. Firstly, if the apparel industry wishes to shed itself of its sweatshop image, it 
must be willing to work cooperatively with workers, unions, and NGOs in formulating 
corporate codes of conduct that support all of the International Labor Standards, 
including: (1) freedom of association and right to organize; (2) right to bargain 
collectively; (3) right to strike; (4) prohibition of forced labor; (5) protection of children; 
(6) equal pay for women and men for comparable work; (7) prevention of occupational 
injuries and illnesses; (8) minimum standards in wages and overtime; and (9) non-
discrimination in hiring, work assignments, and promotions (IRRC 1998). 
At present, the relatively small number of retailers and manufacturers that do 
participate in cooperative-based programs like the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), 
have largely created a public relations guise where benefits to apparel workers remain 
limited. For example, according to Howard (1999), the AIP contains no provisions for a 
living wage; contains monitors selected, controlled, and paid by the companies 
themselves; and limits public information on company performance through several 
layers of corporate control. 
Each of these practices helps to disguise the working conditions inside the apparel 
industry. As Howard (1997: 165) makes clear, “the first and indispensable order of 
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business is to make the system visible and keep it in the public eye.”  More specifically, 
companies must be compelled to publicly disclose the treatment and pay of workers, and 
how and where the products were made. To avoid self-serving report cards and conflicts 
of interests, companies must be willing to allow credible independent monitors who are 
able to communicate with workers, inside the manufacturing and contracting shops that 
sew their labels. Lastly, any violations discovered through independent monitoring must 
be corrected in a manner that safeguards workers and their jobs (Howard 1997). 
Until workers control the production process, it is the primary responsibility of 
large corporations that drive the production process to take responsibility for labor 
standards in the same manner that they are responsible for quality, price, and delivery 
schedules (ibid. 1997). Globally, it is imperative for corporations to explain to 
governments that foreign direct investment and business in their countries will only be 
conducted with effective workers’ rights and protections in place. 
Such goals of course can only be realized when companies no longer exploit the 
“comparative advantage” offered by poor nations’ lesser labor costs. As we were recently 
reminded by the 2005 G8 Summit in Edinburgh, Scotland, debt forgiveness is one vital 
tool in helping to provide impoverished nations’ with more viable economic options for 
their citizens, and for their futures. Such an investment is a crucial first step toward 
ending the forced-dependency that the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the 
world have inflicted upon the poorest and most powerless. 
In addition to debt forgiveness, our international trade organizations, namely 
NAFTA and the WTO, must begin to require that the national labor laws of its 
participants adopt the core standards set forth by the International Labor Organization. 
 167
The U.S., most egregious of all Western industrialized nations, has adopted the fewest of 
the ILO resolutions (IRRC 1998). In adopting only two of the major conventions of the 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the U.S. has signaled to the 
world, that it does not want to commit globally to what it cannot enforce domestically 
(ibid. 1998). 
In the apparel industry, the U.S. can begin to reverse this abysmal labor record by 
passing federal legislation that holds retailers and manufacturers financially liable for law 
violations that occur in either legal or illegal contracting shops (Bonacich and 
Appelbaum 2000). As recalled from chapter one, to date, only New York holds 
manufacturers or subcontractors jointly liable for labor law violations. Retailers are not 
presently covered under joint liability legislation. 
Another piece of apparel-related legislation adopted by New York, called “Hot 
Goods,” provides that any garment retailer, manufacturer, or contractor who ships, 
delivers or sells apparel is violating the state labor law if that company knew or should 
have known that the goods were produced by workers who were underpaid. Given the 
high mobility of the apparel industry, and the transnational scope of its shipment and 
sales, “Hot Goods” legislation at a minimum needs to be federalized. As discussed above, 
the more far reaching the legislation, the more effective it will be in protecting the 
greatest number of apparel workers. 
If our patchwork of U.S. labor laws are ever to become nationalized, it will 
require the same type of information sharing by federal and state agencies, as is now 
required of our criminal law enforcement agencies. Intra- and inter-agency information 
sharing is vital in any effort to understand the full scope of labor problems that apparel 
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workers face. As discussed earlier in this study, the present lack of information sharing 
between key organizations like OSHA, WHD, DOJ, and even the IRS, has been a loss for 
workers. The more holistically the problem of apparel sweatshops is tackled, the greater 
the understanding that each will have in finding new solutions to work cooperatively in 
fighting this national scourge. 
In addition to widening the scope of labor legislation and enforcement, and 
providing greater financial resources to fund these objectives, much work remains to be 
done in improving the safety and health of domestic apparel workers. To begin, the OSH 
Act, without reservation needs amending. As Charles Noble (1997:67) maintains in 
changing OSHA’s regulatory strategy, at a minimum this includes: 
the establishment of worker safety and health committees that enable 
workers to partake in enforcement at the point of production; the building 
of public decision-making mechanisms that limit the ability of regulated 
industries to block, delay, or dilute standard setting and enforcement; and 
[ultimately], the building of economic institutions that free public officials 
from their structural dependence on private firms by promoting social 
control of investment and technological change.  
 
 According to Noble (1997), at present, the OSH Act does not mandate worker-
controlled, in-plant health and safety committees that allow workers access to company 
data. Moreover, the Act does not provide for incentives for workers who participate in 
inspections. Lastly, the Act does not safeguard a workers’ right to refuse dangerous or 
harmful work (ibid. 1997). This is particularly important when one considers that 
workers are often unaware of the dangers that they are exposed to, and that the present 
regulation of toxic chemicals covers only a fraction of harmful substances that are in 
commercial use in American workplaces. 
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 Another critical area that desperately needs improvement is the manner in which 
occupational injury and illness data are collected and recorded. As Leigh et al. (2004) 
note, ASOII summarily excludes 20% of the U.S. workforce from its survey data. In the 
apparel industry, where many homeworkers are employed, the DOL does not even know 
how many of these workers exist, much less estimate how many are injured or fall ill 
each year on the job. In Leigh et al.(2000) Cost of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 
using capture recapture methodology common to epidemiological research, the authors 
estimated that the BLS’s ASOII misses roughly 53% of job related injuries. In the same 
study, the authors found that apparel production workers were among those at greatest 
risk for carpal tunnel syndrome. In a 2004 study by Leigh et al., the authors, again using 
capture recapture methodology, found that the BLS’s ASOII missed between 33% and 
69% of all injuries and illnesses, due to OSHA’s failure to count government workers 
and the self-employed, and because of large estimates of underreporting.  
 As such, occupational medicine scholars and even governmental agencies like 
NIOSH have called for improving the tracking of occupational injuries and illnesses 
among low wage and immigrant populations (Harrison yr) and advocate creating a 
stronger surveillance of special populations, temporary workers, and contingent workers 
(Azaroff 2002). More broadly, occupational medicine physician Ken Rosenman (year) 
following his Michigan study that found that between 61%-68% of injuries and illnesses 
were not recorded in the BLS annual survey recommended the following: (1) a more 
comprehensive national based system that regularly includes multiple databases and does 
not rely solely upon employers submitting their OSHA (injury/illness) logs and (2) the 
creation of a census approach like the one used by BLS to track fatal occupational 
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injuries. Like Leigh et al. (2000) understandably (and understatedly) contest, future 
researcher should not have to investigate the more than 20 sources of primary data and 30 
sources of secondary data that the authors were forced to investigate because of the 
absence of a comprehensive, national-based occupational injury and illness surveillance 
system. 
 With respect to creating a new enforcement strategy for OSHA, Weil (1997) 
argues that it is vital for the agency to conduct a “sufficient number of inspections.” This 
is crucial not only for the purpose of directly enforcing regulatory standards, but also for 
the purpose of creating a deterrent effect by the “threat” of inspections to all firms. 
Unfortunately, with more workplaces to inspect, and more workers to protect, the fact 
that the overall number of CSHOs has decreased, negates any potential deterrent effect 
that might otherwise be of value. Lastly, since small, non-unionized shops (like what is 
commonly found in apparel) receive the least number of inspections, the true nature of 
the industry’s work conditions can be hidden. As such, like WHD above, OSHA must be 
sufficiently funded so that its policies and enforcement efforts are inclusive of all of its 
workers. Related to this, increasing the number and amount of financial penalties 
assessed in the apparel industry is an important enforcement tool, which can be targeted 
against the many small, non-union firms, that in the opinion of Leigh et al. (2000) and 
others, are often treated more leniently compared to larger firms. Leigh et al (2000) also 
recommend levying an industrial tax to offset the cost of occupational injuries and 
illnesses. In the apparel industry, an MSD and/or CTS tax could be levied to cover the 
costs to workers who are afflicted by musculoskeletal disorders and carpal tunnel 
syndrome, respectively. 
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Beyond the efforts of OSHA, more must be done to help workers receive timely 
and accurate information as to the hazards of their jobs (Leigh et al. 2000) as well as the 
diagnoses and treatment, when suffering from occupational illnesses. If industry, 
employees, and the medical field are essential for identifying and preventing industrial 
hazards (as OSHA suggests), State agencies must assist this effort by working more 
closely with medical schools in helping them update their research and teaching 
curriculum. Moreover, economic and other structural incentives must be provided to 
encourage greater specialization in this vital form of public medicine. At a minimum, 
patient workplace history could become a standard in all medical record keeping. 
Without this vital information, physicians (and their patients) will be at a distinct 
disadvantage in recognizing, diagnosing, and treating occupational diseases and illnesses.  
Beyond the above structural and organizational considerations, the cultural 
climate in medicine also needs to be addressed. Physicians are commonly resistant to the 
idea that their “patient” knows more about work hazards than they do. Mainstream 
medical training in America is built on the premise that physicians are scientific 
practitioners of medicine and that patients are laypeople who are only allowed to receive 
care (Lax 1996). This bias not only encourages physicians to ignore potential 
occupationally-based health problems reported by their patients, but may also deprive 
patients of their right to workers’ compensation when environmental job hazards are 
causing their illnesses (ibid. 1996). 
For now, the goal of physicians serving as integral partners in occupational illness 
prevention remains largely unfulfilled.  At the very least, addressing the problem of 
under-diagnosis and treatment will need to start with arming patients with their medical 
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histories, including their occupational histories, and will necessitate encouraging patients 
to inform physicians of their workplace conditions. For the limited number of unionized 
employees, collective bargaining can provide an important opportunity for sharing with 
health care professionals harms in the workplace; it can create a space for educating 
workers about occupational disease; it can provide medical outreach; and may even be 
able to influence the limitation of toxic environmental substances in the workplace (ibid. 
1996). Of course, none of these changes will extend beyond piecemeal reforms if the 
corporatization of health care practices is not challenged in concert with industrial and 
State practices that harm American workers. 
 
Future Research 
 This study has largely focused upon the intersections of corporate and state 
practices in creating and sustaining the global and domestic sweatshop. There are so 
many disciplinary areas within sweatshop studies that researching this topic can at times 
appear overwhelming and never ending. It need not be, as every contribution to the 
sweatshop literature is a building block from which others grow and learn, and hopefully 
can expand upon in turn. With this in mind, I will list a few areas of research that I feel 
may be most beneficial to my discipline: criminology. 
 An understudied area within criminology is occupational safety and health, which 
as we have just learned, is sadly understudied in the field of medicine, as well (Lax 
1996). This dissertation, as well as many other studies, lays out the causal factors that 
give rise to the creation of hazardous and unhealthy work environments. But much less 
has been said about what factors motivate employers to not only comply with safety and 
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health laws, but also to advance the safety and health measures beyond what is required 
by law. In this analysis, it would be interesting to see how much compliance was related 
to fear of inspection, fear of additional regulation, recognition of greater long-term goals 
(i.e. ergonomic improvements=greater production output), public relations concerns, 
union pressures, etc. With a better understanding of what motivates these law abiders, we 
might be able to create more effective strategies for increasing the numbers of 
manufacturers, contractors, and subcontractors who provide safe and healthy work 
environments for their apparel workers. 
Another possibility for future research is in the area of immigration and ethnic 
studies. As Jennifer Gordon (2005) reports in her book Suburban Sweatshops, today 
more than 100 new-style immigrant worker centers are thriving, by organizing along 
lines of ethnic identity and geographic location rather than factory or industry. As 
alternatives to traditional unions, it would be extremely beneficial to research how and 
what these work centers do differently and what their strengths and weaknesses are 
relative to traditional unions. What is exciting about the possibility of transcending 
industry boundaries is the ability to appreciate more readily the overlapping  macro -
cultural and structural barriers that workers of color, particularly immigrant workers, 
must overcome to receive a fair wage in a safe and healthy work environment. 
Using the multidisciplinary approach of law and community organizing, Gordon 
(2005) has created a template for other scholars and activists to replicate in performing 
public interest research that hopefully will translate into more public interest policy 
making. As but one example, Gordon’s organization “Workplace Project” helped 
convince politicians in New York that enforcing the payment of at least the minimum 
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wage, limited unfair competition for their private constituencies. Such blending of 
scholarship and activism led to the passage of New York’s Unpaid Wages Prohibition 
Act, which today, remains the strongest wage enforcement law in the country. 
Finally, readers interested in labor enforcement may consider replicating a 2004 
study by the GAO which examined OSHA’s oversight of its civil penalty determination 
and violation abatement processes. The study did not select a single industry, but rather  
examined its enforcement record on the whole. As far as I am aware, no study on OSHA 
has ever applied its enforcement record to the industry of apparel exclusively. What I 
frequently wondered as I labored on this dissertation was what factors most greatly 
influenced OSHA’s decision making process in deciding whether to impose a penalty, 
and in deciding what type or types of penalties, if any, would be imposed. Fortunately, 
because OSHA publicly posts its enforcement record, researchers have access to a fairly 
large amount of inspection information using OSHA’s Integrated Management 
Information System (IMIS). These data include: name of business; state of business; SIC 
to 4th Industrial breakdown (as well as NAICS data); union status; inspection type (i.e. 
complaint, planned, etc.); ownership type; safety vs. health inspection; advance notice; 
gravity type; hazard category; number of instances; number of persons effected/exposed; 
standard violated; stage of violation; stage of penalty; type of penalty; contest (vs. 
acceptance) of penalty; and final order (informal vs. formal settlement). 
 The above research has the potential to inform policy makers about what factors 
make OSHA’s enforcement efforts effective and ineffective, and can provide a reliability 
measure in determining what industries are most/least hazardous, what industries are 
most/least likely to be inspected, which businesses are recidivists, what types of penalties 
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they receive, how often these penalties are reduced or dropped, and how many are 
referred for criminal prosecution. Undoubtedly, such information could be very useful in 
providing policy makers the data that they need to increase budgets, target resources, and 
increase enforcement efforts and penalties for labor law violators. 
 It is my sincere hope that this study will encourage future research into the many 
yet unexplored areas of sweatshop studies, and that the sweatshop, whether applied to 
apparel or any other industry, will one day be abolished forever, as workers, activists, and 
all those dedicated to cause of social justice join together and UNITE. 
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Endnotes 
1. Industrial homework refers to garment production that is completed inside of the  
worker’s residence. Illegal in the United States, industrial homework is characterized by 
the flexibility it provides contractors and subcontractors in terms of the time, money, and 
space saved by employing this category of workers outside of the factory or garment 
shop. Homeworkers are almost always undocumented immigrant women, and are the 
lowest paid and most exploited employees on the apparel production chain. Commonly, 
homeworkers must purchase their own supplies (sewing machine, garment scissors, the 
“foot”, a device used to guide the stitching channel on a sewing machine, and “folders”, a 
machine used to fold jeans and other heavy fabrics). This of course, drastically depletes 
the homeworkers already meager wages (Bender and Green wald 2003; and Bonacich 
and Appelbaum 2000). 
2. The El Monte compound was just one unit of a “slaveshop” operating in various 
locations in downtown Los Angeles, but sharing the same ownership, control, 
coordination, and assets of its garment contracting business. In addition to the seventy-
two Thai workers, dozens of Latina and Latino workers were also subject to many of the 
same working conditions, and thus joined the El Monte suit.   
3. Textile production involves spinning yarn from natural or man-made fibers and 
weaving or knitting fabrics for clothing, furnishings, or industrial uses (Rosen 2002). 
Apparel production incorporates marking and cutting patterns and sewing clothes from 
textiles.  
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4. For example, sewing as a profession was originally conceived of as men’s work, 
and the sewing machine was deemed a man’s tool. Today, most sewing in the U.S. 
apparel industry is performed by women, and is perceived as “women’s technology”. As 
Green (1996:422) points out, a careful historical study of the global garment trade reveals 
that “women and men in the garment workforce has varied over time by craft, specialty, 
geographic area, and nationality.” 
5. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory was home to one of the most deadly fires in New 
York City’s history at that time, killing 146 garment workers, most of whom were 
immigrant girls in their early teens and twenties. The Factory was well known for its 
disparate and exploitive work and payment systems, low wages and long hours, 
employee mistreatment, and flagrant disregard for safety and health concerns.  
On the night of the fire in 1911, workers in the factory were huddled over their 
sewing machines, surrounded by piles of highly flammable garments, when the fire 
ignited, and engulfed the top floors of the building. Unable to reach the floor where most 
of the workers were, firefighters tried in vain to extinguish the fire, as dozens of workers 
were burned alive at their workstations or were forced to leap to their death.  Though the 
building inspectors had deemed the building fireproof, the factory was actually a firetrap, 
with a myriad of safety hazards including, barrels of combustible sewing machine oil, 
large pieces of garment rags surrounding the work area, wooden trim, window frame, and 
work station, blocked fire escapes, locked exit doors, and a previous history of small fires 
in the loft (Lieurance 2002). 
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Three days after the horrific event, the owners of the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Company, Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, were back in business at a new location. Upon 
inspection, the New York Building Department found that the new facility was not 
fireproof, and that one of the fire escape exits had already been blocked with two long 
rows of sewing machines. This fact proved tragically ironic; the owners were later 
prosecuted for manslaughter, but the all-male jury rendered a verdict of not guilty, 
largely because they could not agree as to whether the owners knew the exit doors were 
locked. In the end, Harris and Blanck settled twenty-three individual civil suits against 
them, paying damages of only seventy-five dollars to each victim’s family. (ibid. 2002). 
6. The earliest types of unions in the U.S., craft unions,  organized workers 
employed in the same occupation or craft. Often referred to as “skilled labor”, craft 
unions in the garment industry were first comprised by American born tailors who made 
custom made clothing for their mostly middle and upper-class patrons. In contrast, the 
industrial (also called trade) unions organized workers in a particular industry, regardless 
of craft. These workers more commonly represent “unskilled labor”, although today the 
distinctions have much less significance (Lieurance 2002). 
7. The CIO was formed in 1935 as a committee within the larger AFL, which 
formed in 1886. By 1938, the CIO (now known as the Congress for Industrial 
Organizations) split with the AFL largely over ideological and organizational differences 
regarding the composition of the workers it represented and the vision of the union itself. 
The AFL was more conservative, and tended to represent older, more established craft 
(skilled) unions. The CIO in its inception was much more radical; it had many socialists, 
a broader vision, and was more inclusive of women, immigrants, and people of color in 
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the less-skilled trade union sector. By 1955, the AFL and CIO merged into one federated 
union, with the more conservative “business union” leanings of the AFL winning out 
both organizationally, politically, and philosophically.  
8. The U.S. never occupied South Korea and Taiwan as it did with Japan. 
Nevertheless, it did employ direct military intervention to thwart Communist incursions 
in both countries. Massive financial and economic support were also given to both 
countries’ national military defense and industrial revitalization efforts, as had been given 
by the U.S. to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philipines, Indonesia, and Singapore 
(Rosen 2002). According to Appelbaum and Henderson (1992), these collective efforts 
led to the development and growth of export-led industrialization, which in turn provided 
the foundation for the globalization of the apparel industry in the U.S.  
9. This protection would be extended further in 1974 through the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA), which in turn would be replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC), in 1995 (Rosen 2002). Included in ACT is the plan to phase out all 
protective apparel and textile quotas by 2005, in an effort to open new markets 
throughout the developing world, and to increase the savings of  the low-wage obsessed 
apparel and textile industries. 
10. The BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook lists the apparel industry as “apparel 
and other textile products”. Textile manufacturers, who turn raw material into fabric, are 
listed in a separate industry. 
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11. The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates in their 2003 
“Occupational Employment Statistics” that there are 265, 200 sewing machine operators 
in the U.S. This survey does not include self-employed workers; it asks employers only 
to classify the occupational status of their workers. The “Current Population Survey” 
(CPS), conducted jointly by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
does include self-employed workers. The CPS estimates that there are approximately 
341,000 sewing machine operators. Because the CPS includes both self-employed and 
non self-employed sewing machine operators, I report this figure in the text. It should 
also be noted however that the CPS asks employees (rather than employers) to classify 
their occupational category.   
12. In July 2004, UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees–
formerly ILGWU and ACTWU) and HERE (Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
International Union) merged to form UNITE HERE. According to the UNITE HERE 
website, the union presently represents 440, 000 active members, comprised largely of 
immigrant women and large percentages of African-American, Latina, and Asian-
American workers. The new union represents the following major industry sectors: 
apparel and textile manufacturing, apparel distribution centers, and apparel retail; 
industrial laundries; hotels; casinos; foodservice; airport concessions; and restaurants 
(UNITE HERE 2004).         
13. In 1996, Senators Ted Kennedy and Bill Clay introduced the “Stop Sweatshops 
Act,” federal legislation that would hold manufacturers and some retailers jointly liable 
for labor law violations. The most recent status report in 1999 lists the Act as awaiting 
Congressional Subcommittee review. For updates on Act (and all Congressional 
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legislation), see:  http://thomas.loc.gov/. 
14. Saipan is the capital of the U.S. Commonwealth, Northern Mariana Islands. 
Garments assembled in Saipan are labeled “Made in the USA.” However, wages in the 
factories average about $3.00 per hour---less than the U.S. minimum wage of $5.15, and 
no over-time is paid for a work week that commonly extends to 70 hours. Most troubling, 
workers are often lured from their home country in impoverished places like China and 
the Philippines by recruiters who charge their recruits as much as $4,000 with the 
promise of a good job in “America.” After arriving in Saipan, most garment and textile 
workers  are forced to live in unsanitary, cramped  barracks, where they sleep head to toe, 
and are prevented from leaving by armed soldiers, and barbed wire surrounding the 
barracks (Abad 2003; Stein 1999). 
15. ESA Budget compiled from the Budget of U.S. Government. WHD data for 1993-
1998 were compiled from the Wage and Hour Management Information System 
(WHMIS); data from 1999 were compiled from WHMIS and the current information 
system, Wage and Hour Investigator Support and Reporting Database (WHISARD). Data 
for 2000-2002 were entered by WHD using WHISARD. 
16. The WHD Budget was compiled from the Budget of the U.S. Government. The 
number of WHD investigators was compiled from the WHD database, reprinted in the 
GAO Report Child Labor (2002). It should be noted that the correlation between the ESA 
and WHD budget is (R) =.976.  Given the high correlation between the two budgets, it is 
not necessary to analyze these two independent variables separately upon the dependent 
variables of either WHD investigators or WHD cases. 
17. See endnotes fifteen and sixteen for graph sources.  
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18. As per the measurement system of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL), during the calendar year; and 200,000 =base for 100 
equivalent full-time workers (working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year). Injury and 
illness rates were compiled from the BLS’s annual survey Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses: Counts, Rates, and Characteristics 
19. For the purposes of the above graph, rate of apparel inspections was calculated as 
the number of OSHA apparel industry inspections/number of apparel industry workers x 
100,000. Inspection rates were tabulated using the DOL’s Occupational Safety and 
Health within Industry (SIC 23) data, from the Integrated Management Information 
System (IMIS). Graph 4a and 4b are shown separately as each has a different level of 
standardization that will not permit side by side comparison in a single graph. 
20. OSHA Budget compiled from the Budget of the United States Government. 
Data compiled from the Occupational Employment Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Labor Department. 
21. Data compiled from economagic.com, data file 108, Apparel and Other Textile 
Products, nondurable goods, manufacturing, domestic, corporate profit after tax 
(millions) 
22. Data compiled from economagic.com data file 164: Industrial Production Index: 
Apparel, NAICS=315, 1997=100, SA. Data compiled from economagic.com data file 
164: Industrial Production Index: Apparel, NAICS=315, 1997=100, SA.
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